




AD 747260

A STUDY OF MASS POPULATION  
DISPLACEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC  
OF VIET-NAM

PART II: CASE STUDIES OF  
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

JULY 1969



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13 ABSTRACT <p>This document is the second in a two-part study of mass population movement in the Republic of Vietnam conducted by Human Sciences Research, Inc., in 1967. Part I is entitled <u>Analysis of the Forced Relocation Process</u>; Part II consists of most of the site reports and data on which Part I is based.</p> <p>A total of eleven sites were studied during the course of the project. This volume reports on only eight sites all of which were located in I Corps. The total number of respondents in these sites is 973. Two sites in IV Corps are reported in a separate Field Research Memorandum (No. 7) entitled <u>The Refugee Situation in Kien Giang Province</u>. Data from the eleventh site, Ap Binh Hoa, in Binh Duong Province, III Corps, were analyzed in Part I but there is no report for the site as such.</p> <p>A standard format has been used for all site reports in this volume. Major topics are (1) the resettlement process and (2) characteristics of the evacuee population. Specific topics include: movement, security, land tenure, employment, housing, property community facilities, community activities, leadership, government information, age and sex distribution, productive capability, impact of evacuation on family size, religion, literacy, and attitudes, including future aspirations.</p>		

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## PREFACE TO PART II

This volume contains case studies of eight of the nine refugee resettlements analyzed in Part I of this report.<sup>1</sup> They are recorded here as distinct cases to reveal some of the peculiarities of the refugee resettlement situation at each site, and to bring together the data relevant to a given population.

All eight cases occur in the I Corps area and were selected to represent various types of resettlement situations. The first three cases represent instances of involuntary movement, or forced evacuation, in which the population was deliberately removed from a restricted area as part of a military operation and resettled in temporary or permanent camps. The remaining five cases represent various kinds of voluntary resettlement, in more or less proximity to urban centers and either in or out of government-sponsored refugee camps. These latter cases are grouped into three reports according to the administrative units in which they occur--Quang-Nam Province, Danang Municipality, and Quang-Tri City.

The data recorded in this volume were collected in the Republic of Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1967 in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Refugee Study Project, Phase II. Since Phase I of this project concentrated almost exclusively on Phu-Yen Province, in the II Corps area, the sites of Phase II were chosen from the other Corps areas, mainly from the north where most of the mass population displacement had occurred.<sup>2</sup> A summary of the report is contained in Part I and the reader is referred to it for an overall description of the project, for the identification and geographical location of all resettlement sites discussed in this report, for an exposition of the rationale underlying the collection and analysis of the data, and for clarification of the concepts and terms mentioned herein.

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<sup>1</sup>See: A Study of Mass Population Displacement in the Republic of Vietnam. Part I: Analysis of the Refugee Relocation Process.

<sup>2</sup>A total of eleven sites were studied in Phase II. Nine of these, including the eight sites recorded here and an additional site, Ap Binh Hoa in Binh Duong Province, were analyzed in Part I of this report; the remaining two sites will be separately reported in a forthcoming Field Research Memorandum, "The Refugee Situation in Kien Giang Province."

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Each report contains a separate Table of Contents.

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SITE REPORT FOR  
DMZ EVACUEE RESETTLEMENT SITE  
(Cam-Lo)

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## DMZ EVACUEE RESETTLEMENT SITE (Cam-Lo)


### I. Introduction

About 20 March 1967, the Government of Viet-Nam and its American advisors decided to evacuate all civilians living along the southern border of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in order to build a military barrier to check North Vietnamese infiltration into the South. The heavy fighting in this area between the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the U. S. Marines encouraged this decision. Most of the civilians living in this area were to be resettled at the intersection of National Highway 9 and Highway 558 about one kilometer east of Cam-Lo, a small village located in the Cam-Lo River valley which serves as the headquarters for a district of the same name in Quang-Tri Province (see Map 1). Cam-Lo is also on National Highway 9, 14 kilometers east of Dong-Ha and 10 kilometers south of the DMZ. Once moved, the evacuees would not be able to return to their native hamlets; these were to be destroyed as part of the construction of the military barrier.

In addition to observation of the evacuation effort from planning through implementation, HSR's research team in the Cam-Lo Resettlement Site took a complete census of the evacuees, assigning a serial number to each family; from this base a random sample of 120 families was selected by using a table of random digits. The selected families were then interviewed in depth using the B-5 Questionnaire.

An ideal relocation operation involves six phases: planning, pre-initiation preparation, roundup of the population, movement, temporary relocation, and resettlement. Certain steps should be implemented at each phase if the ultimate strategic objective mentioned above is to be achieved. The following account of the Cam-Lo resettlement effort is divided into sections on these six phases.

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Map 1. DMZ Evacuee Resettlement Site  
(Cam-Lo)

## II. The Resettlement Effort

### Phase I: Planning

On the 14th of May, before the evacuation had begun, one of the authors visited Quang Tri Province and attended a meeting held by the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and MACV<sup>1</sup>, at which the following GVN/U.S. plans were reviewed:

1. The evacuation of the civilians was to begin on the 16th of May, and 120 families were to be moved each day until all were moved. At this rate, the evacuation process would have taken at least one month to complete.
2. Before initiation of the movement, advance warning was to be given to the hamlets that would be evacuated. (This had already begun at the time of this meeting.) This activity was the responsibility of the GVN district, village, and hamlet chiefs who were to visit each hamlet, where security allowed, to make a personal announcement and notify insecure hamlets using leaflets and airplane loudspeakers.
3. A 45-man psy-war platoon (the ARVN 101st) was to explain the reasons for the evacuation to the people, and then encourage, or force if necessary, them to gather up their possessions and go to the loading zones. This team was to divide into 15 three-man groups, and each group was to bring one family out at a time. This team was instructed to tell the people that the forced evacuation was for their own protection, and that they would receive adequate assistance and land at the resettlement site.
4. Each family was to take all of their movable possessions with them, including housing frames, livestock, and rice stocks. Anything left behind would be destroyed.
5. The resettlement site would be located in the Cam-Lo River valley near the Cam-Lo District Headquarters. This area was selected because agricultural development of unused land there was possible, and because the area could be made secure.
6. The U. S. Marines and the ARVN were to transport the people from the loading zones to the resettlement site in Cam-Lo.

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<sup>1</sup>OCO and MACV were the civilian and military advisory groups, now combined and called CORDS.

Fifty military trucks were available for this purpose--15 province trucks, 15 ARVN trucks, and 20 U. S. Marine trucks.

7. Vietnamese Popular Forces were responsible for providing security during the movement from the loading zones to Cam-Lo.
8. At Cam-Lo, the refugees were to be screened, Viet-Cong suspects were to be removed and interrogated, and each family was to be registered. When registered, each family was to receive a relief distribution card with a list of commodities and relief funds to be distributed, and a place on the card was to be provided for the head of household to sign when he received his monthly allotments.
9. Each refugee was to receive temporary relief consisting of 180 piastres and 12 kilograms of rice each month until permanently resettled. The Quang-Tri Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) was to be responsible for the registration process and for the distribution of temporary aid.
10. An ARVN engineering company was to build five latrines, dig several shallow water wells, and erect 73 command tents and 143 general purpose tents to serve as temporary shelters.
11. OCO was responsible for the drilling of a deep water well.
12. Temporary medical care and inoculations were to be provided by an ARVN medical team consisting of two doctors and 25 medics.
13. Each family was to receive a 400 square meter plot of land on which to build their house. Furthermore, each family was to receive 5,000 piastres and 15 sheets of aluminum roofing to build a house with.

In addition to these plans, the GVN Information Service (VIS) and a special representative from JUSPAO had developed the following psychological operations plans:

1. A temporary school was to be established in a tent to keep the children occupied and to provide a low-key propaganda outlet.
2. Entertainment, including culture-drama teams, movies and loud-speakers, would be provided.
3. A weekly newspaper would be provided explaining to the refugees what was being done for them, and why.



## Phase II: Pre-Initiation Preparation

These plans were made well in advance and necessary relief supplies and equipment were stockpiled before the evacuation began. A school near the Cam-Lo District Headquarters was used as a warehouse for the supplies contributed by OCO, MACV, the U. S. Marines, and the GVN.

Necessary personnel were assigned to work at Cam-Lo. ARVN sent an engineering company to construct the camp, build latrines, and set up temporary tents, and a medical team consisting of two doctors and 29 medics to begin immunizations and to provide all other medical care required by the evacuees. The U. S. Marines and Army had provided necessary trucks and tents, and OCO supplied aluminum roofing, cement, and foodstuffs. Furthermore, people with previous experience with forced evacuations and resettlement were on hand at Cam-Lo.

Preparation for the evacuation included the advance notification of the people to be evacuated. This was accomplished by personal announcement made by a GVN district, village or hamlet chief where possible; other forms of notification included the use of aircraft or truck loudspeakers and the dropping of leaflets. This notification process had begun at least one week before the evacuation occurred and was to have been completed before the 16th.

One hamlet learned of the prepared evacuation well in advance and reacted by moving to the resettlement site before the forced evacuation had begun. This was the Catholic hamlet of Lang Dinh in Gio Linh District, whose people, with the able leadership of a Catholic Priest, had by mid-May already completed the construction of 86 houses for 103 Catholic families at the resettlement site and named the new area "Thuong Gio."

## Phase III: Roundup of the Population

The movement began on the 16th of May as planned. The ARVN Psy-War Platoon moved into each hamlet and began bringing families out one at a time. This platoon provided explanations for the movement, helped the families gather their belongings, and moved them to a loading zone. However, for reasons

unknown to this writer, the ARVN and the U. S. Marines launched military operations Hickory, Lam-Son 54 and Beau Charger on the 18th of May. The result of these operations was the evacuation of all the refugees over a period of ten days instead of the planned one-month period. The result of the accelerated movement was that the ARVN Psy-War Platoon could not handle the gathering of all of the evacuees and their possessions.

Although ultimately force or the threat of force was the obvious moving power behind the evacuation, only 48 percent of the interviewees felt that their own movement had been forced; 20 percent felt that the movement was encouraged and the remaining 32 percent reported that the move was voluntary.

Of those evacuees who considered themselves forced to move only about 54 percent reported receiving advance notice of the movement and only about 26 percent had over two days warning; Table 1 shows that just over half of those receiving advance notice heard the news directly from a GVN official, while the remainder heard about the evacuation plans from aircraft or truck loudspeakers and from leaflets. Why the remaining 46 percent of these forced evacuees did not receive advance warning is not clear. Perhaps poor security prevented such notification or perhaps those responsible failed to notify some of the hamlets due to lack of means or other reasons. Table 2 shows that only about 42.6 percent of those who felt they were forced to leave received an explanation from ARVN and 47.4 percent received no explanation at all. Only one respondent received an explanation for the movement from the U. S. forces, even though 15 respondents (26 percent) reported that the U. S. forces were the imposing agent.

The group of evacuees reporting that they were encouraged to move indicates a subtler form of explaining the movement; the imposing agent did not have to resort to force. Table 3 shows that ARVN was responsible for about 71 percent of the encouraged moves and that the nature of the encouragement was the advice to move to a secure place or move to avoid bombing. Thus, the encouragement was strong in that the respondent was told that if he did not move, war and bombs would be forthcoming due to the battles between the NVA and the U. S. Marines in this area. Therefore, it is not surprising

Table 1. Advance Notice to Forced Evacuees  
(n = 57\*)

<u>Receipt of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Advance notice	31	45.6
No advance notice	<u>26</u>	<u>54.4</u>
	57	100.0

<u>Length of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Source of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Less than one day	16	51.6	Personal Announcement		
2-4 days	10	32.3	by GVN official	17	54.8
5-7 days	1	3.2	Aircraft or truck loud-		
Over one week	<u>4</u>	<u>12.9</u>	speaker	9	29.0
	31	100.0	Leaflet	<u>5</u>	<u>16.1</u>
				31	99.9

---

\* Includes only those evacuees who considered their move "forced" rather than "voluntary" or "encouraged."

Table 2. Explanations Received for Forced Movement  
(n = 57\*)

Explanation	Who Explained					Total	Percent
	No One	Village Chief	ARVN	U.S. Forces	Other		
None	27					27	47.4
Move to help ARVN		1	1			2	3.5
Move to government village			5		1	6	10.5
Avoid attack		1	19	1		21	36.8
Other		1				1	1.8
Totals	27	3	25	1	1	57	100.0
Percent	47.4	5.3	43.9	1.7	1.7	100.0	

\* Only 57 of the 120 respondents considered their move forced.

Table 3. Encouragement of Evacuees:  
Nature, Agents, and Reasons for Compliance  
(n = 24\*)

Agent Encouraging Move	Evacuees' Reasons for Complying				Total	Percentage
	Afraid Not to Comply	To Be Secure	To Protect Family	Other		
ARVN	7	5	2	3	17	70.8
Village Chief	3	1	0	2	6	25.0
Americans	0	1	0	0	1	4.2
Totals	10	7	2	5	24	100.0
Percentage	41.7	29.2	8.3	20.8	100.0	

<u>Nature of Encouragement</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Warning of general insecurity	13	54.2
Warning of possible bombing	11	45.8
	24	100.0

\* 24 of the 120 respondents considered their move encouraged rather than forced or voluntary.

to see that the reasons given by the respondents to comply with the encouragements were "afraid not to comply," "to be secure," and "to protect my family."

The evacuees reporting that they moved voluntarily are part of one of the following groups:


- a. The Catholic families who moved before the forced evacuation began. These families did indeed volunteer to move, but only after they knew that the forced evacuation was to occur.
- b. People who moved two or more times. 23 percent of the respondents reported that they had moved before the evacuation began from another hamlet to the one that was forced to go to Cam-Lo. Thus, their first move was a voluntary one, and it was this move, not the later forced evacuation, that was recorded by the B-5 questionnaire.
- c. Some evacuees, even though forced out, may have felt that the decision was their own due to tactful handling on the part of the imposing agent, and thus reported that they volunteered to move.

Over half of these "voluntary" refugees reported various forms of Viet-Cong activity as their reason for moving (Figure 1).

The evacuees' native villages were not cordoned off by the advancing forces, but, instead, as either the U. S. Marines or ARVN moved into a village, the people were brought together and told to collect their possessions and walk to a central collecting point; in some cases, trucks were driven directly to the houses.

No inventory of possessions was made so that the evacuees could be compensated for their losses, which were heavy. Table 4 shows that 24.2 percent of all evacuees retained none of their possessions and no evacuee reported retaining all of his possessions. The table also shows that a majority of the evacuees could bring only more transportable items such as money and extra clothing. Only a few evacuees could bring rice paddy, livestock, furniture, and other large valuable items. All possessions left behind were later destroyed along with the hamlets.

Figure 1. Specific Reasons for Voluntary Refugee Movement  
(n = 39\*)



\* 39 of the 120 respondents considered their move to be voluntary.  
Respondents could cite more than one reason.

Table 4. Retention of Possessions

	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Sample</u>
Retained No Possessions	29	24.2
Retained Possessions	90	75.0
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Totals	120	100.0

Kind of Possession	Number of Citations	Percentage of 90 Respondents Re- taining Possessions*
All Possessions	0	0.0
Money	54	60.0
Paddy	20	22.2
Extra clothing	64	71.1
Kitchen and household utensils	37	41.1
Livestock and/or trade tools	17	18.9
Vehicle	9	10.0
Furniture	27	30.0
Other	6	6.7

\*More than one kind of possession was retained.

All but a few evacuees were moved at once to resettlement centers, so food, water, and emergency medical care were not provided. Nor was any extensive interrogation and screening conducted during this phase, although Allied forces searched houses for weapons and took Viet-Cong suspects as prisoners.

#### Phase IV: Movement

Sixty-four percent of the respondents reported that they were moved to the resettlement site by a GVN or Allied truck (Table 5). The U. S. Marines and ARVN provided over 80 trucks for this purpose (only 50 had been originally planned). Only two respondents said they flew to Cam-Lo and another five respondents said that they moved by boat. This reflects the usage of these forms of transportation only where required or more convenient. The ones flown were from hamlets where conditions prevented the use of trucks, and boats were used to carry people living on or near the coast to Cam-Lo by way of the Cu-Viet and Mieu Giang Rivers.

The large number of respondents reporting that they had to walk is probably due to the fact that some evacuees had to walk to central loading points and others perhaps were reporting on a voluntary movement from one hamlet to another prior to the forced evacuation (see Phase III). All observers reported that transportation was adequate.

Security along the route from the evacuated areas to the Cam-Lo resettlement site was provided by Vietnamese Popular Force units as planned, with additional security provided by the ARVN and U. S. forces involved in the evacuation. Security was adequate; only 14.2 percent of the respondents reported that the Viet-Cong tried to prohibit movement (Table 6), and these efforts by the Viet-Cong were only at the hamlet level before the evacuation began.

Observers of the evacuation reported that the ARVN and U. S. Marines assisted the evacuees with loading and unloading the possessions they brought with them. Food and water were provided to those few who were not moved at once to the resettlement sites. Over 2,000 families were moved directly to Cam-Lo, 500 families were moved to the Gio Linh District headquarters area, and another



Table 5. Means of Transportation

	<u>Number of Refugees Citing</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Walking	27	22.5
GVN/Allied truck	77	64.2
Aircraft	2	1.7
Boat	5	4.2
Other	<u>9</u>	<u>7.4</u>
Totals	120	100.0

Table 6. Viet-Cong Attempts to Influence Movement

	<u>Number of Refugees Citing</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Did nothing at all	83	69.2
Attempted to prohibit movement	17	14.2
Encouraged movement	0	0.0
Interviewee did not know	20	16.7

200 Buddhist families moved to Quang-Tri City. Since the evacuees who moved to these other resettlement sites represented only a small proportion of the civilians evacuated, this study was of the evacuees resettled at Cam-Lo.

#### Phase V: Temporary Relocation

As mentioned in Phase I, the temporary relocation facilities at Cam-Lo were planned to handle 120 families each day for a duration of over one month. However, due to the military operations launched by the ARVN and the U. S. Marines, the evacuees were generated over a period of only 10 days at a rate of over 220 families per day. As a result, the planned facilities and manpower were overwhelmed. The registration and screening process fell behind, and the interrogation center did not operate at all. The number of personnel available to distribute temporary aid was inadequate, and this process fell behind. The SCR in Saigon dispatched a Mobile Cadre Team to help with the temporary aid distribution, and the families were registered and provided temporary shelter. The latrines were hurriedly made usable, and a team from the 29th Civil Affairs Company was dispatched by the U. S. Army to help with logistical problems.

The ARVN Medical Team could not handle all of the medical problems, so a full Medcap Team from the 3rd Marines and two doctors from the 3rd Medical Battalion were sent to assist with medical care and with plague and cholera immunizations. Furthermore, the Naval Support Activity in Danang sent six immunization teams to help, but only about one-half of the refugees had been inoculated by the fifth of June.

The temporary school and entertainment plans never materialized. The only psychological operations activity was the distribution of one issue of the newspaper and some leaflets, and the daily broadcasts of Radio Saigon over one loudspeaker by the Vietnamese Information Service that had moved from Truong-Luong District along with the refugees.

Water quickly became a problem as all but one of the shallow water wells went dry. The 3rd Marines' 11th Engineering Battalion provided the SCR with a water truck to haul water from the river to supplement the inadequate water supply provided by only one shallow and one deep well.

Nevertheless, the evacuees were finally all registered and provided with shelter in the temporary tents and long tin houses. Furthermore, temporary aid consisting of food commodities and money was distributed. Figure 2 shows that 80.2 percent of the respondents reported that they received money and food from the government.

## Phase VI: Resettlement

### Introduction

The Cam-Lo resettlement program was the direct responsibility of the Quang-Tri Province Chief, and he appointed a representative, a young ARVN Captain who commanded the Engineering Company, to direct the camp activities. However, the Vietnamese I Corps Commander also sent a representative, an ARVN Major, to Cam-Lo. Furthermore, the Province SCR Chief is, of course, responsible for all refugees in the province, including the evacuees at Cam-Lo. Thus, the question of who is in charge is a confused one. Nevertheless, the various authorities appeared to work together well, and responsibilities in the camp were broken down as follows:

- The Province Chief's representative was in charge of camp construction and security, including the screening process.
- The SCR Province Representative, with the assistance of the SCR Mobile Cadre Team, was responsible for the distribution of all temporary and permanent aid and for the required registration and control process that accompanies any aid distribution.
- The I Corps Commander's Representative acted as a high-level overseer.

### Security

Security at the Cam-Lo Resettlement Site was provided by two Vietnamese Regional Force Companies--one having 30 men and the other having 65 men. This number of troops, according to the American Military Advisors, was not adequate to defend the site. The fact that an estimated 60 Viet-Cong had attacked the area during its initial construction and drove out the ARVN Engineering Company strengthened this viewpoint.

Ninety-seven percent of the evacuees reported that they felt the site was secure, and only 3 percent reported that the site was only sometimes secure or was insecure.

#### Permanent Shelter

By early August, 92.1 percent of the respondents had received a house site and construction materials (Figure 2). At the time of this study, all but a few families had already built their houses or were in the process of building them.


The housing structures provided at Cam-Lo were an improvement over the structures in the evacuees' former hamlets. Table 7 shows that the former houses of 83.3 percent of the evacuees were constructed with a thatch roof and bamboo, thatch or clay walls, and all of the houses at the Cam-Lo resettlement site were constructed with aluminum roofing and wood or bamboo walls. The latter construction is deemed better in Viet-Nam, because aluminum roofing is expensive and considered a status symbol.

Regardless of the improved construction, 95.0 percent of the evacuees reported that their resettlement house was less comfortable than their former house (Figure 3). Clearly factors other than house structure determine house comfort. The ARVN Engineering Company in charge of construction had leveled all existing vegetation with bulldozers giving the area a desolate "military camp" appearance. The wind blew constantly over this barren site, carrying with it the loosened soil, and since it was the dry season, there was no rain to alleviate the dusty conditions. This situation, perhaps also the size of the house, obviously outweighed the advantages of an aluminum roof.

#### Land Tenure

In the premovement site, all but nine of the respondents had access to farmland as owners, renters or both, and over three-fourths of them owned some land (see Table 8). At the resettlement site, however, the government had not distributed any farmland and none of the evacuees had access to any land other than their house sites.

Figure 2. Evacuee Expectations of Government Assistance  
Compared to Actual Government Assistance Received



☐ Premovement expectations of assistance.

☒ Assistance actually received.

\* Respondents could cite more than one category.

Table 7. Premovement House Construction

<u>Type of Construction</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percentage of Evacuees</u>
Tile roof and brick walls	6	5.0
Thatch roof and bamboo or thatch walls	45	37.5
Thatch roof and clay walls	55	45.8
Thatch roof and brick walls	6	5.0
Thatch roof and wood walls	4	3.3
Other	4	3.3

Figure 3. Comparison of Present Versus Former House Comfort




Table 3. Premovement Land Tenure

Mau Owned	Mau Rented					Total
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 or over	3	0	2	0	0	5
4-5.9	6	2	3	0	0	11
2-3.9	14	10	6	1	0	31
0-1.9	17	22	6	1	0	46
Total	49	45	22	4	0	120

Owned but did not rent : 40

Owned and rented : 53

Rented but did not own ; 18

Neither owned nor rented :  $\frac{9}{120}$

American agricultural experts differed on the potential of the area. Some felt that with irrigation during the dry season the hot, dry land could produce cash crops such as tobacco, corn, and other vegetables. Others felt that the land would always be unproductive because the hot wind from the mountains would dry out the soil and the crops. All agreed that the land had no potential for rice farming.

Besides the house sites, the GVN planned to provide the refugees with some riceland located near the river. As this land was being cultivated at the time by native farmers, how the GVN proposed to redistribute the land is unclear.

#### Employment

Other than mentioned above, the government did not attempt to develop any agricultural activities at the resettlement site.


No other employment assistance was provided the refugees, except for the efforts of two American advisors to the SCR. These two men, one civilian with OCO and the other with MACV, had previously revived an abandoned lumber mill in Quang-Tri city. As a result of their efforts, a few of the respondents were employed cutting wood for this sawmill.

Figure 4 shows the changes in the evacuees' occupations since the movement. While 79.3 percent of the evacuees were farmers in their native hamlets and only 0.8 percent of the evacuees were unemployed, no evacuee was farming after resettlement and 47.5 percent were unemployed at the resettlement site. Furthermore, the number of women who were only housewives and not part of the labor force increased from the premovement 5.0 percent to 21.5 percent after the evacuation.

There was a slight increase in the number of evacuees in the military and working as laborers after the movement. This indicates that a few evacuees found these opportunities to earn a living.



Figure 4. Changes in Occupation Since Movement  
(n = 261)\*



\* Each Respondent cited occupations for each of his family members.

\*\* Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG.

The evacuees themselves confirm the lack of employment potential in Cam-Lo. Figure 5 shows that 96.7 percent of the evacuees reported their employment situation to be worse than in their former hamlets. Only four respondents (3.3 percent) felt that their present employment situation was the same or a little better than their premovement employment situation.

#### Ownership of Capital Goods

It was explained in the Phase III section of this report that the evacuees had to leave most of their possessions behind in their native hamlets. Table 9 shows that evacuees had not been able to regain their possessions through their own means or through government compensation. For example, over 99 percent of the evacuees reported the possession of chickens in their former hamlets, and only 20 percent had chickens at the resettlement site. This disparity between premovement and resettlement ownership of capital goods is apparent for all livestock, trade tools, vending stock and vehicles.

#### Community Facilities

Table 10 lists premovement community facilities reported by the evacuees as opposed to the availability of these facilities at Cam-Lo.

Educational Facilities. By September of 1967, Cam-Lo was still without a school, but at that time, a voluntary Vietnamese student group called the "Program to Develop School Activities" was building a small school in the site. This was to be a three-room structure, hardly adequate for over 2,500 school-age refugee children.

Since the resettlement site did not have a school, it is not surprising that 86.8 percent of the respondents with school-age children reported that their children did not attend school (Table 11). In contrast, only 33.7 percent of the respondents with school-age children reported that none of their children attended school in their native hamlets. Apparently, the 14 respondents reporting their children as presently attending school must have sent their children elsewhere for their education.

Figure 5. Comparison of Present Versus  
Former Employment Situation




Table 9. Comparison of Possessions:  
Premovement Versus Postmovement

Possessions	Premovement		Postmovement	
	Number Citing	Percent of Respondents Citing*	Number Citing	Percent of Respondents Citing*
Horses, cows, and water buffalo	69	57.5	7	5.8
Pigs	116	96.7	22	18.3
Poultry	119	99.2	24	20.0
Fish ponds	7	5.8	0	0.0
Trade tools	85	70.8	6	5.0
Vending stock	19	15.8	7	5.8
Motorized vehicle	0	0.0	0	0.0
Nonmotorized vehicle	43	35.8	16	13.3

\* Respondents could cite more than one kind of possession.

Table 10. Availability of Premovement and  
Postmovement Community Facilities

<u>Premovement Community Facilities</u>			<u>Facilities Present at Resettlement site?</u>
<u>Community Facility</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percentage of Evacuees</u>	
School	119	99.2	Under construction
Health Service	116	96.7	Yes
Information Service	116	96.7	Yes
Entertainment	89	74.2	No
Cooperative	29	24.2	No
Market	81	67.5	No
Electricity	1	0.8	No
Public well	87	72.5	Yes
Public Transportation	20	16.7	Yes

Table 11. School Attendance of Evacuee  
Children of School Age

Premovement:

School-age children 89  
No school-age children 31

Postmovement:

School-age children 106  
No school-age children 14

	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	30	33.7	92	86.8
Some children attending school	23	25.8	5	4.7
All children attending school	36	40.4	9	8.3
Totals	89	99.9	106	100.0

Health Care. When the medical units who assisted with the temporary medical care and inoculations had departed only one dispensary manned by GVN health cadre remained to meet the medical needs of over 10,000 people. The evacuees reported that they did utilize this service. 70.8 percent of the respondents reported that they went to the dispensary whenever they were ill and 28.3 percent stated that they utilized the dispensary occasionally. Only one respondent did not know that the dispensary existed and thus did not use it.

Water. One of the most critical problems was the shortage of water. All but one of the shallow water wells ran dry, leaving one shallow water well, the deep water well, and the river located over one kilometer away, as the only sources of water. The water truck provided by the Marines' 11th Engineering Battalion was immobilized at the time of the study by a flat tire, and no one was willing or able to repair it. By late August, the U. S. Marines were in the process of solving the water problem by building a water system to pump water from the river to a reservoir in the resettlement site. Once this system was operating, the evacuees would have enough water not only for drinking and bathing but also for small-scale agricultural irrigation.

#### Other Community Facilities

The Government Information Service, while primarily an outlet for Government information, also provides some entertainment by broadcasting radio programs over loudspeakers.

Three types of community facilities, previously enjoyed by some or most of the evacuees, are not provided at the Cam-Lo Resettlement Site. These are cooperatives, a market, and entertainment other than that provided by the information service (see Table 10).

The only public service that was an improvement over its premovement counterpart was the transportation service. Only 16.1 percent of the evacuees enjoyed a public transport system in their native hamlets. In contrast, the Lambretta and bus service that connects Cam-Lo District headquarters with Quang-Tri city now has connections to the resettlement site.

When evacuees were asked to compare their premovement and resettlement community facilities, 56.7 percent reported that the resettlement facilities were worse than their former facilities (Figure 6). 5.8 percent felt that their present community facilities were about the same, and another 37.5 percent felt that the Cam-Lo community facilities were actually better than their former facilities.

#### Exposure to Government Information

Vietnamese are exposed to government information through three major channels: the radio, loudspeakers, and government newspapers/magazines. Radio stations are operated by the GVN; the other channels are utilized by the Information Service. Table 12 shows the percent of the evacuees who cited that they had access to these communications channels. After the evacuation, the number of evacuees with access to loudspeakers remained the same, while more people had access to radio programs. The number of evacuees having access to newspapers and magazines decreased by 10 percentage points after movement. The number of evacuees reporting no exposure to these communications channels is the same for both the premovement and resettlement situations. The evacuees' exposure to loudspeakers after movement is due to the efforts of the Information Service, which has speakers located in the camp. This also can explain increased access to radio programs, as these loudspeakers frequently broadcast government radio programs. The decreased access to newspapers and magazines after movement indicated that the information service was not actively distributing these.

It is obvious, however, that there was no significant increase in government information reaching the evacuees after the resettlement. This indicates a failure of the Information Service to use these communication channels to explain GVN's position in a more active manner to the evacuees.

Figure 6. Comparison of Present and  
Past Community Facilities




Table 12. Communications Media Reaching Evacuees

<u>Medium</u>	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number Citing</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Number Citing</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>
Radio	79	65.8	50	71.7
Loudspeakers	117	97.5	117	97.5
Newspaper/magazine	28	23.3	16	13.3
No Access	2	1.7	2	1.7



### Leadership

In the introduction to this phase, the parties responsible for the resettlement effort were listed. However, these parties were not direct leaders of the various hamlets resettled at Cam-Lo. Instead, the evacuees' former hamlet chiefs and religious leaders, who were living at the site, were the direct government representatives.

When asked about whom they consulted when in need, 86.7 percent of the respondents named their hamlet chiefs, who were now the camp chiefs for separate sections of the resettlement site (Table 13). The 11.7 percent of the respondents who named their religious leader were Catholics; the Catholic Priest was the only religious leader in the resettlement site.

The fact that most of the evacuees turn to their hamlet chiefs for assistance indicates that these officials are quite influential in their communities.

### Travel

Thirty-five percent of the evacuees reported that they did not travel at all. Table 14 shows the activities of those who did travel and the frequency of their trips. Not surprisingly 44.8 percent of those reporting travel indicated that their trips were to a market, since Cam-Lo did not have one. It is surprising, however, that 30.7 percent of this group made business trips. These evacuees may be traveling to locate opportunities to earn a living.

### Community Activities

46.6 percent of the evacuees reported that they did not participate in community activities (Table 15). Of the ones who did participate, their activities were confined to religious ceremonies, weddings, and funerals.

Table 13. Persons Likely to be Consulted  
by Evacuees

<u>Choice</u>	<u>Number of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Hamlet chief or camp chief	104	86.7
Religious leader	14	11.7
Village chief	0	0.0
Friends, relatives, neighbors	0	0.0
District chief	0	0.0
Other	2	1.7
Total	120	100.0

Table 14. Trips Made by Evacuees  
(n = 78)

Frequency of Trips	Reason for Trip					Total	Percent
	Market	Business Require- ments	Visit Friends/ Relatives	Attend Family Rites	Attend Political Meetings		
2-4 trips/year				1		1	1.3
5-7 trips/year						0	0.0
8-10 trips/year	1	1	1	1	1	5	6.4
Once per month	14	9	5		1	29	37.2
Once per week	19	11	2			32	41.0
Daily	1	10				11	14.1
Total	35	31	8	2	2	78	100.0
Percent	44.8	39.7	10.3	2.6	2.6	100.0	

Table 15. Ceremonies Attended by Evacuees  
at Resettlement Site

<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents Citing</u>
None	56	46.7
Buddhist	23	19.2
Catholic-Protestant	15	12.5
Wedding	26	21.7
Funeral	25	20.8
Death Ceremony	2	1.7
Other	4	3.3

### III. Characteristics of the Evacuee Population

#### Demographic Characteristics

##### Age and Sex Distribution

The 120 evacuee families in the study sample are composed of a total of 523 individuals--230 males and 293 females<sup>2</sup>. Figure 7 represents in standard pyramid form data on the age and sex distribution of the refugee population. The underrepresentation of males between the ages of 15 and 49 is particularly striking. The sex ratio (the number of males per 100 females) for this age group is 50 as compared to the sex ratio of 78 for the entire population and 107 for the 0-14 age group. In the Vietnamese context, however, it is not unusual and is undoubtedly due to military recruitment and conscription, both by the GVN and the Viet-Cong. The evacuees reported that 21 males between the ages of 15 and 49 were away serving in GVN forces. By adding in these 21 males, the sex ratio is raised to 68 for this age group, leaving some men still not accounted for. The remaining males not in the population are probably either war casualties or are serving with the Viet-Cong.

It is more difficult to explain the considerable absence of women in the 20-49 age group.

##### Productive Capability


Some 76.5 percent of the evacuees over 15 years of age are reported to be capable of performing normal physical labor (i. e., free of major physical defects). Expectedly, the ratio of disabled to able-bodied persons increases with age with only 29 percent of persons 60 and older being able-bodied.

Assuming that only persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are "producers"--that is, capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs--and that persons outside this age range are consumers

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<sup>2</sup>This sample was randomly drawn from a complete census of the Cam-Lo population. The census counted 2,252 families: 10,644 persons with 4,704 males and 5,940 females. The total population figures are not used here, because complete demographic information was not included in the census.

Figure 7. Population Pyramid



rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratios of various populations. The DMZ evacuee population has 336 producers for 1,000 people--which means that each evacuee producer must support himself plus two other people. While no accurate comparative data for a normal Quang-Tri population is available, a village in Long-An Province had in 1958 (i.e., in the pre-insurgency period), 435 producers per 1,000 population.<sup>3</sup>

In short, this evacuee population has a considerably greater proportion of nonproductive individuals than the norm for rural Vietnamese society and, even if they were effectively "resettled," it is likely to remain a population partially dependent on outside aid to meet its productive deficit.

#### Impact of Evacuation on Family Size

Respondents reported only eight persons being separated from their families during and after the movement, and thus the evacuation had little impact on family size. Two of these were males who joined the government military forces, one went away to school, and one was arrested. The remaining four persons were missing for unknown reasons.

#### Religion

Sixty-five percent of the evacuees follow the traditional Vietnamese faith termed ancestor worship. This faith is primarily Confucianism, influenced slightly by Taoism and Buddhism, and involves the formal worship of ancestors in each individual home. Of the remaining evacuees, 26 percent are Buddhist, and 9 percent are Catholic.

#### Literacy

Each evacuee interviewed was given a card with four printed statements which he was asked to read. The interviewer then asked each respondent questions concerning the content of these statements. If the interviewee could read

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<sup>3</sup>Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51.

and understand three or four statements, he was considered functionally literate. If he could read only one or two of the four statements, he was considered functionally illiterate.

Using this test, 44 percent of the men interviewed and 23 percent of the women interviewed were found to be functionally literate; thus an average of 33 percent of the adult sample were functionally literate. In comparison, when this test was administered to primary school children in a government school in Binh Duong Province, it was found that all of the children in the 2nd form (comparable to the 4th grade in American schools) or above could read and understand all four statements.

The relatively low literacy rate found among the interviewees tested is possibly not indicative of the whole evacuee population. Only the head of each household was tested, not the entire family. As a result, this literacy rate is correct for only older adults in the population. It is probable that the literacy rate would be considerably higher for younger persons.

#### Evacuee Attitudes

To examine the evacuees' attitudes HSR utilized the Cantril scale, explained in detail in Part I, Chapter IV, and other questions including the evacuees' comparisons of their former and present life situations, their future aspirations and their expectations of future government assistance.

#### Cantril Scale Ratings

The Cantril System first has the respondent describe his worst and best possible life situation, and these are given as his worst fears and his highest hopes for the future. When these were asked of the DMZ Evacuees (Table 16), 48.3 percent replied that the worst life situation they could envisage would be one characterized by "misery" and "no education for their children." 63.3 percent replied that peace, happiness, and job security were their highest hopes. Furthermore, 41.7 percent cited no food and insufficient clothing as their worst fears. In this respect, the DMZ Evacuees are quite similar to the other displaced persons studied.

Table 16. Hopes and Fears for the Future  
as Expressed by Cam-Lo Evacuees

Hopes	Number of Evacuees Citing each Category	Percent of Evacuees Citing each Category*
Peace, happiness, easy life	76	63.3
Food, clothing, housing	47	39.2
Money	20	16.7
Education for children	35	29.2
Land	10	8.3
Other	7	5.8
Fears		
No food, clothing	50	41.7
Misery, no education	58	48.3
Sickness, no medicine	47	39.2
War activities	32	26.7
Death	13	10.8
Other	8	6.7

\* Each evacuee was allowed to name as many hopes or as many fears as he desired. Of these, only the first two mentioned are represented in this table. Since multiple citations were commonplace, the number of responses exceeds the number of evacuees interviewed, and if summed, the percentages will exceed 100%.



With fears and hopes defined as above, each evacuee was shown a ladder with ten rungs. Rung 1 represents his lowest possible life situation (i.e., his fears materialize) and rung 10 his highest possible life situation (i.e., his hopes materialize). The evacuees of Cam-Lo were asked where on this ladder their life was five years ago, where it is now, and where it will be five years in the future; the results of this test are shown in Figure 8. The mean level five years ago was between levels five and six. The mean present level was between points two and three, and the future levels averaged out near level five. These results show that the evacuees feel that their present level of life is quite low, but they expect it to improve to a level near the average level of five years ago, a result similar to those found in the other evacuee resettlement sites studied by HSR.

The DMZ Evacuees are also similar to other evacuee groups studied in another way, that is that they are reluctant to speculate about their future level of life. Figure 8 shows that, although the mean past and present ratings are based on responses from 108 evacuees, the future rating is based on responses from only 49 individuals. There appears to be a rather common characteristic among the Vietnamese people to be oriented toward the past or present, with little speculation about the future being manifested.<sup>4</sup>

#### Evacuees' Views of Past and Present Life Situations

A separate section of the interview revealed findings similar to those of the Cantril Scale. When the respondents were asked to compare their present and past life situations, 86.6 percent reported that their present life was worse or much worse than their former one (Table 17). Only 10.8 percent felt that their present life was better.

#### Future Aspirations

The respondents were asked if they had the possibility of two wishes that would come true what would these wishes be. Table 18 shows 28.3 percent

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<sup>4</sup>See Martin Sternin, Robert J. Teare and Peter G. Nordlie, A Study of Values, Communication Patterns, and Demography of Rural South Vietnamese (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., HSR-RR-68/2-Vs, February 1968).

Figure 8. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings  
for Past, Present, and Future




Table 17. Present Life Situation Compared  
to Premovement Situation

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Present much better	0	0.0
Present little better	13	10.8
No change	3	2.5
Present little worse	28	23.3
Present much worse	<u>76</u>	<u>63.3</u>
Total	120	99.9

Table 18. Wishes Expressed by Displaced Persons

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Wealth	25	20.8
Peace	27	22.5
Happiness, easy life	34	28.3
House, clothes, land	15	12.5
Food	10	8.3
Education	9	7.5
Health	26	21.7
Other	9	7.5

cited a happy, easy life, 22.5 percent cited peace, and 21.7 percent cited good health. These results reflect their concerns about food and clothing, the lack of peace in Viet-Nam, and their health. The latter is probably a result of the health problems they were experiencing due to lack of water in Cam-Lo. Cam-Lo evacuees differ from the standard pattern of wishes expressed by other evacuees mainly in that the wish for peace is expressed by only half as many people in Cam-Lo, proportionately, as in the other evacuee relocations.

Respondents were asked about their future plans if the war continued, if peace comes and their present life improves, and if peace comes and their present life doesn't improve. The results shown in Table 19 are clearly polarized. If the war continues, 20.8 percent said they would stay in Cam-Lo, and another 52.5 percent stated that they would just rely on GVN. This response, i.e., reliance on the government, is, for some reason, uniquely high among Cam-Lo Evacuees as compared with other evacuee groups studied. If peace comes, regardless of whether their life situation improves or not, most of the respondents said that they would return to their original homes.

#### Evacuees' Expectations of Future Assistance

Table 20 shows that the evacuees as yet are not self-sufficient, and that they feel they will require continued government assistance--shelter, money, food, and employment--in order to survive.

Table 19. Aspirations on Residence

Aspirations	If War Continues		If Peace Comes and Life Improves		If Peace Comes No Improvement	
	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent
Don't know	10	8.3	1	0.8	2	1.7
Stay here	25	20.8	6	5.0	1	0.8
Return home	1	0.8	98	81.7	104	86.7
Rely on GVN	63	52.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	21	17.5	15	12.5	13	16.8
Total	120	99.9	120	100.0	120	100.0

Table 20. Evacuees' Expectations of  
Future Government Assistance

<u>Type of Assistance</u>	<u>Number of Respondents Citing*</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Nothing	0	0.0
Temporary shelter with monetary and/or commodity assistance	12	9.5
Permanent shelter, a house site with monetary and/or commodity assistance	51	40.5
Employment	52	41.3
Land site for farm	47	37.3
Basic Community Facilities	35	27.8
Money or food	55	43.7

\* Respondents could cite more than one category.

#### IV. Conclusions

The initial objective of evacuating the civilians from the area south of the DMZ in order to construct a military barrier was realized. To what extent the barrier served its purpose is a matter outside the scope of this study. On the nonmilitary side, however, it is possible to examine the evacuation effort and to determine if each of the six phases described earlier were adequately carried out by those in charge. Furthermore, one can assess the adequacies or inadequacies of the resettlement effort by examining the attitudes of the evacuees towards the resettlement effort and towards the GVN.

Plans were made by the GVN and their American advisors well in advance of the evacuation. These covered every phase of the resettlement, and adequate supplies and manpower were provided to carry them out. However, ARVN and the U. S. Marines greatly accelerated the movement by launching three military operations, a factor not known by the planners and thus not considered in their plans.

Original plans called for the ARVN psy-war platoon to explain the purpose of the evacuation to the population, and to bring each family out with all of their possessions. However, the acceleration of the movement prevented these plans from being realized. As a result, many evacuees never received an adequate explanation, and most could not bring all of their possessions.

This phase of the evacuation also suffered from the acceleration of the movement. However, adequate temporary relief, medical care, and shelter were provided due to the increased combined efforts of ARVN, GVN, the U. S. Marines and CORDS.

Most of the evacuees were provided a house site, aluminum roofing, and some money, in order to construct new homes. However, the site for these houses was dry and barren, and more effort should have been directed toward creating a more hospitable environment.

In addition, the community facilities constructed at the site are far from adequate: the evacuees will need more schools, markets, and health facilities to meet their needs.

The water supply for the site was also inadequate for the needs of the evacuees and for the development of the area's agricultural potential. At the time of this study the U. S. Marines were building an excellent water system which should solve this problem.

The most pressing problem in Cam-Lo is the lack of any employment opportunities. It is unlikely that enough industrial potential exists in the area to employ these refugees. The agricultural potential of the area could be developed, but the efforts of agricultural experts will be required to make the land productive. If these efforts are not made by the GVN Agriculture Service and/or the CORDS agricultural advisors, then the refugee families will continue to drift away from Cam-Lo in order to earn a living.

The inadequacies of the resettlement effort in each of the six phases are reflected in the attitudes of the evacuees. They consider their present life to be at a low level compared to their premovement life; they still feel dependent on future government assistance in order to survive, and most of them desire to return to their native hamlets if and when conditions permit.

SITE REPORT FOR  
HUNG-QUANG EVACUEE REGROUPMENT SITE

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## HUNG-QUANG EVACUEE REGROUPMENT SITE

### I. Introduction

The Hung-Quang Campaign is a pacification program that was originated in February of 1967 by the 51st ARVN Regiment to provide additional security in their portion of the Quang-Da Special Zone<sup>1</sup>. The name, Hung-Quang, itself is a word coined by the Regiment which means, "to restore Quang-Nam."

The Campaign has two parts. One is the use of Revolutionary Development (RD) Teams in the more central and populated areas to win over the population to the GVN side and to provide security. The other is the regroupment of people from several scattered hamlets into central "peace" hamlets where adequate protection forces can be provided. The new peace hamlets are located near the people's former hamlets, and they are allowed to return to their fields during the day to work their crops. At night, they must stay within the fences of the peace hamlets, making it easier to detect Viet-Cong movements in the areas of their former villages. Since these people moved from their native hamlets as a result of government action they are technically evacuees, and thus objects of this study.

The peace hamlets are and will be located in the fringe areas on both the east and west side of the RD area. The purposes of this campaign include the following:

- to increase security in the area to the point of being able to turn the area over to the District Chiefs, the National Police, and the Regional and Popular Forces;
- to protect the inhabitants of the area from the Viet-Cong and from the dangers of the war caused by the Vietnamese and American Forces pursuing the Viet-Cong and the North Vietnamese Army;
- to deny the Viet-Cong access to the support, both manpower and material, that they extract from the population; and
- to destroy the Viet-Cong infrastructure.

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<sup>1</sup>The Quang-Da Special Zone is a high priority area for the Pacification Program. The area covers Danang City and Quang-Nam Province.

The area under the 51st Regiment, and thus covered by the Hung-Quang Campaign, is located directly south of Danang City and includes most of Hoa Vang and parts of Hieu-Duc and Dien Ban Districts (see Map 1).

The east flank of the RD area is located along the South China Sea (see Map 1), and as yet, Binh-Ky is the only peace hamlet in this area. At the time of this study, Binh-Ky was under construction with plans calling for 99 houses. Near Binh-Ky, there is a refugee camp called Nuoi Kim-Son under construction, but this is a Hoa-Vang District project that is coordinated with the Hung-Quang Campaign, but not part of it.

The Binh-Ky peace hamlet, the district refugee camp, and most of the population are located in the northern half of the east flank.

The west flank of the RD area covers parts of Hieu-Duc and Hoa-Vang Districts which lay between the RD area and the Annamite Cordillera (see Map 1). In Hieu-Duc, two peace hamlets were under construction at the time of this study: Duong-Lam and Duyen-Son. Both of these hamlets were planned at the beginning of this campaign, but neither were started until late August 1967.


The two sites studied by HSR, Yen-Ne and Le-Son peace hamlets,<sup>2</sup> are located in the Hoa-Vang portion of the west flank, and they were the only peace hamlets completed at the time of this study.

During September of 1967, an HSR interviewing team drew a detailed map of the two peace hamlets, Yen-Ne and Le-Son. From these maps a random sample of houses was drawn. The team then interviewed the families living in the selected houses.

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<sup>2</sup>The names Yen-Ne and Le-Son are used in this text in reference only to the peace hamlets, and these should not be confused with the two nearby native hamlets with the same names.

Map 1. Hung-Quang Evacuee Regroupment Site



An ideal type relocation operation involves six phases--planning, pre-initiation preparation, roundup of the evacuees, movement, temporary relocation, and resettlement. Certain steps should be implemented at each phase if the ultimate strategic objectives are to be achieved. These phases are individually dealt with in the following presentation.

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## II. The Resettlement Effort

### Phase I: Planning

As described in the introduction, this regroupment is part of an overall plan to pacify a large area covering three districts. Plans for the regroupment itself were made along with the overall pacification plans in early 1967. Thus, the regroupment was planned in detail in advance of the movement.

The whole regroupment operation was to be handled by the 51st ARVN Regiment. The Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) was not involved in the program, and the only American assistance was cement and foodstuffs provided by CORDS. ARVN was to be responsible for carrying out the movement and for resettling the evacuees. However, all of the Regiment's efforts were coordinated with the GVN District Chiefs.

These plans called for providing advance notification to those to be moved. The people were to be encouraged to move at first, and if they did not agree, they were to be told that they would be forced out in the near future.

This movement was not a resettlement operation, but a regroupment. In other words, the evacuees only had to move from their various hamlets to one new peace hamlet located only one or two kilometers away. They could easily walk so transportation was not required. Since after moving they were allowed to return at will to their native hamlets during daylight hours, they had ample opportunity to move all of their possessions.

### Phase II: Pre-Initiation Preparation

Construction of the first peace hamlet, Yen-Ne, began during this phase. Vietnamese soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, began building the defense perimeter for the hamlet and started the construction of some housing. CORDS supplied cement and aluminum roofing for this construction.

During this phase, ARVN and GVN began warning the people that they would have to move.

Table 1. Advance Notice to Forced Evacuees  
(n=41\*)

<u>Receipt of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Advance notice	25	61.0
No advance notice	16	39.0
	<u>41</u>	<u>100.0</u>

<u>Length of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Source of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Less than one day	3	12.0	Personal announcement		
2-4 days	2	8.0	by GVN official	10	40.0
5-7 days	4	16.0	Aircraft or truck loud-		
Over one week	16	64.0	speaker	14	56.0
	<u>25</u>	<u>100.0</u>	Leaflet	0	0.0
			Other	1	4.0
				<u>25</u>	<u>100.0</u>

---

\*Includes only those evacuees who considered their move "forced" rather than "voluntary" or "encouraged."

### Phase III: Roundup of the Evacuees

Only 41 (31.5%) of the respondents claimed to have been forced to leave. Of the rest, 37 (28.5%) claimed to have been encouraged, and 52 (40.%) felt that the move was voluntary.

Of those evacuees who considered themselves forced to move, 61 percent reported that they received advance notice of the regroupment and 39 percent stated that they received over one week advance notice (Table 1). The source of this advance notice was ARVN (56.%) and GVN hamlet and village officials (40.%). Most of the forced evacuees (82.9%) reported that they were forced to move by the ARVN and only seven (17.1%) reported being forced out by U. S. forces. The latter group apparently were forced to move during a U. S. Marine Operation in the area.

Explanations for the forced movement were made during this phase. Table 2 shows that 70.7 percent of the evacuees received explanations, mostly from ARVN. The large percentage of respondents who reported that they were not forced to move belong to one of the following groups:

- Some of the respondents were talking about a move made prior to the forced regroupment. In fact, 67.7 percent made one move before this one and 10.8 percent made two or more moves before the regroupment.
- During this phase of the operation, ARVN made an attempt to follow up their advance notification with specific encouragements to move and many complied; 89.2 percent of the respondents who reported that they were encouraged to move said that they were encouraged by ARVN. The nature of this encouragement included moving to a secure place, moving to avoid bombing, and offers of government assistance (Table 3).
- A few voluntary refugees moved into the peace hamlets during this phase and also after Phase IV. The variety of reasons for this voluntary movement indicate the insecurity and war activity that exists in the surrounding area (Figure 1).

As a result of this encouraged and voluntary movement, the Yen-Ne peace hamlet actually started to become populated during this phase. However, all of the people did not move voluntarily or after encouragement, and the Yen-Ne peace hamlet did not become fully populated and the Le-Son peace hamlet was not even in existence until Phase III of this regroupment.



**Table 2. Explanations Received for Imposed Movement**  
(n=41\*)

Explanation	Who Explained						Percent
	No One	Village Chief	ARVN	U. S. Forces	Other	Total	
None	12					12	29.3
Move to help Viet-Cong						0	0.0
Move to help ARVN			6			6	14.6
Move to government village			6			6	14.6
Avoid attack			15	1		16	39.0
Other			1			1	2.4
Totals	12	0	28	1	0	41	99.0
Percent	29.3	0.0	68.3	2.4	0.0	100.0	

\*Only 41 of the 130 respondents considered their move forced.

**Table 3. Encouragement of Evacuees:**  
**Nature, Agents, and Reasons for Compliance**  
(n=37\*)


Agent Encouraging Move	Evacuees' Reasons for Complying				Total	Percent
	Afraid Not to Comply	To Be Secure	To Protect Family	Other		
ARVN	17	14	0	2	33	89.2
Village Chief	3	0	0	0	3	8.1
Americans	1	0	0	0	1	2.7
Totals	21	14	0	2	37	100.0
Percent	56.8	37.8	0.0	5.4	100.0	

<u>Nature of Encouragement</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Warning of general insecurity	28	58.3
Warning of possible bombing	8	16.7
Offer of government aid	12	25.0
	48**	100.0

\* 37 of the 130 respondents considered their move encouraged rather than forced or voluntary.

\*\* Some evacuees cited more than one kind of encouragement.

Figure 1. Specific Reasons for Voluntary Refugee Movement  
(n=59\*)



\* 59 of the 130 respondents considered their move to be voluntary.  
Respondents could cite more than one reason.

ARVN assisted with the movement of possessions and only 11.5 percent of the respondents reported that they did not retain any possessions. Of the group reporting that they retained possessions, 10.4 percent reported that they retained all of their possessions. It was stated in Phase I that the evacuees only had to move one or two kilometers to the peace hamlet and could easily return to their premovement hamlets during the day to collect their belongings and work their fields. Therefore, one would expect that all possessions would be retained, but Table 4 shows a large proportion of respondents reporting the retention of only a few possessions. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that most of the evacuees moved one or more times before the regroupment began (see Phase II), and they reported their retention of possessions for their complete movement including moves made before the regroupment began.

#### Phase IV: Movement

The area from which the regroupment was made is located along the Yen River only about two kilometers east of the two peace hamlets. As a result, transportation was not required since the peace hamlets were within walking distance of the evacuees' former hamlets. Table 5 shows that 98.5 percent of the respondents did walk, and only one respondent (0.8%) moved by truck and another moved by boat.

As the movement was made directly to the peace hamlets, no provisions for food, water, or medical care were required. ARVN forces did help the people carry their possessions.

The area from which the evacuees moved was a contested one, and the Viet-Cong were active in the area. However, only two respondents (1.2%) reported that the Viet-Cong tried to prohibit the movement (Table 6).

#### Phase V: Temporary Relocation

The evacuees moved directly from their former hamlets to the two peace hamlets. Many of the houses in the Yen-Ne peace hamlet were already under construction before they moved, and the evacuees, with help from the ARVN soldiers,

Table 4. Retention of Possessions

	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Sample</u>
Retained no possessions	15	11.5
Retained possessions	<u>115</u>	<u>89.5</u>
	130	100.0

Kind of Possession	Number of Citations	Percentage of 115 Respondents Re- taining Possessions*
All possessions	12	10.4
Money	59	51.3
Paddy	66	57.4
Extra clothing	99	57.4
Kitchen and household utensils	59	51.3
Livestock and/or trade tools	25	19.2
Vehicle	1	.9
Furniture	34	29.6
Other	4	3.5

\* More than one kind of possession was often retained.

Table 5. Means of Transportation

	<u>Number of Refugees Citing</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Walking	128	98.5
Lambretta/Horse Cart	0	0.0
GVN/Allied truck	1	0.8
Aircraft	0	0.0
Boat	1	0.8
	<u>130</u>	<u>100.1</u>

Table 6. Viet-Cong Attempts to Influence Movement

	<u>Number of Refugees Citing</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Did nothing at all	103	78.2
Attempted to prohibit movement	2	1.5
Encouraged movement	0	0.0
Interviewee did not know	25	19.2

began construction of their houses as soon as they were moved. As a result, the evacuees were promptly resettled and this forced relocation did not have a temporary phase.

## Phase VI: Resettlement

### Introduction

This phase of the regroupment, as well as the other phases, was handled completely by the 51st ARVN Regiment. The SCR was not involved with the resettlement of these people and did not provide any form of assistance. CORDS provided foodstuffs, cement, and aluminum roofing to the 51st Regiment for these evacuees.


### Security

The evacuees felt that the peace hamlets were secure; 93.8 percent of the respondents reported that the area was always secure, and only 6.2 percent felt that the area was sometimes or always insecure.

### Relief

Figure 2 shows a comparison of the evacuees' premovement expectations of government assistance (in this case, ARVN assistance) as compared to actual assistance received. Six respondents expected nothing, and only four respondents received nothing. The figure shows that the remaining respondents reported receiving temporary shelter, permanent shelter, or house site and housing materials, money, and food. This figure shows that the evacuees received housing assistance and monetary or commodity assistance beyond their premovement expectations. However, some evacuees expected employment assistance and farmland, which were not provided.

Figure 2. Refugee Expectations of Government  
Assistance Compared to Actual Government Assistance  
 (n = 130)



Most of the evacuees did not have any premovement expectations of assistance from the local populace and friends and relatives. Their expectations proved correct as 88.5 percent of the respondents reported that they received nothing from friends and relatives.

#### Permanent Shelter

The house structures at Le-Son and Yen-Ne peace hamlets compare favorably with the evacuees' premovement houses. Table 7 shows that 66.4 percent of the respondents had houses built with thatch or bamboo in their native hamlets. Only 33.6 percent had houses of superior construction of brick walls and tile or tin roofs. In the peace hamlets, all of the houses had aluminum roofs and thatch or wood walls, and 93.1 percent of the houses had cement or tile floors.

When asked to compare former and present house comfort, 66.9 percent of the evacuees replied that their premovement house was more comfortable (Figure 3). Apparently, other factors than house structure affect house comfort, one of which is location. Le-Son peace hamlet was located on a barren sand dune exposed to the wind and the hot sun. Yen-Ne was in a more favorable location with some vegetation and no sand, but many of the houses were exposed to the wind and sun. In contrast, the evacuees' native homes were shielded from the wind and sun by very dense hedgerows and other vegetation.

#### Land Tenure


At the premovement site all but 11 of the respondents had access to land as owners or renters, or both; over half owned some land. In the resettlement site, there are marked decreases in those owning and renting, with corresponding increases in those now claiming to have no access to land (see Table 8). The 31 respondents who owned land in their native hamlets, but not at the regroupment site, are apparently those who had been refugees at least once prior to the regroupment and who lost their land in the earlier move (see Phase II).



Table 7. Premovement House Construction  
(n = 128)

<u>Type of Construction</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage of Evacuees</u>
Tin roof and brick walls	1	0.8
Tile roof and brick walls	15	11.7
Thatch roof and bamboo or thatch walls	85	66.4
Thatch roof and clay walls	0	0.0
Thatch roof and brick walls	27	21.1
Total	128	100.0

Figure 3. Comparison of Present versus Former House Comfort  
(n = 130)



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Table 8A. Premovement Land Tenure

Mau Owned	Mau Rented					Total
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-5.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
2-3.9	1	2	0	0	0	3
0-1.9	30	32	2	0	0	64
None	11	50	2	0	0	63
Total	42	84	4	0	0	130

Owned but did not rent : 31

Owned and rented : 36

Rented but did not own : 52

Neither owned nor rented: 11

130

Table 8B. Postmovement Land Tenure

Mau Owned	Mau Rented					Total
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-5.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
2-3.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
0-1.9	25	11	0	0	0	36
None	52	42	0	0	0	94
Total	77	53	0	0	0	130

Owned but not rented : 25

Owned and rented : 11

Rented but not owned : 42

Neither owned nor rented : 52

130

### Employment


This loss of land is indicated by the present occupations reported by the evacuees. Figure 4 shows that 228 persons (80.3%) were farmers in the pre-movement situation, while 135 persons (47.5%) were farmers after the regroupment. Expectedly, the number of unemployed persons, and housewives increased after the movement, but not to the extent found in other evacuee resettlement sites. For example, the unemployment rate for the DMZ Evacuee Resettlement Site was 47 percent, considerably higher than the Hung-Quang rate of 13.4 percent. This difference is due to the Hung-Quang policy of allowing the evacuees to return to their native fields in daylight hours, and the only persons who cannot return to their fields are those who moved voluntarily from more remote areas before the forced regroupment.

When asked to compare their present and former employment situation, 94.7 percent of the respondents reported their present situation to be worse (Figure 5). Of course, the respondents who lost land and are now unemployed would consider the employment situation to be worse. Furthermore, the respondents who still walk back to their fields would consider a one or two kilometer walk each day enough reason to state that the present employment situation is worse than their former one.

### Ownership of Capital Goods

In Phase III the retention of possessions by the evacuees during the movement was discussed. It was mentioned that many evacuees lost possessions, probably during voluntary movements from more remote hamlets made before the forced regroupment. Table 9 shows that these evacuees have not been able to gain back the possessions left in their native hamlets. Of course, those respondents who no longer have land to cultivate would not have need for such possessions as livestock and farm tools, and the gaining of other forms of possessions may explain the increased number of citations in the "Other" category.

Figure 4. Changes in Occupation Since Movement  
(n=284\*)



\* Each respondent cited occupations for each of his family members.

Figure 5. Comparison of Present Versus  
Former Employment Situation




Table 9. Comparison of Possessions:  
Premovement Versus Postmovement  
(n=130)

Possessions	Premovement		Postmovement	
	Number Citing	Percent of Respondents Citing*	Number Citing	Percent of Respondents Citing*
Horses, cows, and water buffalo	49	37.7	20	15.4
Pigs	119	91.5	83	63.8
Poultry	105	80.8	56	43.1
Fish ponds	0	0.0	2	1.5
Trade tools	76	58.5	33	25.4
Vending stock	33	25.4	15	11.5
Motorized vehicle	0	0.0	0	0.0
Nonmotorized vehicle	13	10.0	9	6.9
Other	53	40.8	93	71.5

\* Respondents could cite more than one kind of possession

### Community Facilities

The evacuees were moved from more remote and scattered hamlets into the centrally located peace hamlets. As a result, community facilities that were available to some of the evacuees in their native hamlets are now available to all. Table 10 lists the more important community facilities and the percent of evacuees reporting that these facilities were available in their native hamlets. The table also shows that all of these facilities, except electricity and cooperatives were available in the peace hamlets.

### Education Facilities

ARVN soldiers were building a new primary school in Yen-Ne peace hamlet at the time of this study. The only other school that was available in the area was located in a neighboring hamlet, and this school was destroyed by a Viet-Cong bombing action. The Yen-Ne school was under construction to replace the bombed school.

Since the new school was unfinished, it is not surprising that the number of respondents reporting that all or some of their children presently attended school was less than the number of respondents with children attending schools in their native hamlets (Table 11). Once the new school is finished it is likely that school attendance will increase. However, the new school will only have three classrooms, and it is unlikely if it will be sufficient for all of the children in the area.

### Health Facilities

A Government Health Service was available in the area for the evacuees, and 86.9 percent of the respondents reported that they utilized this service when they were ill. In comparison, a health service was available to only 66.9 percent of the respondents in their native hamlets, and only 64.6 percent utilized or were able to utilize a health service. Clearly, health care was available to and utilized by more respondents after the movement.

Table 10. Availability of Premovement and  
Postmovement Community Facilities

Premovement Community Facilities			Facilities Present at Resettlement site?
Community Facility	Number of Citations	Percentage of Evacuees	
School	127	97.7	Under Construction
Health Service	87	66.9	Yes
Information Service	109	83.8	Yes
Entertainment	95	73.1	Yes
Cooperative	7	5.4	No
Market	129	99.2	Yes
Electricity	0	0.0	No
Public well	69	53.1	Yes
Public Transportation	34	26.2	Yes

Table 11. School Attendance of Evacuee  
Children of School Age

	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	46	41.8	86	76.1
Some children attending school	38	34.5	17	15.0
All children attending school	26	23.6	10	8.8
Total number of respondents with children of school-age	110	99.9	113	99.9



### Information Service and Entertainment

The Government Information Service was discussed earlier concerning its function of disseminating Government Information. However, the Service also functions as a provider of entertainment and in this sense is also a community facility. Of the respondents, 83.8 percent reported having an Information Service in their native hamlets, and the Information Service located in the resettlement area is available to all. This service broadcasts music and classical Vietnamese plays over the loudspeakers, sponsors traveling entertainment groups, and shows movies.

Private entertainment groups also tour Viet-Nam bringing classical plays and other forms of entertainment to hamlet dwellers. Because the peace hamlets are not as remote as the evacuees' native hamlets, the peace hamlets have more touring entertainment groups visiting them.

### Cooperatives

Only seven respondents reported that a cooperative was available in their native hamlets, and there were no cooperatives available in the peace hamlets.

### Markets

A market was available to all of the respondents in both the premovement and postmovement areas. However, the peace hamlets are less remote than the native hamlets, thus the markets in the resettlement area are better.

### Public Transportation

Public transportation such as buses and lambrettas were available to only 26.2 percent of the respondents in their native hamlets. In contrast, the peace hamlets are both located on a new road built by the U. S. Marines connecting the area to Danang, and buses and lambrettas travel this road daily.

### Conclusions

Overall, community facilities in the peace hamlets are superior to those that existed in the evacuees' native hamlets. When asked to compare their pre-movement and postmovement community facilities, 67.7 percent of the respondents reported that their postmovement facilities were better and 32.3 percent reported these facilities as being worse (Figure 6).

### Exposure to Government Information


In Viet-Nam people are exposed to Government information through three major channels--radio, loudspeakers, and newspapers or magazines. Except for the Communist broadcasts, the radio stations are run by the American Government. Loudspeakers are used by the Government Information Service to broadcast information and radio programs. Newspapers and magazines are published privately or by the Government Information Service and the American JUSPAO. The private publications are sold in the markets, and the Government and JUSPAO publications are distributed by the Information Service.

The respondents were asked if they were exposed to the above communications channels for both the premovement and postmovement situations. Table 12 shows that the respondents' postmovement exposure to loudspeakers and newspapers or magazines was about the same as their premovement exposure, while their exposure to radio increased considerably. The number of respondents citing no access to these communications decreased by eight cases after the movement.

### Leadership

The regroupment program was run by the 51st ARVN Regiment, but both peace hamlets had elected hamlet chiefs. Furthermore, the villages in which these hamlets were located had chiefs and there are always the District chief, elders, religious leaders, and other respected leaders. When the evacuees were asked who they consulted when in need of assistance, 87.6 percent named the hamlet chief (Table 13); 8.5 percent named the village chief, and 3.8 percent named other parties such as friends, relatives, or ARVN officers. None of the respondents cited religious leaders or the District chief.

Figure 6. Comparison of Present and  
Past Community Facilities



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Table 12. Communications Media Reaching Evacuees

<u>Medium</u>	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number Citing</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Number Citing</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>
Radio	31	23.8	64	49.2
Loudspeakers	110	84.6	109	83.8
Newspaper/magazine	13	10.0	12	9.2
No Access	13	10.0	5	3.8

Table 13. Persons Likely to Be Consulted  
by Evacuees

<u>Choice</u>	<u>Number of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Hamlet Chief	114	87.6
Village Chief	11	8.5
District Chief	0	0.0
Other	5	3.8
	<u>130</u>	<u>99.9</u>

Table 14. Trips Made by Evacuees

Frequency of Trips	Reason for Trip						Total	Percent
	Market	Business Require- ments	Visit Friends/ Relatives	Attend Family Rites	Other	None		
Not at all						13	13	10.0
One trip/year		1	1		1		3	2.3
2-4 trips/year	7	2	4	2	2		17	13.1
5-9 trips/year	2	1	3				6	4.6
8-10 trips/year	4	3	2				9	6.9
Once per month	13	7	2				22	16.9
Once per week	20	5	1		3		29	22.3
Daily	14	11	2	2	2		31	23.8
Total	60	30	15	4	8	13	130	99.9
Percent	46.2	23.1	11.5	3.1	6.2	10.0	100.1	

### Travel

Only 10 percent of the respondents did not travel, while the remainder made trips for the various reasons given in Table 14. Most of the traveling was done to visit a market, probably in Danang or in neighboring hamlets.

### Ceremonies Attended by Evacuees

Half of the respondents stated that they did not attend any ceremonies in resettlement areas (Table 15). The remaining respondents attended religious ceremonies, weddings, funerals, death ceremonies, and Dinh ceremonies.<sup>3</sup>

Table 15. Ceremonies Attended by Evacuees  
at Resettlement Site

<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents Citing</u>
None	64	49.2
Buddhist	21	16.2
Catholic/Protestant	1	0.8
Wedding	33	25.4
Funeral	30	23.1
Death Ceremony	10	7.7
Dinh Ceremony	2	1.5
Other	12	9.2

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<sup>3</sup> The Dinh is a community meeting place which is usually a temple built for a village hero. This custom is widespread in Viet-Nam.

### III. Characteristics of Evacuee Population

#### Evacuee Demography

The 130 evacuee households interviewed in this study are composed of a total of 663 individuals--303 males and 360 females. Figure 7 presents in standard pyramid form data on the age and sex distribution of the evacuee population. The underrepresentation of males between the ages of 15 and 49 is particularly significant. The sex ratio<sup>4</sup> for this age group is 30 as compared with the sex ratio of 84 for the entire population and 118 for the 0-14 age group. In the context of Viet-Nam this is not surprising and is undoubtedly due to military recruitment and conscription, both by GVN and the Viet-Cong.

Some 80 percent of the evacuees over 15 years of age are reported to be capable of performing normal physical labor (i. e., free from major physical defects). Expectedly, the ratio of disabled to able-bodied increases with age with only 56 percent of persons 60 and older being able-bodied.

Assuming that only persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are "producers"--that is, capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs--and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers--it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratio of various populations. The Hung Quang Evacuee population has 240 producers per 1,000 people--which means that each evacuee producer must support himself plus three other people. While no accurate comparative data for a normal population in Quang-Nam Province is available, a village in Long-An Province had, in 1958 (i. e., in the pre-insurgency period), 435 producers per 1,000 population.<sup>5</sup>


In short, this evacuee population has a considerably greater number of nonproductive individuals than the norm for rural Vietnamese society and, even if

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<sup>4</sup> A sex ratio is the number of males per 100 females.

<sup>5</sup> Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51.

Figure 7. Population Pyramid



effectively "resettled," it is likely to remain a population dependent, at least in part, on outside aid to meet its productive deficit.

### Literacy

Each evacuee interviewed was given a card with four printed statements which he was asked to read. The interviewer then asked the respondent questions concerning the content of these statements. If the interviewee could read and understand three or all four statements, he was considered functionally literate. If he could read only one or two of the four statements, he was considered illiterate.

Using this test, 34.6 percent of the men interviewed and 16.9 percent of the women interviewed were found to be functionally literate, and 24 percent of both men and women were literate using this test. In comparison, when this test was administered to primary school children in a government school in Binh Duong Province, it was found that all of the children in the 2nd form (comparable to the 4th grade in American schools) or above could read and understand all four statements.

The low literacy rate found among the interviewees tested is possibly not indicative of the whole evacuee population. Only the heads of households were tested, not the entire family. As a result, this rate is correct only for older adults in the population. It is probable that the literacy rate would be higher for younger persons.

### Evacuee Attitudes

In order to study the attitudes of evacuees, the HSR questionnaire included a portion of the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (described in detail in Part I, Chapter IV of this document) and other items attempting to measure evacuees' comparisons of their present and former life situations, their aspirations for the future, and their expectations of government aid in the future.



### The Self-Anchoring Striving Scale

The Cantril Scale begins with an individual describing his highest hopes and his worst fears for the future. These hopes and fears are then used as anchoring points for an equal-interval scale, with the best life assuming a scale value of 10 and being defined as the situation in which all the individual's fondest hopes materialize, while the worst life (i. e., if all the worst fears should come to pass) is assigned a zero scale value. By use of a visual aid, a ten-rung ladder device, the respondent points out where he feels he stands at present on this ten-point scale between best and worst possible life. He then points out where he stood five years ago, and finally where he thinks he will stand five years hence.

Hung-Quang evacuees were quite similar to other evacuees and to volitional refugees in that the most frequently named hopes were those for: peace, happiness, in easy life and job security; then food, clothing, housing; money; and education for one's children (see Table 16). The most frequently named fears of this group were also similar to those of persons in other relocation and resettlement sites. These were fear of: shortages of food and clothing; sickness and no medicine; war; and general misery.


Figure 8 shows the mean scale ratings adopted by Hung-Quang evacuees with regard to the present, the past, and the future. The mean rating on a ten-point scale for the past (i. e., five years ago) was near the midpoint of the scale. The mean present rating is significantly lower than the past, however. And among the relatively few persons who chose to speculate about the future, the mean future rating is higher than the present, but the future is not expected to bring as good a life as what these persons feel they had five years ago. This pattern is again typical of all evacuee groups studied, that is that the past is remembered as having been much better than the present, which they seem to feel is the worst period they have ever experienced. The fact that so few persons made judgments about the future seems typical of the Vietnamese people in that they tend to be tradition-

Table 16. Hopes and Fears for the Future  
as Expressed by Cam-Lo Evacuees

Hopes	Number of Evacuees Citing each Category	Percent of Evacuees Citing each Category*
Peace, happiness, easy life	79	60.8
Food, clothing, housing	54	41.5
Money	39	30.0
Education for Children	17	13.1
Land	5	3.8
Other	7	5.3
<hr/>		
Fears		
No food, clothing	100	76.9
Sickness, no medicine	67	51.8
War activities	40	30.8
"Misery," no education	34	26.2
Death	9	6.9
Other	4	3.1

\* Each evacuee could name as many hopes and as many fears as he desired. Of these, only the first two mentioned are represented in this table. Since multiple citations were commonplace, the number of responses exceed the number of evacuees interviewed and if summed, the percentages would exceed 100%.

Figure 8. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings for  
Past, Present, and Future for Hung-Quang Evacuees



(i. e., past-) or situation- (i. e., present-) oriented, rather than goal- (or future-) oriented.<sup>6</sup>

#### Evacuees' Views of Past and Present Life Situations

When evacuees were asked to compare the situation in which they now live with that in which they lived prior to movement, the results proved quite similar to those obtained by the Cantril method. A total of 76.1 percent of Hung-Quang's evacuees felt their overall situation was worse or much worse than the premovement situation, while only 13.1 percent felt the present was better (see Table 17).

This result is similar to that reported earlier (Figure 5), where it was seen that almost 95 percent of this group felt that the employment situation at the present time is worse than the premovement situation, even though objective measures show that many of these people are still able to return to their former homes to work their fields, and that the unemployment rate is only 12.4 percent of the population, which is relatively low compared to certain relocation sites. Similarly, well over half (66.9%) of the Hung-Quang evacuees felt that their present houses were less comfortable than their old homes (Figure 3).

#### Aspirations of Evacuees

The Hung-Quang Evacuees were asked where they would prefer to live under each of three sets of conditions, viz.: if war continues; if peace comes and life remains otherwise unchanged. Table 18 displays the group's responses to this question. If war should continue, well over 80 percent would remain where they are. This is the majority choice for two other forced relocation sites and five voluntary refugee settlements and camps, also. If peace should come to the country and life improves, however, over 70 percent would return home, while only about 21 percent would remain where they are now. If peace came and life stayed as it is otherwise, only 17 persons or 13.1 percent would not return home.

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<sup>6</sup> See M. Sternin, R. J. Teare, and P. G. Nordlie. A Study of Values, Communications Patterns and Demography of Rural South Vietnamese (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc. (HSR-RR-68/2-Vs), February 1968, p. 62.

Table 17. Present Life Situation Compared with  
Premovement Situation for Hung-Quang Evacuees  
(n = 130)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Present much better	1	0.8
Present a little better	16	12.3
No Change	14	10.8
Present a little worse	41	31.5
Present much worse	58	44.6
Total	130	100.0

Table 18. Aspirations on Residence  
(n = 130)

Aspirations	If War Continues		If Peace Comes and Life Improves		If Peace Comes No Improvement	
	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent
Don't know	2	1.5	3	2.3	3	3.1
Stay here	108	83.1	27	20.8	6	4.6
Return home	1	0.8	94	72.3	113	86.9
Rely on GVN	10	7.7	0	0.0	0.	0.0
Other	9	6.9	6	4.6	7	5.4
Total	130		130		130	

When asked what they would request if given two wishes, the Hung-Quang evacuees gave the plurality vote to wishes for peace; next in line was personal wealth; then came health; then, happiness and an easy life, followed by the wish for a sufficient supply of food (Table 19). Again, this group did not differ, in this regard, from the other evacuee groups studied, and the wishes thus expressed are quite parallel to the hopes expressed in connection with the Cantril scale, as presented earlier.

#### Evacuees' Expectations of Future Government Aid

It would appear from Table 20 that a large number of evacuees feel a lack of self-sufficiency in some areas, and consequently expect the government to provide for them in those areas. Only one of the 130 individuals interviewed expected no aid. In contrast, almost half (47.7%) expect the government to provide aid in the form of money and/or food; over 40 percent feel the government will (or should) provide aid in finding employment. While only about 10 percent of the respondents expect the government to provide shelter and temporary monetary or commodity aid, 36 percent expect that same type of aid for the duration of their refugee status. The other types of specific expectations most frequently mentioned are for government provision of community facilities and land for a farm site.

Table 19. Wishes Expressed by Evacuees  
(n = 130)

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent</u> *
Peace	62	47.7
Wealth	38	29.2
Health	25	19.2
Happiness, easy life	24	18.5
Food	18	13.8
House, clothing, land	9	6.9
Other	5	3.8

\*Due to the fact that each respondent could name up to two wishes, the percentages, based on the number of respondents will total more than 100%.

Table 20. Evacuees' Expectations of  
Future Government Assistance  
(n = 130)

<u>Type of Assistance</u>	<u>Number of Respondents Citing</u> *	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Money, food	62	47.7
Employment	56	43.1
Shelter or house site and monetary or commodity assistance for duration of refugee period	47	36.2
Shelter or house site and monetary or commodity assistance on a temporary basis	14	10.8
Community facilities	44	33.8
Land for farm site	41	31.5
No expectations	1	0.8

\* Respondents could cite more than one category.

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SITE REPORT FOR  
LAM-SON 87 EVACUEE RESETTLEMENT SITE

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## LAM-SON 87 EVACUEE RESETTLEMENT SITE

### I. Introduction

On the 16th of June, 1967, troops from the ARVN 1st Division in Hue and the ARVN Airborne Brigade began a four-day operation, called Lam-Son 87, in Thua-Thien Province. The arena for this operation was a populated narrow strip, about 28 kilometers long and three kilometers wide, located on the southern side of the Phu-Tan Lagoon, directly across from the famed "Street Without Joy." The purpose of this operation was to clear the area of all civilians and make it a free strike zone,<sup>1</sup> thus denying the Viet-Cong a source of manpower, food, and shelter.

The resulting 13,000 evacuees were taken to Phong-Dien and Quang-Dien District Headquarters. Phong-Dien District Headquarters is located on National Highway 1, thirty kilometers north of Hue City. Quang-Dien District Headquarters is located 23 kilometers north of Hue on a small road that runs east from National Highway 1. (See Map 1.)

During September of 1967, an HSR Research Team moved into Thua-Thien Province to study the evacuees. At that time, construction of housing for these evacuees had not been started, so the evacuees were still scattered about, making the process of drawing a random sample to study more difficult. In Phong-Dien District, the evacuees were scattered throughout the district town, making a study impossible, unless the evacuees were called into a central area and interviewed en masse. However, in Quang-Dien District, this study was possible, since the evacuees had found shelter in or around these four central areas (see Map 1).

1. Cong-Lap: This is a center formed around a public high school and a pagoda, located less than one kilometer south of the district headquarters. Evacuee families were found living in the high school, in the pagoda, and with nearby native families.

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<sup>1</sup>A free strike zone is an area that is depopulated or considered completely inhabited by Viet-Cong, in which bombs and artillery may be directed without having permission from GVN and without having an observer to clear the fire.


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2. Khuon-Pho: In this area, most of the evacuee families were living in a primary school, with only a few families living with nearby native families. This is the central market area for the district, and it is located about one kilometer north-east of the district headquarters on the main road.
3. Thach-Binh: Here, 1 1/2 kilometers east of the district headquarters, the evacuees were found in deserted houses located around a Catholic and a Protestant Church. The houses in this area were deserted over a year ago when they were bombed by American aircraft during a Viet-Cong attack on the district.
4. Ban-Cong: This area is located 1 1/2 kilometers north of the district headquarters (by road) and less than a kilometer from the central market area. The evacuees found shelter in a semi-public school located here, and in nearby houses.

Conditions and time prohibited taking a complete census of this area; a study sample was selected by placing interviewers into each of the four areas in numbers in proportion to the estimated number of evacuees living in each area. The interviewers divided each area into parts and interviewed evacuees as randomly as possible.

An ideal relocation operation involves six phases--planning, pre-initiation preparation, roundup of the evacuees, movement, temporary relocation, and re-settlement. Certain steps should be implemented at each phase if the ultimate strategic objectives are to be achieved. The following presentation discusses each of these phases as they occurred in the Lam-Son 87 resettlement.

Map 1 Lam-Son 87 Evacuee Resettlement Site



## II. The Resettlement Effort

### Phase I: Planning

The evacuation was completely carried out by ARVN forces conducting the Lam-Son 87 military operation, and their plans were not available to this writer. However, the ARVN troops were apparently briefed on explaining the reasons for the forced evacuation, as 84 percent of the forced evacuees interviewed by HSR reported receiving an explanation (Table 1). Furthermore, the explanations provided were such that 36.7 percent of the respondents felt that the movement was encouraged and not forced.

As for relocation planning, there apparently was none. For security reasons, the Quang-Dien and Phong-Dien District chiefs and the Thua Thien representative of the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) were not informed of the evacuation until two days before the operation occurred. Since ARVN itself did not plan to resettle the evacuees, but instead turned them over to the District chiefs and SCR, no planning for the temporary relocation and resettlement of the evacuees was undertaken.

### Phase II: Pre-Initiation Preparation

The District chiefs and SCR were not able to stockpile necessary supplies and equipment to handle the 10,000 evacuees, as they were told of having to resettle these people only two days before the evacuees were moved to Phong-Dien and Quang-Dien Districts.

Of the evacuees interviewed by HSR, 29.6 percent reported that they received no advance warning of the move; of those who were warned, 96.5 percent received less than four days notice (Table 1).

Of the respondents reporting receiving an advance notice of the evacuation, only 22.8 percent were notified by a personal announcement by GVN while 70.2 percent reported that they were notified by aircraft or truck loudspeakers.

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Table 1. Advance Notice to Forced Evacuees  
(n = 81)\*

<u>Receipt of Notice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Advance notice	57	70.4
No advance notice	24	29.6

<u>Length of Notice</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Source of Notice</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 1 day	39	68.4	Personal announcement by GVN official	13	22.8
2-4 days	16	28.1	Aircraft or truck loudspeaker	40	70.2
5-7 days	2	3.5	Leaflets	0	0.0
Over 1 week	0	0.0	Not available	4	7.0
Totals	57	100.0	Totals	57	100.0

\* Includes only those evacuees who considered their move "forced" rather than "voluntary" or "encouraged."

### Phase III: Roundup of the Evacuees

The roundup of the civilians, the explanation for the movement, and the security for the evacuation was completely handled by ARVN. They moved into each village during the course of the operation, explained the evacuation to the people, and helped them load their possessions directly onto trucks or helped them carry their possessions to a loading zone.

Most of the respondents, 81 (63.3 percent) felt that they were forced to move; the rest, 47 (36.7 percent) felt that they had been encouraged. In both cases, the agent responsible for this movement was ARVN.

Of the evacuees reporting that they were forced to move 82.7 percent reported receiving an explanation from ARVN with only 1.2 percent receiving explanations from their village chief, and the remaining 16 percent receiving no explanation at all (Table 2). The bulk of these explanations (66.7 percent) were reported by the respondents as statements informing the people that they must move to avoid an attack.

The encouraged movement indicates a more tactful method of explanation employed by ARVN. Thus, these evacuees felt that they were encouraged to move--by warnings of impending military activity and offers of government assistance (Table 3)--and did not have to be forced.

All of the respondents who received explanations reported that they felt that the explanations were reasonable at the time. However, 6 percent of these respondents (four evacuees) reported that they did not feel that the explanations were reasonable after the evacuation.

No inventory of the evacuees' possessions was made so that GVN could compensate for their losses. Ten percent of the respondents reported that they had to leave all of their possessions behind, and none of the respondents were able to bring all of their possessions with them (Table 4). Of the respondents who could bring some of their possessions, most could only bring money, rice paddy, extra clothing, and kitchen and household utensils. Most of the evacuees had to leave large valuable items such as livestock, furniture, and vehicles behind.

Table 2. Explanations Received for Forced Movement  
(n = 81)\*

Explanation	Who Explained			Total	Percentage
	No one	Village Chief	ARVN		
No explanation	13			13	16.0
Move to help ARVN			2	2	2.5
Move to government village			12	12	14.8
Avoid attack		1	53	54	66.7
Totals	13	1	67	81	100.0
Percentage	16.0	1.2	82.7	99.9	

\* Only 81 of the 128 respondents considered their move forced.

Table 3. Encouragement of Evacuees:  
Nature, Agents, and Reasons for Compliance  
(n = 47)\*

Agent Encouraging Move	Reasons for Compliance				Total	Percentage
	Afraid not to Comply	To be Secure	To Protect Family	Other		
ARVN	22	21	1	1	45	95.7
Village chief					0	0.0
Americans					00	0.0
Other		1		1	2	4.3
Totals	22	22	1	2	47	100.0
Percentage	46.8	46.8	2.1	4.3	100.0	

\* 47 of the 128 respondents considered their move encouraged rather than forced or voluntary.

<u>Nature of Encouragement (n = 67)*</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Warning of general insecurity	29	43.3
Warning of possible bombing	15	22.4
Government aid offered	23	34.3
Totals	67	100.0

\* Some evacuees cited more than one kind of encouragement.



Table 4. Retention of Possessions  
(n = 130)

	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Refugee Population</u>
Retained no possessions	13	10.0
Retained possessions	117	90.0
Totals	130	100.0

Kind of Possessions	Number of Citations	Percentage of 117 Respondents Retaining Possessions*
All possessions	0	0.0
Money	62	53.0
Paddy	92	78.6
Extra clothing	88	75.2
Kitchen and household utensils	77	65.8
Livestock and/or trade tools	31	26.5
Vehicle	2	1.7
Furniture	12	10.3
Other	3	2.6

\* More than one kind of possession was often retained.

Everything left behind including the houses would be destroyed by bombs, since the area was to become a free air strike zone.

A screening of the population for Viet-Cong suspects was carried out during this phase. Suspects were arrested, removed from the population, and either interrogated at the scene or back at the operation's command post.

#### Phase IV: Movement

The movement was handled completely by ARVN forces, as were the other phases of the evacuation except the temporary relocation and the resettlement. Most of the evacuees were loaded onto military trucks along with their retained possessions and taken directly from their hamlets to the Quang-Nam and Phong-Dien District headquarters. Thus, Table 5 shows that 85.9 percent of the respondents reported that they moved via military trucks. A few respondents reported that they had to walk or were moved by boats or aircraft. This is due to the fact that some of the hamlets did not have roads, but instead were connected to the outside world by canals and rivers. Thus, ARVN either made the people walk to loading points, or loaded them on boats or helicopters to be transported to the two district headquarters.

The ARVN forces provided the security for the movement, and assisted the evacuees as much as possible. Once the evacuees arrived at the Quang-Dien or Phong Dien District Headquarters, they were turned over to the District Chiefs.

The Viet-Cong made few attempts to stop the evacuation. Only 9.2 percent of the respondents reported that the Viet-Cong attempted to prohibit the movement (Table 6), and these attempts were made before the evacuation began.

#### Phase V: Temporary Relocation

At this point during the evacuation, the ARVN forces turned the evacuees over to the district chiefs and SCR. The district chiefs are, of course, responsible for all of the people in their districts including the evacuees, but the task of providing temporary assistance to, and resettling the evacuees fell to the Thua-Thien

Table 5. Means of Transportation  
(n = 128)

	<u>Number Citing</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Walking	5	3.9
GVN/Allied truck	110	85.9
Aircraft	4	3.1
Boat	9	7.0
Totals	128	99.9

Table 6. Viet-Cong Attempts to Influence Movement  
(n = 130)

	<u>Number Citing</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Did nothing at all	80	61.5
Attempted to prohibit movement	12	9.2
Encouraged movement	0	0.0
Interviewer did not know	38	29.2
Totals	130	99.9

SCR. Due to lack of time and the difficulties mentioned in the introduction of this report, HSR only studied the evacuees at Quang-Dien District.

Given the short lead time, the district chiefs and SCR were not able to prepare adequate temporary assistance and housing. Thus, the refugees had to find shelter in pagodas, in schools, in deserted houses, and with native residents. Furthermore, the province SCR could not handle the distribution of temporary aid, and an SCR Mobile Cadre Team from Saigon was dispatched to the district to help the province staff distribute this assistance to the refugee families. At the time of this study, SCR had already distributed a can of cooking oil to each refugee family, three kilograms of rice to each refugee man, woman, and child, and had paid temporary relief payments amounting to a total of 1,419,150 Vietnamese piastres to 1,956 families (Figure 1).

The Mobile Cadre Team, besides assisting with the above temporary aid, attempted to make an accurate count of all the refugees in the area. To do this, they called all of the refugees in to a central area, checked identification cards and family records, and came up with a total of 570 families. This number is considerably smaller than the number of families to which temporary payments have already been made, but the writer was informed by this cadre team that some refugees did not show up to be counted, and the remainder have already moved to some other area--probably to Hue or back to their former hamlets. At that time, the Mobile Cadre Team was beginning to make a more accurate count with the cooperation of the village and hamlet chiefs.

Figure 1 shows that 71.9 percent of the evacuees reported their pre-movement expectations of government aid as shelter or house site and temporary or permanent assistance. At the time of this study only 9.4 percent had actually received both shelter and assistance, while 88.3 percent had received money and food but no shelter.


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**Figure 1. Evacuee Expectations of Government Assistance  
Compared to Actual Government Assistance Received**  
(n = 128)



As for assistance from the native inhabitants of the district, Figure 2 shows that 57.8 percent expected nothing and 58.6 percent received nothing. However, 39.8 percent of the respondents reported that they received shelter from local inhabitants and some temporary assistance and two evacuees (1.6 percent) reported receiving only some money or food.

The respondents reported that they received even less assistance from friends or relatives (Figure 3). Only 19.6 percent received shelter and temporary or long-term assistance and 7.8 percent received only money and food. Apparently, most of the evacuees did not have friends or relatives living in this area.


Other than this assistance mentioned above, nothing was done for the evacuees. The shelter provided was inadequate, sanitary facilities and emergency health care was nonexistent, and in general, the evacuees were left to find some place to sleep and to survive on the temporary assistance mentioned above. It is not surprising that many, if not most, of the evacuees left the area promptly in search of a better place to begin again or to return to their native hamlets.

## Phase VI: Resettlement

### Introduction

It is not clear whether the evacuees had reached this phase at the time of this study. In terms of housing they clearly had not since the evacuees were living temporarily in pagodas, schools, and with native inhabitants. However, these evacuees had been living in the area for three months, and the community facilities and life were available to them throughout this period. Since these evacuees did not leave the area, they apparently intend to stay and build permanent homes when housing materials are distributed to them by SCR. Thus, they are resettled in terms of community life and consequently, the extent of their resettlement is discussed in this phase.


Figure 2. Evacuee Expectations of Assistance From the  
Local Populace Compared to Actual Assistance Received  
(n = 128)



□ Premovement expectations of assistance  
 ▨ Actual assistance



Figure 3. Evacuee Expectations of Assistance From  
Friends and/or Relatives Compared to Actual Assistance  
Received from Friends and/or Relatives  
(n = 128)



- ☐ Premovement expectations of assistance
- ☒ Assistance actually given

### Housing

SCR was planning to build permanent housing for the evacuees. By the end of September, two months after the refugees were dropped in Quang-Dien, roofing tin was just beginning to arrive from Hue for refugee housing. As a result, the evacuees were living in very crowded conditions in pagodas and schools, or in the homes of native residents. A few more fortunate families were able to take over some abandoned bombed-out houses. These houses were abandoned by their former residents after an Allied bombing that took place when the Viet-Cong attacked the District in 1966.

Table 7 shows the number of respondents reporting premovement houses of certain types of construction. Figure 4 shows the respondents' comparison of premovement and resettlement house comfort. It is not surprising, considering the conditions in which the evacuees now live, that 90 percent of the respondents reported that their present house (or shelter) is less comfortable than their former home.


### Security

The evacuees confirmed the secure nature of the area. 85.0 percent of the interviewees (108 evacuees) stated that the area was secure. Only 18 respondents (14.2 percent) stated that the area was sometimes secure, and only one respondent (0.8 percent) felt that the area was insecure.

Table 7. Premovement House Construction  
(n = 130)

<u>Type of Construction</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Tin roof and brick walls	5	3.8
Tile roof and brick walls	2	1.5
Thatch roof and bamboo or thatch walls	73	56.2
Thatch roof and clay walls	5	3.8
Thatch roof and brick walls	44	33.8
Thatch roof and wood walls	1	0.8
Totals	130	99.9

Figure 4. Comparison of Present versus Former House  
(n = 130)



### Land Tenure

In the premovement site, all but eight of the respondents had access to farmland as owners, renters or both. Two-thirds of them were renters who did not own land (see Table 8).

At the resettlement site none of the evacuees had access to land as owners or renters. Land is not plentiful in this area and most good riceland was already utilized by native residents.

### Employment

While some 73.8 percent of the evacuees were farmers in their native hamlets, the agricultural opportunities were so limited in the resettlement site that only one respondent claimed to till the land there, and the rest had found other forms of employment or were unemployed.

The Quang-Dien District Headquarters is located in a small market area commonly called Sia, with the only industries being trading with the district officials and the ARVN battalion, and rice farming. Hue, the provincial capital, is only about 23 kilometers away by the main district road and National Highway 1. Daily, buses and lambrettas travel this route south to Hue.


Figure 5 shows a comparison of premovement and postmovement occupations cited for individuals over 15 years of age. While only seven persons (2.3 percent) were unemployed and nine (3.0 percent) others were housewives before the movement, 158 persons (53 percent) were unemployed and 23 (7.7 percent) were housewives after the movement. The figure for housewives is given because women are an essential part of the labor force in Viet-Nam. As the portion of people engaged in farming was reduced from 73.8 percent to 1.3 percent, the portion of people employed in other occupations increased slightly after the movement. Figure 6 shows that the vast majority of the people felt that the present employment situation was much worse than in the premovement situation.

Table 8. Premovement Land Tenure

Mau Owned	Mau Rented					Total
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 or over	1	1	0	0	0	2
4-5.9	1	0	0	0	0	1
2-3.9	4	1	4	1	0	10
0-1.9	9	6	8	0	0	23
None	8	34	43	8	1	94
Total	23	42	55	9	1	130

Owned but not rented : 15  
Owned and rented : 21  
Rented but not owned : 86  
Neither owned nor rented: 8  
130


Figure 5. Changes in Refugee Occupation Since Movement  
(n = 298)\*



\* Each respondent cited occupations for each of his family members.

\*\* Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG.

Figure 6. Comparison of Present versus  
Former Employment Situation  
(n = 130)



### Ownership of Capital Goods

The possessions retained by the evacuees during the movement was discussed in Phase III of this report. It is stated there that evacuees had to leave most of their possessions behind. Table 9 shows that the evacuees were not able to gain back the possessions they lost through government aid or through their own means. The percentage of respondents reporting postmovement possessions of livestock, trade tools, vending stock and vehicles had dropped considerably from the percent of respondents who had these possessions in their native hamlets.

### Community Facilities

The Quang-Dien District Headquarters area has most government and nongovernment community facilities, as it is the seat of the District's Government. Since the evacuees came from more remote hamlets, moving to Quang-Dien represented an increase in the quantity and quality of community facilities available to most or only some of the evacuees at their native hamlets, are all available to all of the evacuees at the resettlement site. Each of these facilities is discussed independently in the following pages.

Educational Facilities. There is one six-room public primary school, one five-room semi-public school (primary)<sup>2</sup> and one ten-room public high school in the resettlement area. At the time of this study these schools were housing the evacuees and were not open. However, once the evacuees receive their roofing sheets and build their houses, the schools would again function.

Table 11 shows the percentage of respondents who stated that all or some of their children were attending school in both the premovement and postmovement situations. With the Quang-Dien schools closed, it is surprising that 28 percent of the evacuees had children attending school after the evacuation. Apparently these evacuees were sending their children elsewhere to school.

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<sup>2</sup>Semi-public schools are jointly financed by parents and by GVN, and they were built to teach a vocational curriculum under the Diem government. These schools were built for teenagers seeking vocational training, but due to the lack of vocational teachers and equipment, most of these schools including this one, function as primary schools.



Table 9. Comparison of Possessions:  
Premovement versus Postmovement  
(n = 128)

Possessions	Premovement		Postmovement	
	Number	Percent Citing*	Number	Percent Citing*
Horses, cows, and water buffalo	57	44.6	20	15.6
Pigs	120	93.8	12	9.4
Poultry	121	94.3	20	15.6
Fish Ponds	1	0.8	0	0.0
Trade tools	75	58.6	5	3.9
Vending stock	57	44.5	35	27.3
Motorized vehicle	1	0.8	0	0.0
Nonmotorized vehicle	10	7.8	3	2.3
Other	41	32.0	64	50.0

\* Respondents could cite more than one kind of possession.

Table 10. Availability of Premovement and  
Postmovement Community Facilities  
(n = 128)

Premovement Community Facilities			Facility Present at Resettlement Site
Community Facility	Number of Citations	Percentage of Evacuees citing	
School	127	99.2	Yes
Health Service	126	97.7	Yes
Information Service	124	96.9	Yes
Entertainment	119	93.0	Yes
Cooperative	50	39.1	Yes
Market	73	59.4	Yes
Public Well	68	53.1	Yes
Public Transportation	50	39.1	Yes

Table 11. School Attendance by  
Evacuee Children of School Age

	<u>Evacuee Households</u>			
	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	51	47.2	77	72.0
Some children attending school	41	38.0	24	22.4
All children attending school	16	14.8	6	5.6
Total	108	100.0	107	100.0

Since the schools were closed, it is apparent why the percentage of respondents with no children attending rose from 47.2 percent to 72.0 percent after the evacuation. However, it is doubtful that the Quang-Dien schools can accommodate the evacuee children when they do open, as they are normally filled by native residents.

Health Services. There is a large impressive dispensary located near the district headquarters, with beds, medicine, and trained health cadre. However, there has always been a shortage of medicine, a situation made worse by the influx of refugees.

Nevertheless, 96.9 percent of the respondents reported that they did utilize this dispensary, and 96.0 percent of the respondents reported that they utilized their premovement dispensary. Thus, the evacuees apparently receive medical care at the Quang-Dien dispensary similar to the care they received in their native hamlets.

Information Service and Entertainment. The Government Information Service was discussed previously as the main distributor of Government information. However, this service also functions as a provider of entertainment, and in this capacity it is also a community facility. Since the Information Service at the resettlement area is the central one for Quang-Dien District, it would be an improvement over the Information Services that functioned in the evacuees' native hamlets. Indeed, this service did provide more movies, and other forms of entertainment, such as plays, than the services found in the hamlets.

As for entertainment provided by private touring groups, the area of resettlement had more concerts and traditional musicals than did the respondents' native hamlets. Since Quang-Dien is on a hard-surfaced road only 23 kilometers from Hue, it was not as remote as the evacuees' native hamlets, and therefore touring groups came to Quang-Dien much more frequently.

Cooperatives. A Government Farmers' Association (a cooperative) functions in this area as a supplier of rice seed, fertilizer, corn, small tools, and other farmer needs, at reduced costs. However, since most of the evacuees

do not have land to farm, they do not participate in this Association. In fact, only eight respondents (6.3 percent) reported that they participated in this Association.

This Farmers' Association is available, however, if the evacuees are able to start farming and want to make use of it. In contrast, only 39.1 percent of the respondents reported that cooperatives were available in their native hamlets.

Market. Only 59.4 percent of the evacuees reported that they had a market in their native hamlets. In contrast, the Quang-Dien market (Sia) is available to all, and it is considerably larger than the evacuees' premovement markets.


Public Transportation. Because of direct bus and Lambretta service from the resettlement area to Hue, the public transportation service is superior to any that existed in the evacuees' native hamlets. Indeed, only 39.1 percent enjoyed public transportation at all before moving.

Conclusions. In general, community facilities in the resettlement area are as good or superior to the facilities that existed in the evacuees' native hamlets. When asked to compare their present and past community facilities, 79.7 percent of the respondents felt that their present facilities were similar or superior to the ones in their native hamlets (Figure 7). Only 20.3 percent felt that the present community facilities were worse, and 60.9 percent felt that their present facilities were better than their former ones.

#### Evacuee Exposure to Government Information

In Viet-Nam, people are exposed to Government information primarily through three channels: (1) the Government radio, (2) loudspeakers, and (3) newspapers or magazines. The Government radio broadcasts a program consisting of classical music, popular music and news. Loudspeakers are used by the Government Information Service to broadcast news, music, and often the Government radio programs. Newspapers and magazines are published by private

Figure 7. Comparison of Present and  
Past Community Facilities  
(n = 128)



groups, by the GVN, and by JUSPAO. Private publications are sold commercially, and the Government Information Service distributes the GVN and JUSPAO publications.

Table 12 shows the percentage of respondents citing their access to these forms of communication for both the premovement and postmovement situations. This table shows that the evacuees exposure to radio increased after the movement, while their exposure to loudspeakers and newspapers or magazines decreased. Furthermore, the number of respondents reporting no access to these communications media increased from two to seven after the movement.

It is clear from this data that the Government Information Service in Quang-Dien had not increased the evacuees exposure to communications media and to government information. This can be explained by the fact that no special psyops or information programs have been designed for the evacuees. Instead, the programs normally maintained for the area's native population are the only programs that are available to the evacuees.

#### Leadership

The responsibility for assisting the evacuees is clearly that of SCR as stated in Phase V, but it is the long-term local leadership that will be discussed here. When asked who they turned to with problems, 96 percent of the respondents replied that they consulted their hamlet chiefs or village chiefs (Table 13), and only four (3.2 percent) respondents replied that they normally consulted their elders or religious leaders. This shows that the evacuees consider their hamlet or village chiefs as their leaders.

#### Travel

19.5 percent of the respondents reported that they did not travel at all, leaving 80.5 percent who travel (Table 14). 46.9 percent made market trips (probably to Hue) and 12.5 percent traveled to visit friends and relatives. Twenty-four respondents (18.3 percent) reported that they made business trips, probably seeking opportunities to earn a living.

Table 12. Communications Media Reaching Evacuees  
(n = 128)

	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Medium Cited</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Medium Cited</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>
Radio	43	33.6	61	47.7
Loudspeakers	126	98.4	114	88.4
Newspaper/magazine	14	10.9	2	1.6
No access	2	1.6	7	5.5

Table 13. Persons of Authority Likely to  
be Consulted by Evacuees  
(n = 125)

<u>Choice</u>	<u>Number of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Hamlet chief	96	76.8
Village chief	24	19.2
Elders	1	0.8
District chief	0	0.0
Religious leaders	4	3.2

Table 14. Frequency of Evacuee Travels and Purpose of Trips  
(n = 128)

<u>Frequency of Trips</u>	<u>Does not Travel</u>	<u>Market</u>	<u>Business Require-ments</u>	<u>Visit Friends/Relatives</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
No trips	25					25	19.5
Once per year				1		1	0.8
2-4 trips per year		2	4	1	1	8	6.3
5-6 trips per year		3	1			4	3.1
8-10 trips per month		4	2	3	1	10	7.8
Once per month		17	9	10		36	28.1
Once per week		23	6	1	1	31	24.2
Daily		11	2			13	10.2
Totals	25	60	24	16	3	128	100.0
Percent	19.5	46.9	18.8	12.5	2.3	100.0	

### Participation in Community Ceremonies

Almost half of the respondents (42.2 percent) did not attend any community ceremonies (Table 15); however, the remaining respondents did attend religious ceremonies (mostly Buddhist), weddings, funerals, death ceremonies, and Dinh<sup>3</sup> ceremonies.

Table 15. Evacuee Participation in Community Ceremonies  
(n = 128)

<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Evacuees Citing</u>
None	54	42.2
Buddhist	53	41.4
Catholic/Protestant	9	7.0
Wedding	7	5.5
Funeral	12	9.4
Death Ceremony	5	3.9
Dinh Ceremony	2	1.6
Other	2	1.6

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<sup>3</sup> A Dinh is a village meeting place that is sometimes a temple dedicated to a revered village hero. This custom is strictly a Vietnamese one, and is related to Confucianism.



### III. Characteristics of Evacuee Population

#### Demography

The 128 evacuee households interviewed in this study are composed of a total of 675 individuals--310 males and 365 females. Figure 8 presents in standard pyramid form data on the age and sex distribution of the evacuee population. The underrepresentation of males between the ages of 15 and 49 is particularly significant. The sex<sup>4</sup> ratio for the age group is 37 as compared with the sex ratio of 85 for the entire population and the sex ratio of 113 for the 0-14 age group. In the context of Viet-Nam this is not surprising and is undoubtedly due to military recruitment and conscription, both by GVN and the Viet-Cong.

Some 82.2 percent of the evacuees over 15 years of age are reported to be capable of performing normal physical labor (i.e., free from major physical defects). Expectedly the ratio of disabled to able-bodied persons increases with age with only 61.2 percent of persons 60 and older reported as being able bodied.

Assuming that only persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are "producers"--that is, capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs--and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratios of various populations. The Lam-Son 87 evacuee population has 271 producers per 1,000 people--which means that each evacuee producer must support himself plus 2.7 other people. While no accurate comparative data for a normal population in Thua Thien Province is available, a village in Long-An Province had, in 1958 (i.e., in the pre-insurgency period), 435 producers per 1,000 population.<sup>5</sup>


In short, this evacuee population has a considerably greater number of nonproductive individuals than the norm for rural Vietnamese society, and, even

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<sup>4</sup>A sex ratio is the number of males per 100 females.

<sup>5</sup>Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51.

Figure 8. Population Pyramid



if effectively "resettled," it is likely to remain a population dependent, at least in part, on outside aid to meet its productive deficit.

### Literacy

Each evacuee interviewed was given a card with four printed statements which he was asked to read. The interviewer then asked the respondent questions concerning the content of these statements. If the interviewee could read and understand three or four statements, he was considered functionally literate. If he could only read one or two of the four statements he was considered functionally illiterate.

Using this test, 18.2 percent of the men interviewed and 16.4 percent of the women interviewed were found to be functionally literate, and 17.2 percent of both males and females were literate using this test. In comparison, when this test was administered to primary school children in a government school in Binh Duong Province, it was found that all of the children in the 2nd form (comparable to the 4th grade in American schools) or above could read and understand all four statements.

The low literacy rate found among the interviewees tested is possibly not indicative of the whole evacuee population. Only the heads-of-household were tested, not the entire family. As a result, this rate is correct for only older adults in the population. It is probable that the literacy rate would be higher for younger persons.

### Evacuee Attitudes

In order to study the attitudes of evacuees, the HSR questionnaire included a portion of the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (described in detail in Part I, Chapter IV of this document) and other items attempting to measure evacuees' comparisons of their present and former life situations, their aspirations for the future, and their expectations of government aid in the future.

### Cantril Scale Ratings

The Cantril Scale begins with an individual describing his highest hopes and his worst fears for the future. These hopes and fears are then used as anchoring points for an equal-interval scale, with the best life assuming a scale of ten and being defined as the situation in which all the individual's fondest hopes materialize, while the worst life (i. e., if all the worst fears should come to pass) is assigned a zero scale value. By use of a visual aid, a ten-rung ladder device, the respondent points out where he feels he stands at present on this ten-point scale between best and worst possible life. He then points out where he stood five years ago, and finally where he thinks he will stand five years hence.

The Lam-Son evacuees are quite similar to other evacuee groups studied in the frequency with which they name certain types of hopes and fears (Table 16). The category of hopes which includes peace, happiness, an easy life and job security, that is an overall good life, received as many mentions as did the category including the necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Other hopes frequently mentioned by all displaced persons studied, including the present group, were the hope for education for one's children and the ability to get sufficient money for one's personal use. The most frequently mentioned fears were, in order: shortage of food and clothing; sickness with no medicine; "misery;" and war.


Figure 9 presents the mean ratings assigned to the past, present, and future by Lam-Son evacuees using the Cantril ladder scale. The pattern of ratings for this group is quite similar to those derived for other displaced persons in that the present is rated lower than the past, and the future though not predicted to hold as good prospects as the life experienced five years in the past, is still slightly higher than the present. What does command attention is the fact that the mean "present" ratings of this site is lower than at any other site studied, as is the mean future rating. Thus, though the pattern here is similar to the others, the present and future are viewed much more dimly (in absolute terms) by Lam-Son evacuees than by other evacuees.

Table 16. Hopes and Fears for the Future  
Reported by Lam-Son 87 Evacuees  
(n = 128)

Hopes	Number of Evacuees Citing each Category	Percent of Evacuees Citing each Category*
Peace, happiness, good life	81	62.3
Food, clothing, shelter	79	60.8
Education for one's children	32	24.6
Money	27	20.8
Land	5	3.8
Other	2	1.5
<b>Fears</b>		
No food, clothing	78	60.0
Sickness, no medicine	55	42.3
"Misery"	53	40.8
War	42	32.3
Death	9	6.9
Other	12	9.2

\* Each evacuee was allowed to name as many hopes or as many fears as he desired. Of these, only the first two mentioned are represented in this table. Since multiple citations were commonplace, the number of responses exceeds the number of evacuees interviewed, and if summed, the percentages will exceed 100%.

Figure 9. Mean Scale Ratings for Past,  
Present, and Future for Lam-Son 87 Evacuees



Here, as in other sites studied, the mean future rating is based on a smaller number of individual ratings than are the mean past and present ratings. A recent study indicates that Vietnamese in general tend to be tradition- (past-) or situation- (present-) oriented rather than goal- (future-) oriented, which may help to explain the reluctance of many respondents to speculate about conditions five years hence.<sup>6</sup> This phenomenon may also be due, in part, to the recent and dramatic experience of these individuals which illustrates the lack of control they have over their future activities.

#### Evacuees' Views of Past and Present Life Situation

The Lam-Son evacuees were asked how they would compare their overall life situation at the time of interview with the situation prior to their evacuation. Table 17 shows the results of this question. It is clear that very few Lam-Son evacuees feel they are nearly as well off now as they were in their old homes. In fact, over 95 percent feel that they are worse off now than before. This is a result similar to that reported earlier, where it was stated that Lam-Son evacuees voted decidedly that their employment situation and the comfort of their houses is not presently up to their premovement level.

#### Aspirations for the Future

Respondents were asked what they would do under each of three sets of conditions, viz.: if war should continue; if peace should come and life improves, if peace should come and life stays the same otherwise.

In the first case, as shown in Table 18, while about 55 percent would stay where they are and no one would return home under conditions of war, over 35 percent would rely on the government to tell them what to do. This is the second highest proportion of citations devoted to that response in any site studied,

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<sup>6</sup> Martin Sternin, Robert J. Teare, Peter G. Nordlie, A Study of Values, Communication Patterns, and Demography of Rural South Vietnamese (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., HSR-RR-68/2-Vs, February 1968).

Table 17. Comparison of Present and Former

Life Situations by Lam-Son Evacuees

(n = 127)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Number Responding</u>	<u>Percent of Evacuees</u>
Present much better	0	0.0
Present a little better	5	3.9
No Change	2	1.6
Present a little worse	14	11.7
Present much worse	106	83.5

Table 18. Aspirations of Lam-Son Evacuees

(n = 128)

Aspirations	If War Continues		If Peace Comes and Life Improves		If Peace Comes No Improvement	
	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent
Don't know	4	3.1	1	0.8	1	0.8
Stay here	70	54.7	20	15.6	1	0.8
Return home	0	0.0	106	82.8	126	98.8
Rely on GVN	46	35.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	8	6.3	1	0.8	0	0.0
Total	128		128		128	



forced or volitional. Only in the evacuee group at the Cam-Lo DMZ Evacuee resettlement site was that response given more frequently than here. This appears to convey a high degree of dependency on the part of the Lam-Son evacuees.

If peace should come and life improve, on the other hand, about 83 percent of these same persons would return home and about 16 percent would remain where they are. If life remained unchanged except for the cessation of war, the proportion wishing to return home increases to 98 percent.

It is apparent then, that most of these persons would like to return home, but only under peacetime conditions and that a substantial proportion of the group feel a dependency on the government during their displaced status.

Respondents were also asked what they would request if they were to be granted two wishes for anything they would like to do, have, or be. Responses to this question are presented in Table 19. Here again the Lam-Son evacuees differed little from the pattern of all evacuee groups studied. The largest number of persons would wish for peace; then for personal wealth; an easy and happy life; food; clothing and land; and good health. These wishes are comparable to the hopes expressed in relation to the Self-Anchoring Striving Scale mentioned earlier.

#### Evacuees' Expectations of Future Government Assistance

Table 20 indicates that the most frequently expressed expectation among Lam-Son evacuees was for government provision of shelter or house site and monetary or commodity assistance for the duration of the refugee period. The only other expectations mentioned by more than ten percent of the people were for money and food and for shelter and temporary assistance.

Here again the pattern of expectations is not atypical of forced evacuees, and shows a substantial degree of dependency on the government among these people.

Table 19. Wishes Expressed by Lam-Son Evacuees  
(n = 128)

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Number Responding</u>	<u>Percent of Evacuees</u>
Peace	60	46.9
Wealth	30	23.4
Happiness, easy life	28	21.9
House, clothing, land	22	17.2
Food	23	18.0
Health	19	14.8
Other	11	8.6

Table 20. Expectations of Future Government  
Aid Among Lam-Son Evacuees  
(n = 128)

<u>Expectation</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Evacuees</u>
Shelter and long-term aid	69	53.9
Shelter and temporary aid	13	10.1
Money, food	35	27.3
Employment	7	5.5
Other	4	3.2
Totals	128	100.0

SITE REPORT FOR  
QUANG-NAM REFUGEE CAMP AND  
QUANG-NAM REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

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## QUANG-NAM REFUGEE CAMP AND QUANG-NAM REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

### Introduction


As of mid-1967, Quang-Nam Province had the second highest number of refugees in Viet-Nam, with an estimated 74,000 refugees living in government camps and another 80,000 living outside camps. The present report is based on a study of two Quang-Nam refugee sites. One is the Ngoc Thanh camp on the outskirts of the provincial capital of Hoi-An. The second site is an unofficial refugee settlement (i.e., it is not a government-sponsored camp) in a section of Vinh-Dien hamlet near the Dien Ban District headquarters. (See Maps 1 and 2.)

A census was taken at both sites, giving a refugee population of 481 families at the Ngoc Thanh camp and 210 families at the Vinh-Dien settlement. A random sample was then selected from refugee households that had lived in these areas for less than two and a half years. In the following pages, data collected from the sample households are either compared or grouped together for a composite analysis. Unless otherwise indicated, all tables and figures are based on a sample  $n$  of 118 for the Ngoc Thanh camp and an  $n$  of 120 for the Vinh Dien settlement. Thus the  $n$  equals 238 when the samples are aggregated.


### Ngoc Thanh Refugee Camp

Ngoc Thanh Refugee Camp is located in Cam-Kim Village, Hieu-Nhon District, just south of Hoi-An on the north bank of the Hoi-An River (see Map 2). Refugees have been moving to the Ngoc Thanh site for more than five years, but it was not officially declared a camp until October 1965. More than half of the camp refugees (about 60 percent) came from the section of Cam-Kim Village located on the south side of the Hoi-An River, an area contested by the GVN and Viet-Cong. The sandspit on which Ngoc Thanh is located is the only secure area left in Cam-Kim Village.

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Map 1. Vinh Dien Settlement



Ngoc Thanh Refugee Camp

The sandy soil on which the camp is situated is totally unfit for agricultural purposes. Since most of the refugees were formerly farmers, they now have to seek some form of employment in Hoi-An. The refugees who were formerly fishermen continue to make their living by fishing in the Hoi-An River or the South China Sea.

Due to its proximity to Hoi-An and the presence of some members of a Revolutionary Development Team, Ngoc Thanh is fairly secure. The Viet-Cong could easily infiltrate the camp from across the river, but such incidents were not reported to the interviewing team.

Ngoc Thanh is connected to Dien-Ban and other inland districts by the Hoi-An River. The only other transportation route is a small dirt road leading to Hoi-An.

The Chief of Cam-Kim Village serves also as chief of Ngoc Thanh camp. He is elected and is regarded as the official primarily responsible for the camp population. According to regulations, any refugee may vote if he has lived in the area for more than six months. If the refugee has lived in the area for more than one year, he may run for election. It is the Village Chief's duty to screen every arriving family and determine its refugee status, and to prepare a list of all refugee families to be registered with the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR). Refugee families from hamlets outside Cam-Kim village must have a certificate from their former hamlet chief confirming their refugee status before they can be registered.

Once registered, it is SCR's responsibility to provide the refugee families with temporary relief commodities and funds, and finally resettlement payments, as outlined by the SCR national program. At the time of this study, SCR had not completed the payment of either temporary or resettlement funds to Ngoc Thanh residents.



Ngoc Thanh is more fortunate than most refugee camps in that the Cam-Kim Village facilities were moved into the camp from across the river. Thus, the camp enjoys the presence of the Government Health Service, a five-room public school, an agricultural cooperative, and the Information Service.

The Health Service has a dispensary manned by one male nurse. Medical supplies are inadequate, but not more so than is usually the case in nonrefugee villages.

The government-run elementary school holds classes at five levels of instruction, but it is not large enough for all of the children in Ngoc Thanh. Several private schools also operate in the camp. The government provides teachers and supplies for the public school, but no aid is given to the private schools.

The government-sponsored agricultural cooperative is the only agency with an economic program in Ngoc Thanh. Since there is no tillable land in the area, the cooperative functions only as a consumer's cooperative, offering rice to housewives at lower than market prices.

The Information Service distributes leaflets and magazines, broadcasts music and news over the camp's loudspeaker, and occasionally shows a movie. The information program in Ngoc Thanh is similar to programs directed to non-refugee villages, as the Service does not have a special program for refugees.

The only special programs for refugees in Ngoc Thanh are the relief and resettlement payments made by SCR which were mentioned above, and some work done by the German Knights of Malta. This Catholic voluntary group holds occasional sick calls in the camp and also has distributed 2 1/2 kilograms of rice to every refugee.

### Vinh Dien Hamlet

Vinh Dien Hamlet is located in Vinh-Xuong Village, Dien-Ban District between Hoi-An and Danang. It is situated at the intersection of the main road to Dai-Loc and Thuong-Duc District, on National Highway Number One (see Map 1). Bus and lambretta service is available to Hoi-An and to Danang, and the Vinh Dien River passes through the hamlet providing an additional transportation route to the more remote districts and to Hoi-An. Over the past five years the hamlet has experienced a heavy influx of refugees from outlying Quang-Nam districts who have built their mud and thatch huts among the homes of native residents.

Most of the refugees are farmers who have found that all usable land in the area is claimed by the native residents. Some refugees have been able to find some work as agricultural laborers. Others have found employment in local industries, which include three lumber mills, one ice factory, a bakery, and a limestone crushing facility.

Vinh Dien was formerly the province capital; during the Diem regime the headquarters was moved to Hoi-An. During peacetime the area thrived as a major commercial point lying between southern Viet-Nam and the cities of Hue and Danang, and the closing of the highway to the south by the Viet-Cong has had adverse effects on the area's economy. The influx of refugees has also been an economic blow to Vinh Dien. The population of the area has doubled during the last few years, causing more competition in the labor market and forcing wages down, and increasing the demand for consumer goods and forcing prices to rise. Although some in the native population have complained about the rising prices and crowded conditions caused by refugees, local officials feel that the residents have generally accepted the refugees as people in need.

Despite the presence of security forces, the Viet-Cong have reportedly been able to infiltrate the area and kidnap a few refugees. Local officials believe, nonetheless, that, because male refugees have been recruited into local self-defense forces and the army, and because they are mainly anti-communist, the presence of the refugees has increased security in the area. These officials also believe that the Viet-Cong have been weakened by the loss of population in the areas they control.

Because the Vinh Dien refugees are not in an official government camp, the SCR will not provide assistance unless the local officials approve and submit a refugee application. If a refugee seeks assistance, the Vinh Dien Hamlet Chief will help him fill out the application papers, providing the refugee has a certificate from his former hamlet chief certifying that he is a bona fide refugee. Once the application papers are filled out, they must be approved by both the Village Chief and the District Chief before they are submitted to the SCR. This process takes several months, and generally few refugee applications are approved. By mid-1967 only 300 refugee applications had been approved in Vinh-Xuong Village, and most of these had resulted in little or no assistance for the applicants. Thus, it is the Hamlet Chief and the Village Chief who are primarily responsible for the refugees, but only as new residents in their area. It is the Hamlet Chief who clears a new resident for security and enters the family on the hamlet and village roles.

Refugees have heard promises of assistance by the SCR, and because of these promises they have been encouraged to move to Vinh Dien. However, few refugees have received help from the SCR because of the registration process mentioned above, and because the SCR has not been able to complete its assistance program even in the official camps.

Since Vinh Dien is not a refugee camp, there are no programs directed to the refugees as a group. However, Vinh Dien Hamlet is a district and a village center, and the many local facilities are available to the refugees. These facilities include a government health dispensary, three elementary schools, a district information center, a government-sponsored farmer's association, and a private farmer's cooperative.

The government dispensary is run by two trained health cadre. It is a good one by Viet-Nam standards, but like most others it could use more medicine and trained health cadre to effectively administer to the needs of the population. In addition to the dispensary, several private nurses practice in the area.

One of the elementary schools is a government school operated by the Education Service; it holds classes in the first three levels of instruction. The second is a community school that offers classes at the first five levels of elementary instruction. This school is a joint venture between the GVN and the students' parents. The third school is a private school run by a local teacher who offers the full five levels of primary instruction. Together, these schools are insufficient even for the native student population, and the influx of refugees has worsened the problem of overcrowded schools.

The GVN Information Service has the usual program found in district towns. It distributes leaflets and magazines, broadcasts news and music by loudspeaker, and occasionally shows movies.

The Government Farmer's Association provides corn, rice seed, and other farmer needs to the local farmers at reduced prices. The private cooperative is a joint venture by twelve farmers to provide irrigation for their fields. Since most of the refugees are unable to find land to work, they do not participate in these cooperatives.

## I. Dynamics of Refugee Movement

Refugee movement to both sites was primarily intradistrict and almost wholly intraprovincial. 80 percent of the Ngoc Thanh camp families and 95 percent of the Vinh Dien families were from the same districts in which they resettled. Only six families in the camp and one in the settlement were from another province. The median distance traveled from their homes to the site by the Ngoc Thanh refugees was only one kilometer, as compared to a median distance of 7.5 kilometers traveled by Vinh Dien refugees.


Most of the refugees at both the sites moved of their own volition. Altogether, 224 (94 percent) of the 238 interviewees reported moving voluntarily. Only three respondents indicated that they were forced to move, and 11 said they were encouraged.

### Reasons for Refugee Movement

Refugees could give more than one reason when asked why they had moved. The responses were divided into seven categories as shown in Figure 1. The lack of security due to Viet-Cong activity was cited most frequently, followed by bombing and artillery.


The reasons given for movement can be grouped by causal agent as follows: reasons 1 and 5 are grouped as VC activity, reasons 2 and 3 as GVN/US activity, and reasons 4, 6, and 7 as unattributable to either side. When grouped in this fashion and represented in graphic form (Figure 2), it can be shown that more than half the reasons given at both sites are related to VC activity. (Since the random sample was taken only from refugees who had moved within the last two and a half years, it is impossible to compare the reasons for movement with time of movement as has been done in the other voluntary site reports.)

**Figure 1. Specific Reasons for Voluntary Refugee Movement**  
(n = 108 camp respondents and 116 settlement respondents)



Quang Nam (Camp Respondents)  
 Quang Nam (Settlement Respondents)

Figure 2. Percentage of Refugee Citations of VC, GVN/US,  
or Other Factors as Causes of Movement  
 (n = 153 camp citations and 159 settlement citations)



### Decision to Move

There was some difference in responses between sites when refugees were asked how long the conditions causing them to move had existed in their hamlets before they moved. About one-third (31.3 percent) of the Ngoc Thanh camp respondents, as compared to about three-fourths (73.3 percent) of settlement respondents, reported such conditions existing for a short period of three months or less; the camp, as compared to only 11 percent at the settlement, indicated they had lived under such conditions for a longer period of six months to two years. In general, then, camp refugees had endured conditions causing them to move somewhat longer than the settlement refugees. When respondents were asked how long before actually moving they had decided to move, 45.8 percent at the camp, as compared to 66.7 percent at the settlement, said they had moved within only a week's time of their decision to move. Almost a third (29.6 percent) at the camp, as compared to 8.3 percent at the settlement, indicated they had decided to move at least two months or more before actually doing so. Thus, most of the camp refugees not only lived longer under conditions causing them to move, but many more at the camp than at the settlement decided to move quite some time before actually moving.

### Viet-Cong Attempts to Prohibit Movement

There were similar patterns of responses at the two sites on the question of Viet-Cong prohibition of movement. Table 1 shows that 53.4 percent of the combined sample respondents reported the Viet-Cong did nothing at all to keep them from moving. Another 40.3 percent reported that the Viet-Cong did attempt to prohibit movement. None of the respondents reported being encouraged to move by the Viet-Cong.

### Means of Transportation

The mode of transportation used by most refugees differed measurably between sites. As shown in Table 2, more than three-quarters (77.5 percent) of the settlement dwellers walked to the site, while almost an equal proportion



Table 1. Viet-Cong Attempts to Influence Movement

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Did nothing at all	127	53.4
Attempted to prohibit movement	96	40.3
Encouraged movement	0	0.0
Interviewee did not know	15	6.3

Table 2. Means of Transportation

	<u>Settlement</u>	<u>Camp</u>
Walking	93 (77.5)	26 (22.0)
Lambretta/Horse cart	1 ( 0.8)	2 ( 1.7)
GVN/Allied truck	2 ( 1.7)	0 ( 0.0)
Aircraft	2 ( 1.7)	1 ( 0.8)
Boat	11 ( 9.2)	83 (70.3)
Bus	9 (7.5)	5 ( 4.2)
Other	2 ( 1.7)	1 ( 0.8)

(70.3 percent) of camp refugees traveled by boat. Since most of the Ngoc Thanh camp dwellers came from south of the Hoi An River the high citation by boat travel is not surprising.

#### Concurrent Departure

There is very little difference between sites in terms of the size of units in which refugees traveled. As shown in Figure 3, more than 55 percent of the respondents at both sites reported moving either alone, with members of their own household, or with relatives. Most of the refugees, then, moved individually or in rather small groups. But the data also show that, at both sites, at least a quarter of the respondents moved either with a group of more than 10 other families or with their entire hamlets.

#### Retention of Possessions

Similar proportions of refugees at both sites--25 percent at the camp and 19 percent at the settlement--reported retaining no possessions at all during movement. Of those who retained some possessions, a slightly greater percentage at the camp than at the settlement reported retaining heavier or bulkier items. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the median distance moved among camp refugees was only one kilometer as compared to more than seven kilometers among settlement refugees. More camp refugees no doubt found it easier to return home and gather possessions that they had previously left behind.

#### Resettlement Site Selection

Although the two refugee sites are different in nature in that one is an official government-sponsored camp and the other is an unorganized and unsponsored settlement, Figure 4 shows that there is not much difference between the two populations in the reasons given for selecting the site where they relocated. Some 14 percent at the settlement site reported that the site was arranged by the government. They were probably referring to the actions of district authorities who suggested that refugees who were unable to find a place to live in an official camp might find a living site in Vinh Dien hamlet.

Figure 3. Other Persons Moving with Interviewee





Table 3. Retention of Possessions

	<u>Settlement</u>	<u>Camp</u>
Retained no Possessions	23 (19.2%)	29 (24.6%)
Retained Possessions	97 (80.8%)	89 (75.4%)
Total	120 (100.0)	118 (100.0)

Kind of Possession	Settlement	Camp
All possessions	0 ( 0.0%)	3 ( 3.4%)
Money	82 (84.5%)	65 (73.0%)
Paddy	15 (15.5%)	22 (24.7%)
Extra clothing	86 (88.7%)	77 (86.5%)
Kitchen and household utensils	16 (16.5%)	29 (32.6%)
Livestock and/or trade tools	1 ( 1.0%)	22 (24.7%)
Vehicle	9 ( 9.3%)	10 (11.2%)
Furniture	5 ( 5.2%)	17 (19.1%)
Other	2 ( 2.1%)	4 ( 4.5%)

Figure 4. Refugee Reasons for Relocation at Present Site



## II. Refugee Relief and Resettlement

### Security

When asked if their present location is secure, all but five respondents at both sites indicated that it is. Four camp dwellers and one settlement dweller consider the location only sometimes secure.

### Aid Received by Refugees

Figures 5A and 5B make possible a comparison between sites of refugee expectations of government assistance and the assistance actually received. As can be seen, there is surprisingly little difference between sites in any of the categories. The one exception would be the 81.8 percent at the camp, as compared to the 54.5 percent at the settlement, who expected some kind of temporary shelter or house site. It is noteworthy that almost as many respondents at the settlement (24.8 percent) as at the camp (31.4 percent) reported receiving a shelter or house site and temporary assistance. The figures also show that about one-third at both sites (36.4 percent at the camp and 30.6 percent at the settlement) have not received any assistance from the government. Refugee expectations of assistance from friends, relatives, or the local populace, and the assistance actually received from these sources, varied insignificantly between sites. A little more than half expected nothing from friends or relatives, and about three-fourths received nothing. About two-thirds at both sites did not expect any assistance from the local populace, and more than 80 percent received nothing.

### Housing

When asked to compare the comfort of their present house with that of their former house, only seven percent at the camp said their present house was the same or more comfortable as their former house, as compared to 21 percent at the settlement. Thus, the fact that the government gave housing assistance seems to have mattered little to the camp refugees. Of all voluntary sites studied, the Ngoc Thanh camp population produced the highest percent believing that their present abode is less comfortable than their former one. (See Figure 6.)

Figure 5A. Settlement Refugee Expectations of Government  
Assistance Compared to Actual Assistance Received




Figure 5B. Camp Refugee Expectations of Government Assistance Compared to Actual Assistance Received







Figure 6. Comparison of Present versus Former House



### Land Tenure

The respondents from Ngoc Thanh and Vinh Dien differ markedly in their premovement access to farmland. In Ngoc Thanh, well over half of the respondents claimed that they neither owned nor rented any land, while in Vinh Dien less than one sixth fell in the same category. In their present sites, only one person in Ngoc Thanh and none in Vinh Dien claimed to have any access at all to land other than their house sites. (See Table 4.)

### Employment

Data on the employment situation of refugees over 18 years reflects the impact movement has had on means of livelihood for occupants of both sites. As Figures 7A and 7B show, there was a much broader distribution of premovement occupations among camp dwellers than among settlement dwellers. Before movement, 73.5 percent of those at the settlement were farmers, as compared to 28.6 percent of those at the camp. After movement there were only a very few farmers at either site. Increased numbers at both sites reported occupations as housewives, vendors, laborers. While there were 33 fishermen reported at the camp site, none were reported at Vinh Dien.

There is some difference between sites in assessment by refugees of their present employment situation as compared to their former one (Table 8). There is a slightly greater tendency among settlement refugees to compare their present situation more favorably than their past situation, although the difference is not statistically significant.

### Ownership of Capital Goods


Table 5 presents a comparison of possessions owned in the premovement situation with those owned following movement. The categories showing the biggest percent decreases are the first three--livestock, draft animals, and poultry. The relatively lower ownership of these items among camp dwellers is probably related to the fact that fewer of them listed their premovement occupation as farming.

Table 4. Premovement Land Tenure

NGOC THANH						
Mau Owned	Mau Rented					Total
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0
4-5.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
2-3.9	4	1	1	0	0	6
0-1.9	26	6	0	0	0	32
None	67	11	2	0	0	80
Total	97	18	3	0	0	118
VINH DIEN						
6 and over	1	0	0	0	0	1
4-5.9	1	0	0	0	0	1
2-3.9	10	2	2	0	0	14
0-1.9	32	22	2	1	0	57
None	17	28	2	0	0	47
Total	61	52	6	1	0	120

	<u>Ngoc Thanh</u>	<u>Vinh Dien</u>
Owned but did not rent:	30	44
Owned and rented:	8	29
Rented but did not own:	13	30
Neither owned nor rented:	67	17
	118	120

Figure 7A. Changes in Camp Refugee Occupations




\* Work force consists of the total number of people who are 15 and older. Students are omitted. The respondent answered for entire family.

\*\* Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG.

Figure 7B. Changes in Settlement Refugee

Occupations Since Movement  
(n = 238)\*



\* Work force consists of the total number of people who are 15 and older. Students are omitted. The respondent answered for entire family.

\*\* Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG.

Figure 8. Comparison of Present versus  
Former Employment Situation




Table 5. Comparison of Possessions Owned:  
Premovement versus Postmovement

REFUGEE CAMP				
Possessions	Premovement		Postmovement	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Horses, cows, and water buffalo	19	16.1	0	0.0
Pigs	94	79.7	34	28.8
Poultry	100	84.7	40	33.9
Fish Ponds	1	0.8	0	0.0
Trade Tools	66	55.9	46	39.0
Vending Stock	27	22.9	23	19.5
Motorized Vehicle	2	1.7	3	2.5
Nonmotorized Vehicle	34	23.8	22	18.6
Other	24	20.3	79	66.9
REFUGEE SETTLEMENT				
Horses, cows, and water buffalo	58	48.3	0	0.0
Pigs	116	96.7	45	37.5
Poultry	114	95.0	38	31.7
Fish Ponds	1	0.8	0	0.0
Trade Tools	66	55.0	16	13.3
Vending Stock	9	7.5	10	8.3
Motorized Vehicle	3	2.5	3	2.5
Nonmotorized Vehicle	54	45.0	44	36.7
Other	17	14.2	74	61.7

### Community Facilities

Table 6 shows a comparison of the community facilities available to the refugees in their native hamlets with the facilities presently available to them. A large majority of respondents reported having a school, health service, information service, market, public well, and some kind of entertainment in their native hamlets. All of these, plus other facilities which a majority report not having in their native hamlets are available at the two refugee sites. When asked to compare their present and former community facilities, a large majority of respondents (Figure 9) at both sites indicated that the postmovement facilities were better than those available in their native hamlets. Only 9.2 percent at the settlement and 4.2 percent at the camp considered the facilities formerly available to them as being better than those at the refugee sites.

### Educational Facilities

As Table 7 shows, there is some difference between sites in terms of school attendance by refugee children. At the settlement there has been an overall decrease in school attendance by children of school age. At the camp site, however, attendance has increased overall in the postmovement situation.

### Health Care

As shown earlier in Table 6, 81.5 percent of the total respondents at both sites had reported the presence of a health station in their native hamlets; of these, almost all (95.4 percent) reported regular use of the facility when needed. When camp respondents were asked how often they availed themselves of the camp dispensary, which had been built as the camp was constructed, 63.3 percent indicated they went or would go occasionally and 18.3 percent said they went or would go whenever ill. Another 16.7 percent said they never went (or would not go) to the dispensary. At the Dien Ban settlement site, 50.8 percent said that they went or would go occasionally and another 45.8 percent said they would go whenever ill.



Table 6. Availability of Premovement and  
Postmovement Community Facilities  
(n = 238)\*

Premovement Facilities			Facility Present at Camp?	Facility Present at Settlement?
Facility	Number Citing*	Percent of Respondents*		
School	236	99.2	Yes	Yes
Health Service	194	81.5	Yes	Yes
Information Service	225	94.5	Yes	Yes
Entertainment	173	72.7	Yes	Yes
Cooperative	109	45.8	Yes	Yes
Market	204	85.7	Yes	Yes
Electricity	3	1.3	No	No
Public Well	170	71.4	Yes	Yes
Public Transportation	35	14.7	Yes	Yes

\* The two samples are combined here, since the patterns of responses for the two sites were quite similar.

Figure 9. Comparison of Present and  
Past Community Facilities




Table 7. School Attendance by Refugee  
Children of School Age

	<u>Camp Households</u>			
	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	29	32.6	23	23.0
Some children attending school	24	27.0	32	32.0
All children attending school	36	40.4	45	45.0
Total number of refugees with school age children	89	100.0	100	100.0

	<u>Settlement Households</u>			
	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	20	21.1	37	37.0
Some children attending school	37	38.9	39	39.0
All children attending school	38	40.0	24	24.0
Total number of refugees with school age children	95	100.0	100	100.0

### Cooperatives

As shown earlier in Table 6, 45 percent of the total number of respondents reported the presence of some kind of cooperative in their native hamlets. In the postmovement situations, 28 (23.3 percent) of the camp respondents report presently participating in a cooperative; of these, all but one are in a farmers' cooperative. At the settlement, 13 (11.0 percent) report participating-- nine in a farmers' cooperative and four in a consumers' cooperative.

### Exposure to Government Information

Table 8 shows a comparison of premovement and postmovement exposure to media among refugees at both sites. At both the camp and the settlement more refugees cited exposure to radio than during their premovement situations. Loudspeaker exposure was about the same at the camp but higher at the settlement. Newspaper/magazine exposure changed little for refugees at either site.

### Leadership

When asked whom they consult when they have problems, some 76 percent at the camp and 65 percent at the settlement indicate they contact the hamlet chief or camp chief (Table 9).

### Travel

Each refugee was asked about his travels outside the refugee location. 22 (18.3 percent) of the camp respondents, and 14 (11.9 percent) of the settlement respondents, indicated they made no trips at all. Table 10 shows the frequency and purpose of trips made by the respondents who reported such travels.

Table 8. Communications Media Reaching Refugees

	<u>Camp Households</u>		<u>Settlement Households</u>	
	<u>Premovement</u>	<u>Postmovement</u>	<u>Premovement</u>	<u>Postmovement</u>
Radio	87 (73.7%)	102 (86.4%)	83 (69.2%)	114 (95.0%)
Loudspeakers	112 (94.9%)	115 (97.5%)	97 (80.8%)	111 (92.5%)
Newspaper/magazine	38 (32.2%)	35 (29.7%)	53 (44.2%)	54 (45.0%)
No access	1 ( 0.8%)	0	9 ( 7.5%)	0

Table 9. Persons Likely to be Consulted by Refugees

	<u>Camp</u>	<u>Settlement</u>
Hamlet chief or camp chief	90 (76.9%)	79 (65.8%)
Village Chief	14 (12.0%)	22 (18.3%)
Elders	12 (10.3%)	11 ( 9.2%)
Religious Leader	0	3 ( 2.5%)
Other	1 ( 0.8%)	5 ( 4.2%)

Table 10. Purpose and Frequency of Travel

VINH DIEN SETTLEMENT

Purpose of Travel	Frequency of Travel						
	1 Trip per Year	2-4 Trips per Year	5-7 Trips per Year	8-10 Trips per Year	1 Trip per Month	1 Trip per Week	Total Daily
Market	1	3			12	9	16
Business Requirements	2	6			7	8	5
Visit Friends/Relatives	2	5	1	4	5	4	21
Attend Family Rites		1		1	3	2	1
Watch Game or Theatre							
Attend Religious Ceremonies							
Attend Political Meetings							
Collect Possessions							
Other							
Total	5	15	1	5	27	23	98
Percent	5.1	15.3	1.0	5.1	27.6	23.5	100.0

NGOC THANH CAMP

Market		2		1	8	24	11	46	44.2
Business Requirements				2	6	18	18	44	42.3
Visit Friends/Relatives		1	2		3	1	1	8	7.7
Attend Family Rites						3	3	6	5.8
Watch Game or Theatre									
Attend Religious Ceremonies									
Attend Political Meetings									
Collect Possessions									
Other									
Total	0	3	2	3	17	46	33	104	
Percent		2.9	1.9	2.9	16.3	44.2	31.7	100.0	

### Participation in Ceremonies

Refugees were asked if they participate in religious or traditional ceremonies at their present location. As Table 11 shows, there is somewhat greater participation at the camp than at the settlement, where more than half (57.6 percent) indicated they did not participate in any ceremonies.

Table 11. Participation in Ceremonies

<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Camp</u>	<u>Settlement</u>
None	46 (38.3%)	68 (57.6%)
Buddhist	20 (16.7%)	14 (11.9%)
Catholic/Protestant	5 ( 4.2%)	0
Wedding	40 (33.4%)	37 (31.4%)
Funeral	34 (28.3%)	29 (24.6%)
Death Ceremony	11 ( 9.2%)	8 ( 6.8%)
Dinh Ceremony	0	1 ( 0.8%)
Other	13 (10.8%)	1 ( 0.8%)

### III. Refugee Population Characteristics\*

#### Age and Sex Distribution

Figure 10 presents in standard pyramid form data on the age and sex distribution for the two populations. As with other sites, there is a significant underrepresentation of males in the 15 to 39 age group. The sex ratio for this group is 58 at the camp site and 59 at the settlement site, as compared to a sex ratio of 125 for the 0-14 age group for the two sites combined, and a ratio of 102 for the composite population.

#### Refugee Productivity

Some 92 percent of the camp refugees over 15 years old, and 84 percent at the settlement, are reported to be free of major physical defects and capable of performing normal physical labor.

Assuming that only those persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are "producers"--that is, capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs--and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratios of various populations. The camp has 350 producers per 1,000 people, and the settlement has 312 producers.

#### Effects of Movement on Family Size



Camp and settlement respondents together reported 40 persons being separated from their families during and after movement. Of these, four had joined the military, 26 had found employment elsewhere, four were away at school, and six were missing for unknown (or unexplained) reasons.

---

\* No literacy tests were administered in this site.



Figure 10. Population Pyramid



### Refugee Attitudes

In order to study the attitudes of refugees, the HSR questionnaire included a portion of the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (described in detail in Part I, Chapter IV of this document) and other items attempting to measure refugees' comparisons of their present and former life situations, their aspirations for the future, and their expectations of government aid in the future.

### Cantril Scale Ratings

The Cantril Scale begins by having an individual describe his highest hopes and his worst fears for the future. These hopes and fears are then used as anchoring points for an equal-interval scale, with the best life assuming a scale value of 10 and being defined as the situation in which all the individual's fondest hopes materialize, while the worst life (i. e., if all the worst fears should come to pass) is assigned a zero scale value. By use of a visual aid, a 10-rung ladder device, the respondent points out where he feels he stands at present on this 10-point scale between best and worst possible life. He then points out where he stood five years ago, and finally where he thinks he will stand five years hence.

The concerns (both hopes and fears) expressed by refugees in both the camp and settlement sites, as displayed in Tables 12A and 12B fit very closely the pattern of concerns expressed by refugees in other resettlement sites. In order of the frequency with which camp refugees mentioned them, the hopes which these refugees hold for the future are: peace and personal happiness, money, adequate amounts of food, clothing, and shelter, and education for one's children. The most frequently expressed fears were those of: personal "misery," shortages of food and clothing, sickness, and continuation of war activities. Concerns over personal happiness are prevalent, but the specific concern over life's necessities is widespread, indicating the insecurity of life in a wartime situation.

In order of frequency, the hopes expressed by settlement refugees were: hope for peace and personal happiness and security, the hope for sufficient supplies of food, clothing, shelter, the hope for ability to obtain money in some way, and education for one's children; less than five percent mentioned future ownership

Table 12A. Hopes and Fears for the Future Expressed by  
Refugees at the Quang-Nam Refugee Camp

Hopes	Number of Responses	Percent of Refugees
Peace, happiness, easy life	80	67.8
Money	35	29.7
Food, clothing, shelter	32	27.1
Education for one's children	25	21.2
Other	10	8.4
Fears		
"Misery"	62	52.5
No food, clothing	60	50.8
Sickness, no medicine	44	37.3
War activities	16	13.6
Death	6	5.1
Other	9	4.5

Table 12B. Hopes and Fears for the Future Expressed by  
Refugees at the Quang-Nam Refugee Settlement

Hopes	Number of Responses	Percent of Refugees
Peace, happiness	67	55.8
Food, clothing, house	47	39.2
Money	25	20.8
Education for one's children	16	13.3
Land	5	4.2
Other	10	8.3
Fears		
General "misery"	61	50.8
No food, clothing	52	43.3
Sickness, no medicine	28	23.3
War activities	15	12.5
Death	12	10.0
Other	10	8.3

of land. Their most frequently mentioned fears were of general "misery," lack of sufficient food and clothing, sickness, and continued war activities.

Using these concerns as upper and lower anchoring points, where did this refugee group place itself on the Cantril scale? Figure 13A, giving the mean past, present, and future ratings of the camp refugees show that the present is seen as somewhat less satisfactory than the past. The future is seen as very promising. In fact, these persons are more satisfied with the present situation than are any other group of the nine studied, and are also more optimistic about the future than any other group, and feel that the future will bring even better times than those experienced five years prior to the interview date.

The mean ratings for past, present, and future for the settlement refugee group are given in Figure 13B. These people have fond memories of the past (i.e., five years ago), feel that the present is a low-point in life, being much lower than either the past or the future, about which this group is particularly optimistic on the average. They show, in fact, a greater optimism than did any other group studied but one. This mean future rating is based, however, on a smaller sample of cases than are the other two ratings, indicating that not all people interviewed were willing to express such optimism.

#### Refugees' Comparison of Present and Former Life Situations

Table 14 presents the results of the question which asked refugees to compare the overall situation in which they now find themselves to that experienced prior to their assuming refugee status, i.e., the premovement situation. The camp refugee results are not atypical for refugees as a whole, although somewhat less unfavorable than those for evacuee groups studied. While a decided majority feel the present is at least a little worse, over 20 percent feel that it is at least as good as the premovement situation.

The residents of the settlement responded in much the same way as did other refugee groups. The majority indicated that conditions at the time of interview were at least a little worse than were premovement conditions, while an additional 27 percent feel they were at least a little better off at present.

Figure 13A. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings for Past, Present,  
and Future--Quang-Nam Camp Refugees




Figure 13B. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings for Past, Present,  
and Future--Quang-Nam Settlement Refugees




Table 14. Refugees' Comparisons of Present and  
Former Overall Life Situations

REFUGEE CAMP		
Attitude	Number of Responses	Percent of Refugees
Present much better	6	5.1
Present a little better	22	18.8
No change	6	4.3
Present a little worse	52	44.4
Present much worse	32	27.4
REFUGEE SETTLEMENT		
Present much better	14	11.7
Present a little better	18	15.0
No change	7	5.8
Present a little worse	48	40.0
Present much worse	33	27.5

### Refugees' Aspirations and Wishes for the Future

Quang-Nam Camp and Settlement dwellers who were interviewed were asked where they would go under each of three conditions, viz.: if war should continue, if peace should come and life improve, if peace should come, but life stay unchanged otherwise. The results are presented in Table 15. The pattern of responses displayed here are much like those of all other groups of displaced persons who were studied.

Under conditions of continued war, the vast majority of camp refugees would remain where they are, very few would return home, and over 20 percent would move on to a new location.

If peace should come to the country, however, bringing an improved life situation, almost 70 percent would return home and only 18 percent would remain. If peace should be accompanied by no other changes in living conditions, approximately the same proportions would do the same things.

In the case of the settlement refugees, over 67 percent would stay where they are if war continues, only 2.5 percent would return home, but almost 22 percent would move on to another location. If peace should come to Viet-Nam, it is clear that large numbers of settlement refugees would like to return to their former homes, regardless of whether or not peacetime conditions bring about general overall improvement in life as it is now. Under no condition would these people rely on the government to make the decision for them as many forced evacuees said they would.

All respondents were asked what they would request if given two "magic wishes" for anything they wanted to do, to be, or to have. These wishes are presented in Table 16.

The wishes expressed by the camp group are neither vastly discrepant from the pattern among other refugee groups, nor in conflict with the types of hopes described earlier in conjunction with the Cantril scale.

The settlement refugees appear to be far less concerned about the basic necessities than about peace, happiness, and personal wealth. Again, this is in

Table 15. Preferred Place of Residence

REFUGEE CAMP						
Aspiration	If war continues		If Peace, Life Improves		If peace, Life Same	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Stay here	87	73.7	21	17.8	16	13.6
Return home	3	2.5	81	68.6	88	74.6
Rely on GVN	1	0.8	0	-	0	-
Other	27	22.9	16	13.5	14	11.8
REFUGEE SETTLEMENT						
Stay here	81	67.5	8	6.7	4	3.3
Return home	3	2.5	101	84.2	108	90.0
Other	26	21.7	9	7.5	6	5.0
Don't Know	10	8.3	2	1.7	2	1.7



Table 16. Wishes Expressed by Refugees

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Camp</u>	<u>Settlement</u>
Happiness, easy life	37 (31.4%)	31 (25.8%)
Personal wealth	32 (27.1%)	33 (27.5%)
Peace	26 (22.0%)	27 (22.5%)
Food, house, clothing, land	0	12 (10.0%)
Education for children	16 (13.6%)	8 ( 6.7%)
Good health	11 ( 9.3%)	8 ( 6.7%)
Other	16 (13.6%)	12 (10.0%)

Table 17. Refugees' Expectations of  
Future Government Aid

<u>Type of Aid Expected</u>	<u>Camp</u>	<u>Settlement</u>
Shelter or house site and commodity or monetary assistance for duration of refugee period	78 (64.5%)	63 (52.1%)
Shelter or house site and commodity or monetary assistance on a temporary basis	11 ( 9.1%)	18 (14.9%)
Employment	44 (36.4%)	51 (42.1%)
Land for farm site	36 (29.8%)	26 (21.5%)
Money, food	28 (23.1%)	15 (12.4%)
Community facilities	24 (19.8%)	33 (27.3%)

line with the wishes expressed by other groups of displaced persons, with the exception that forced evacuees named food, clothing, and shelter more often than did the refugees, but still not so often as they named the other wishes just mentioned.

Expectations of Future  
Government Aid

Table 17 indicates that all but three interviewees in the refugee camp still expect the government to supply aid in the future. The largest number, representing about 65 percent of the sample, indicated that their expectations included provision of shelter or a house site and monetary or commodity aid for the duration of their refugee status, while less than 10 percent expect the same type of aid on a short-term temporary basis. The other expectations of this group, in order of frequency with which they are mentioned, are for provision of: employment, farm land, money and/or food, and community facilities.

Evidently those people interviewed still feel a great deal of dependency on the government in almost all aspects of refugee life.

The expectations of the settlement refugees are quite like those of other refugees interviewed in that the largest number still expect to be provided with shelter or a house site plus monetary or commodity aid for the duration of the refugee period, while a considerably smaller number expect this same kind of assistance on a temporary basis. Additionally, like other refugees, their expectations include government provision of employment, community facilities, land for a farm site, and money and/or food, in that order.

SITE REPORT FOR  
DANANG REFUGEE CAMP AND  
DANANG REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

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## DANANG REFUGEE CAMP AND DANANG REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

### Introduction

Large numbers of refugees first began flowing into the City of Danang at the time of the late 1964 floods. As the war expanded in Central Viet-Nam after 1965, Danang became the haven for increasing numbers of rural hamlet dwellers who left their homes for life in the more secure urban area. In addition to the search for greater security, refugees have been attracted by the employment opportunities offered by the large U. S. military establishment and by Danang's community facilities, and they have moved into the city in such numbers as to severely overcrowd living conditions there. Between 1963 and 1967 the city's population doubled from 120,000 to 240,000. Yet, at the beginning of 1967, officials reported that there were only about 10,000 officially registered refugees residing in the city's four temporary refugee camps, and an additional 11,000 unregistered displaced persons living within the city limits.

Many of the early arriving refugee families found shelter at four temporary sites operated by the Danang City Government; these were the Dong-Giang, My-Khe, Phuoc-Hai, and Hoa Thien temporary camps. But because of the large numbers of refugee families all were not able to find shelter in the temporary camps, and many were forced to squat on public land. Since only those refugees located in the official temporary camps were registered and thereby qualified for government assistance, these "squatter" families were largely ignored by Danang's SCR authorities. Thus a situation developed where large numbers of refugees in Danang have existed in makeshift dwellings on public land and these families are unregistered and have received little or no assistance from the government.

To help solve the refugee problem in his city, the Mayor of Danang decided in early 1966 to construct permanent housing in which to relocate all registered refugees living in the temporary camps. In June 1966, with assistance from CORDS, construction of permanent housing for 1,020 families was begun at the An Cu site in Danang East. But, as the registered families were gradually moved from the temporary camps to the An Cu site, more refugees

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moved in to take their place. In an effort to discourage further refugee movement into the city, the Mayor decided in October 1966 that families moving into the temporary camps after that date would not be registered, assisted, or resettled, and therefore that these families would be left to fare for themselves like other unregistered refugees. In addition, unregistered refugees were ordered to leave the city, an order which has not been enforced. The largely anti-refugee policy of the Danang City Government continued to the point of disbanding the Danang office of the Special Commissariat for Refugees in early 1967.

In mid-1967 the Mayor partially changed his policy of the previous year and announced plans for another permanent resettlement site for the refugee families that had refilled the temporary camps. But still no official plans had been announced to assist those unregistered families who were living outside the camps. Also, in another change of policy, the Danang City SCR was re-established in late 1967.

This report is based on a study of two refugee sites in Danang. One site is the model An Cu Camp where permanent housing was constructed and refugee families from the temporary camps resettled. The second site is a "squatter" location, Ap Mot (Hamlet 1), where unregistered refugee families live largely unassisted by the government. Both sites are located on the Danang East peninsula as shown on Map 1. Under the many subheadings of this report, data from the two sites are either compared or grouped together for a composite analysis. Unless otherwise indicated, all tables and figures are based on random samples of the An Cu Camp population ( $n = 129$ ) and the Ap Mot Settlement population ( $n = 120$ ). (Thus when the two samples are considered compositely, the  $n$  equals 249.)

### An Cu Camp

Construction was started on the An Cu camp site during June 1966. Original plans called for the construction of 1,020 houses, of which 925 had been completed by September 1967. The site is on the intersection of Cach-Mang Street and the road to China Beach, the American recreation facility (see Map 1).

The camp is divided into three sections: An Cu I, II, and III. Each refugee family had a choice of two housing plans--one was to live in one-half of a duplex with a 20 x 4 meter plot of land, and the other was to occupy one unit of the ten-unit row housing sections without any land. All of the dwellings were constructed with concrete, and represent the finest refugee housing to be found in I Corps.

The Government of Danang had 17 million piastres available for loans to refugees. If the refugee elected to live in a duplex, he could borrow up to 12,700 piastres to build his house and to start a small garden on the land. If the refugee chose instead to live in the row housing, he could borrow a larger sum of 14,000 piastres to build his house and to start a small business. As a rule, the refugee found it necessary to use only a small part of his loan for the construction of his house, since the GVN provided free cement and aluminum roofing.

Leadership for the entire An Cu camp had not been elected at the time of this study. The refugees from each temporary camp were resettled as a group, and each of the former camp chiefs retained the leadership of his own group. The Catholic group from Phuoc-Hai temporary camp, led by a priest and the temporary camp chief, resettled in An Cu III. By September 1967 the Catholic refugees had already built a church to function as a religious and a community center.

The Danang City Government built a two-room school in each section of An Cu, but none was open at the time of this study. When the three schools are opened, it is doubtful that they will be adequate for the children of 1,020 families. Each section of the camp has a functioning dispensary, complete with common medicines and health cadre. At the time of the study twelve Revolutionary Development Cadre were stationed in An Cu to assist with construction and to provide additional security and leadership.

#### Programs for Refugees

A program which does not deal exclusively with refugees deserves some mention here. Through the efforts of the GVN and the U. S. Navy, a vocational

school was established in Danang. By June 1967, the school had an enrollment of 194 students, and was holding classes in carpentry, driving, typing and office filing, electricity, sewing, auto mechanics, welding, mechanical drawing, and sheet metal working. Efforts have been made to enroll refugees in this school, and jobs are available in Danang for all who graduate.

In addition to the vocational training school other efforts were underway to assist refugees. The U. S. Marines, the U. S. Navy, the U. S. Air Force, and CORDS were actively hiring refugees, and as a result most of the refugees in An Cu had found employment with one of these American agencies.

An Cu is a model of how refugees could and should be resettled. The housing is more than adequate and school and medical facilities have been provided. But what is more important, an attempt has been made to enroll refugees in vocational training and to employ refugees with American agencies. Furthermore, loans were made available to the refugees so they could start a small business or a small agricultural enterprise.

#### Ap Mot (Hamlet 1)

Ap Mot (Hamlet 1), Section An Thuong, An Hai Ward, is a narrow strip on the East Danang Peninsula, measuring about one kilometer long and about one-fifth of a kilometer wide. It borders Cach Mang Street and the road leading to the Ba-Lat Bridge and West Danang. The site is the native hamlet for about 70 resident families. At the time of this study 124 refugee families were settled there.

Hamlet 1 is just one of the refugee settlement areas within Danang City where unregistered families have lived for some time largely unassisted by the government and apparently with little or no hope of being resettled or receiving substantial assistance.



But not all is bleak in Hamlet 1, for the large American presence has made employment relatively plentiful around Danang. And, if the refugee cannot find employment with the Americans, he can always join the ARVN or one of the Vietnamese self-defense forces. Women who are widowed earn a living by selling sundry goods or themselves.

Thus most of the refugees are doing reasonably well, even when compared to refugees who have received assistance and are living in government camps elsewhere in Viet-Nam. In fact, it is certain that these refugees were attracted to, and continue to stay in Danang because they can find some means of earning a living and because of the community facilities available there.

Refugees in Danang have electricity for the first time, health facilities are accessible and generally better, and schools are bigger and perhaps better than the ones found in their native hamlets. Furthermore, security in the area is good because of the concentration of Vietnamese and American armed forces.

Thus, the newcomers in Hamlet 1 are refugees who, according to the Danang Mayor, have squatted illegally on public land. There are no programs for these refugees, and they have received little or no assistance. Nonetheless, they are doing well in taking advantage of the opportunities available in and around Danang City.

## I. Dynamics of Refugee Movement

The refugee populations at both the Danang sites are made up almost entirely of volitional refugees: only one of 249 respondents reported being forced to leave his home. Sixteen (6.4 percent) respondents reported being encouraged to move, mostly by community or religious leaders. Thirteen of the 16 who were encouraged live in the An Cu camp, whose Catholic residents moved largely under the direction of their religious leader.

Most of the refugees moved prior to the heavy fighting that followed the American buildup in Central Viet-Nam. As shown in Table 1, a majority of refugees at both sites moved prior to February 1965, while camp refugees showed a tendency to move earlier than settlement refugees.


Table 1. Date of Refugee Movement for Both Sites

	<u>Camp</u> <u>(n = 130)</u>	<u>Settlement</u> <u>(n = 120)</u>
Before February 1965	95 (73%)	63 (52%)
Before June 1965	109 (84%)	73 (61%)
Before October 1965	119 (92%)	86 (72%)
Before February 1966	126 (97%)	97 (81%)

### Reasons for Refugee Movement

Refugees were allowed to give more than one reason in answering the question, "What were the reasons for [your] decision to move?" War-related responses were placed in seven categories as shown in Figure 1. An eighth and separate category was created for a major natural catastrophe--the floods of late 1964. The flood devastation was of course also related to the course of the war, since it contributed greatly to the disruption of government control in the countryside. The floods also influenced many characteristics of refugee movement, especially for families living at the camp site.

Figure 1. Specific Reasons for Refugee Movement



□ Danang Refugee Settlement

▣ Danang Refugee Camp

As shown in Figure 1, camp respondents cited the flood as a reason for movement more frequently than any other single reason. The frequent citation of the flood by camp dwellers corresponds with the large number of camp refugees (73 percent) who moved prior to February 1965. In contrast, only 16 percent of the settlement refugees cited the flood as a reason for movement.


The connection between the flood and Viet-Cong activities as reasons for movement is clear: all of the settlement refugees who mentioned the flood also mentioned simultaneous or subsequent Viet-Cong activity as a reason; and similarly, 52 of the 67 camp respondents citing the flood also cited an initial or strengthened Viet-Cong presence in their hamlets after the flood waters receded as a reason for movement.

Specific causal agents of refugee movement can be assigned by dividing the seven war-related reasons for movement into the following categories: reasons 1 and 5 are categorized as VC activity, reasons 2 and 3 as GVN/US activity; and reasons 4, 6, and 7 are not attributable to either side. When the reasons are grouped in this fashion, as presented in Figure 2, it can be shown that refugees at both sites mention Viet-Cong activity most frequently as causing them to move. There is a distinction between sites, however, in that among settlement refugees there is not as great a difference between VC and US/GVN citations as there is among camp refugees. This might be explained by the fact that the families at the settlement site left their homes later than camp refugees and thus were more affected by the stepped-up war operations that accompanied the American military buildup. Table 2, where reasons for movement are grouped by causal agents and time of movement, shows this apparent trend in greater detail. Here, as movement becomes more recent, one can see a slight proportionate increase in citations of GVN/US war activities and a slight decrease in citations of Viet-Cong activities.

#### Decision to Move

When refugees were asked how long the conditions causing them to move had existed in their hamlets before they moved, 66.7 percent of the respondents at both sites replied that such conditions had existed for three months or less.

Figure 2. Percentage of Refugee Citations of VC, GVN/US,  
or Other Factors as Causes of Movement





 Danang Refugee Settlement  
 Danang Refugee Camp

Table 2. Changes in Frequency of Citation

DANANG REFUGEE SETTLEMENT									
Time Period	VC		GVN/US		Other		Total		
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	Citations	Respondents	
Prior to 1 October 1965 (1-3)	77	46.1	58	34.7	32	19.2	167	83	
October 1965-September 1965 (4-6)	13	27.7	20	42.5	14	29.8	47	21	
October 1966-September 1967 (7-9)	10	33.3	13	43.3	7	23.3	30	11	
Total	100	41.0	91	37.3	53	21.7	244	115	
DANANG REFUGEE CAMP									
Prior to 1 October 1965 (1-3)	87	47.8	43	23.6	52	28.6	182	105	
October 1965-September 1966 (4-6)	9	56.3	3	18.8	4	25.0	16	8	
October 1966-September 1967 (7-9)	1	33.3	1	33.3	1	33.3	3	1	
Total	97	48.3	47	23.4	57	28.4	201	114	

An additional 17.3 percent indicated that such conditions had existed from three months to a year. Refugees at both sites were also asked how long before actually moving they had decided to move, and 71 percent said they had decided within a week's time of their movement. Thus, most of the refugees at both sites moved as a result of conditions that existed in their hamlets for relatively short periods, and most of them moved shortly after deciding to move. No particular groups were reported as staying behind when the respondents moved.

#### Viet-Cong Attempts to Prohibit Movement

As shown in Table 3, only 18 percent of the respondents at both sites reported Viet-Cong attempts to prohibit their movement. None of the refugees at either site indicated that the Viet-Cong encouraged him to move.

#### Nature of Movement

##### Means of Transportation

Table 4 shows that 31 percent of the settlement refugees traveled on foot, while 62 percent traveled by bus. These figures contrast with those of camp respondents, 24 percent of whom migrated on foot, 18 percent by bus, and 42 percent by boat. The high citation of boat travel by camp respondents is clearly related to the fact that more than half of those refugees cited the 1964 floods as a reason for movement.

##### Concurrent Departure

To determine the degree to which refugee movement has taken place in various sized groups, each respondent was asked what other persons moved at the same time. Responses were placed in categories covering departure by individuals, by household, groups of households, and entire hamlets. Figure 3 shows that 61.4 percent of the camp respondents, and 76.7 percent of the settlement respondents moved alone, with members of their household, with relatives, or with five or less other family groups. The remainder at both sites moved with other family groups of various sizes. Thus, a majority of refugees at both sites moved in relatively small groups.

Table 3. Viet-Cong Attempts to Influence Movement


	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent citing</u>
Did nothing at all	172	69.1
Attempted to prohibit movement	47	18.9
Encouraged movement	0	0.0
Interviewer did not know	30	12.0

Table 4. Means of Transportation

	<u>Settlement</u>		<u>Camp</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Walking	38	31.7	31	24.0
Lambretta/Horsecart	2	1.7	4	3.1
GVN/Allied truck	4	3.3	5	3.9
Aircraft	1	0.8	9	7.0
Boat	0	0.0	55	42.6
Bus	75	62.5	24	18.6
Total	120	100.0	129	100.0



Figure 3. Other Persons Moving with Interviewee



### Retention of Possessions

As shown in Table 5, a much greater proportion of camp refugees (42.6 percent) than settlement refugees (10.8 percent) reported retaining no possessions during movement. In addition, a comparison of those who brought some of their possessions with them shows a higher percent of the settlement refugees retaining heavier and bulkier items such as furniture, vehicles, livestock, and trade tools. This difference between sites is probably related to the difference in terms of means of transportation during movement. As pointed out earlier, nearly all (94 percent) of the settlement respondents moved on foot or by bus, while nearly half (49 percent) of the camp respondents moved by boat or aircraft. Thus, the settlement refugees, who moved mainly by land, found it much easier to take their possessions with them.

### Resettlement Site Selection


As expected, a large majority (82 percent) of the camp refugees cited government arrangement of the site as their reason for relocating there (Figure 4). Another seven percent cited influence by religious leaders or coreligionists. Reasons given by the settlement refugees, or "squatters," were more varied 44 percent said they relocated there because land was available for a home site, 25 percent because friends or relatives were already living there 15 percent because they followed other refugees, and eight percent because the site was the closest secure hamlet to their hamlet of origin. As expected, none of the "squatters" said that the site had been arranged by the government.

Table 5. Retention of Possessions

	<u>Settlement</u>	<u>Camp</u>
Retained no Possessions	13 (10.8%)	55 (42.6%)
Retained Possessions	<u>107 (89.2%)</u>	<u>74 (57.4%)</u>
Total	120 (100.0%)	129 (100.0%)

Kind of Possession	Settlement	Camp
All possessions	7 ( 6.5%)	2 ( 2.7%)
Money	71 (66.4%)	53 (71.6%)
Paddy	19 (17.8%)	4 ( 5.4%)
Extra clothing	93 (86.9%)	57 (77.0%)
Kitchen and household utensils	26 (24.3%)	11 (14.9%)
Livestock and/or trade tools	12 (11.2%)	2 ( 2.7%)
Vehicle	15 (14.0%)	8 (10.8%)
Furniture	26 (24.3%)	7 ( 9.5%)
Other	11 (10.3%)	5 ( 6.8%)

Figure 4. Refugee Reasons for Relocation at Present Site



## II. Refugee Relief and Resettlement

This section examines the postmovement experiences of the An Cu camp refugees and the Ap Mot settlement refugees--the former having been registered and formally resettled, and the latter having been left unregistered and largely unassisted. In some instances their experiences differ sharply; in others they are very similar.

### Security

When asked if their present location was secure, all 129 respondents at the camp site and all 120 respondents at the settlement site replied that it was.


### Aid Received by Refugees

Refugees differed a little between sites in terms of assistance expected and received from friends and/or relatives. At the camp site, about 20 percent expected some kind of assistance, and 14 percent reported receiving some. At the settlement, about 30 percent expected assistance, and the same number reported receiving some.


When asked what expectations they had of assistance from the local populace where they first moved, once again about 20 percent at the camp said they expected some kind of assistance, as did a slightly smaller percent (18 percent) at the settlement. But only 11 percent at camp reported receiving aid, as compared to 20 percent at the settlement.

As expected, there is a sharp difference between sites in terms of government assistance received by refugees. As shown in Figure 5, there is little difference in expectations of government assistance, but the major difference lies in what was actually done for the refugees by the government. More than three-fourths (79.8 percent) of the settlement dwellers reported receiving nothing at all, although 12 percent did report receiving some money or food. This, of course, contrasts with the camp refugees, almost all of whom reported receiving permanent housing assistance and money or food.

**Figure 5A. Settlement Refugees' Expectations of Government Assistance Compared to Actual Government Assistance Received**  
(n = 124)



**Figure 5B. Camp Refugees' Expectations of Government Assistance Compared to Actual Government Assistance Received**  
(n = 132)



## Refugee Adaptation to Resettlement Life

### Housing

As expected, there is a sharp difference between sites with regard to refugee assessments of the comfort of their present abodes. 51 percent of the camp respondents consider their present house to be about the same or more comfortable than their former house, as compared to only 23 percent at the settlement. (See Figure 6.)

### Land Tenure

In their premovement native hamlets, the bulk of the refugees at both sites were either landowners or persons who had no access to land as owners or renters; prior land ownership was claimed by over one third of the respondents in the settlement and over one half in the camp (see Table 6).

In their present sites none of the respondents claim to own or rent any farmland.

### Employment

Data on the employment situation of refugees over 15 years reflects the impact of movement on those who formerly made their living as farmers. Figure 7 shows that 53 percent at the camp and 41 percent at the settlement were farmers before moving. At present, however, less than one percent and about 2.2 percent, respectively, give their occupations as farmers. Those who formerly farmed are now found in the categories of the unemployed, housewives, and laborers. (The increased number of housewives might also be considered unemployed, since in the rural setting they formed an important part of the work force.)

Although the effects of migration on occupational activities have been heavy for refugees at both sites, not all the refugees regarded their employment situation as having worsened. As shown in Figure 8, 36.7 percent at the settlement and 41.1 percent at the camp believed their present employment situation



Figure 6. Comparison of Present versus Former House




Table 6. Premovement Land Tenure


DANANG REFUGEE SETTLEMENT						
Mau Owned	Man Rented					Total
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 and over	2	0	0	0	0	2
4-5.9	1	0	0	0	0	1
2-3.9	7	1	0	0	0	8
0-1.9	24	11	0	0	0	35
None	52	18	3	1	0	74
Total	86	30	3	1	0	120
DANANG REFUGEE CAMP						
6 and over	3	0	0	0	0	3
4-5.9	7	0	0	0	0	7
2-3.9	16	6	1	0	0	23
0-1.9	27	12	0	0	0	39
None	43	13	1	0	0	57
Total	96	31	2	0	0	129

	<u>Settlement</u>	<u>Camp</u>
Owned, but did not rent:	34	53
Owned and rented:	12	19
Rented but did not own:	22	14
Neither owned nor rented:	52	43
	120	129

Figure 7A. Changes in Settlement Refugee

Occupations Since Movement

(n = 276)\*



■ Premovement Occupation


▨ Postmovement occupation

\* Work force consists of the total number of people who are 15 and older. Students are omitted. The respondent answered for entire family.

\*\* Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG.

Figure 7B. Changes in Camp Refugee


Occupations Since Movement  
(n = 309)\*



\* Work force consists of the total number of people who are 15 and older. Students are omitted. The respondent answered for entire family.

\*\* Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG.

Figure 8. Comparison of Present versus  
Former Employment Situation



☐ Danang Refugee Settlement  
☒ Danang Refugee Camp

was as good as or better than their former one. It appears that more than a third of the work force at both sites has taken good advantage of the employment opportunities in the Danang area.

### Ownership of Capital Goods

It was shown earlier that less than four percent of the refugees interviewed had taken all their possessions with them when they migrated. Table 7 presents a comparison of possessions owned in the premovement situation and those owned after movement. All but the last three categories of possessions show a decrease in the number of owners. In the cases of horses, cows, water buffaloes, pigs and poultry, and to a lesser extent with trade tools and vending stock it has been impossible for most refugees to gain back what they lost at the time of movement. It is interesting, however, to note the slight increase in the ownership of motorized and nonmotorized vehicles. The large increases in ownership of "Other" possessions in the postmovement situation can be explained by the fact that refugees lacking major possessions felt compelled to list such common items as furniture and clothing.

### Community Facilities

Table 8 shows a comparison of the community facilities available to the refugees in their native hamlets with the facilities either available at the two Danang refugee sites or in the immediate vicinity. Although a vast majority of respondents had most of the facilities available to them in their native hamlets, it appears that most of them considered the facilities in or around the refugee sites as superior to those at home. When asked to compare their present and former community facilities (see Figure 9) a majority of respondents at both sites indicated that the postmovement facilities were better than those available to them in their native hamlets. Less than 15 percent of the combined refugee population reported the community facilities in their native hamlets as being better than those at the refugee sites.

Table 7. Comparison of Possessions Owned:

Premovement versus Postmovement

DANANG REFUGEE SETTLEMENT				
Possessions	Premovement		Postmovement	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Horses, cows and water buffalo	32	26.7	1	0.8
Pigs	94	78.3	44	36.7
Poultry	98	81.7	29	24.2
Fish Ponds	1	0.8	0	0.0
Trade tools	58	48.3	15	12.5
Vending Stock	45	37.5	31	25.8
Motorized Vehicle	9	7.5	12	10.0
Nonmotorized Vehicle	51	42.5	53	44.2
Other	57	47.5	106	88.3
DANANG REFUGEE CAMP				
Horses, cows and water buffalo	58	45.6	0	0.0
Pigs	119	92.2	39	30.2
Poultry	117	90.7	46	35.7
Fish Ponds	2	1.5	0	0.0
Trade tools	51	39.5	20	15.5
Vending Stock	41	31.8		7.0
Motorized Vehicle	4	3.1	7	5.4
Nonmotorized Vehicle	50	38.7	61	47.3
Other	50	38.8	91	72.1


Table 8. Availability of Premovement and  
Postmovement Community Facilities  
(n = 249)\*

Premovement Facilities			Facility Present at Camp?	Facility Present at Settlement?
Facility	Number Citing*	Percent of Respondents*		
School	248	99.6	Yes	Yes (Danang)
Health Service	206	82.7	Yes	Yes
Information Service	221	88.8	Yes	Yes
Entertainment	210	84.3	Yes	Yes
Cooperative	62	24.9	Yes	Yes
Market	206	82.7	Yes	Yes
Electricity	3	1.2	Yes	Yes
Public Well	126	50.6	Yes	Yes
Public Transportation	77	30.9	Yes	Yes

\*The two samples are combined, since the patterns of responses at the two sites were almost identical.



Figure 9. Comparison of Present and  
Past Community Facilities



☐ Danang Refugee Settlement  
☒ Danang Refugee Camp

Additional information was gathered on utilization of the community facilities at the relocation sites.

#### Educational Facilities

Despite the availability of schools for school age children at both sites, Table 9 shows a drop in school attendance after movement. When asked why all of their children did not attend school--both before and after becoming refugees--most respondents replied that the children either had to work or guard possessions at home or that they could not afford tuition and books.

#### Health Care

As shown earlier in Table 8, 82.7 percent of the total respondents at both sites reported the presence of a health station in their native hamlets; of these, almost all (95.1 percent) reported regular use of the facility when needed. When camp respondents were asked how often they availed themselves of the camp dispensary, which had been built as the camp was constructed, 34.9 percent reported they went or would go whenever they were ill, and 33.3 percent reported they went or would go occasionally. Fourteen percent indicated a belief that no dispensary was available in the camp. At the settlement site, 35.8 percent said that no dispensary was available. Still, another 35.8 percent reported using the Ap Mot dispensary whenever ill, and 20 percent reported occasional use.

#### Cooperatives

As shown earlier in Table 8, one-fourth (24.9 percent) of the total number of respondents reported the presence of a cooperative of one kind or another in their native hamlets. By contrast, among all the respondents at both sites, only a single refugee living in the settlement reported any knowledge of a cooperative--a consumers' cooperative--at his present location. And none, of course, reported presently participating in a cooperative.

Table 9. School Attendance by Refugee  
Children of School Age

	<u>Settlement Households</u>			
	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	16	16.0	22	21.2
Some children attending school	32	32.0	40	38.5
All children attending school	52	52.0	42	40.4
Total number of refugees with school age children	100	100.0	104	100.1

	<u>Camp Households</u>			
	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	6	6.2	17	15.7
Some children attending school	37	38.1	39	36.1
All children attending school	54	55.7	52	48.1
Total number of refugees with school age children	97*	100.0	108*	99.9

\*The total number of respondents with school age children, and the n value for this column.

### Exposure to Government Information

Exposure to communications media is a measure of the refugees' exposure to government information. A comparison between sites (see Table 10) of pre-movement and postmovement exposure shows that residents at both sites experienced an increase in radio exposure. Loudspeaker and newspaper/magazine exposure for residents of both sites was about the same as before movement.

### Leadership

When asked whom they consult when they have problems some 80 percent at both sites stated that they consult the hamlet chief or camp chief. Evidently the settlement residents have "adopted" the Ap Mot hamlet chief as their leader, since they have not organized to select a leader from among themselves.

### Travel

Each refugee was asked about his travels outside the refugee location. 15.5 percent of the camp respondents and 6.7 percent of the settlement respondents indicated they made no trips at all. Table 12 shows the frequency and purpose of trips made by the respondents who did report some travels.

### Participation in Community Ceremonies

Refugees were asked if they participate in religious or traditional ceremonies at their present location. As Table 13 shows, 40 percent of the settlement respondents participated in no ceremonies, as compared to only 15 percent at the comparatively better organized camp.

Table 10. Communications Media Reaching Refugees

	<u>Settlement Households</u>		<u>Camp Households</u>	
	<u>Premovement</u>	<u>Postmovement</u>	<u>Premovement</u>	<u>Postmovement</u>
Radio	72 (60.0%)	110 (91.7%)	86 (66.7%)	119 (92.2%)
Loudspeakers	90 (75.0%)	83 (69.2%)	100 (77.5%)	100 (77.5%)
Newspaper/magazine	42 (35.0%)	38 (31.7%)	61 (47.3%)	63 (48.8%)
No access	7 ( 5.8%)	1 ( 0.8%)	7 ( 5.4%)	0 ( 0.0%)

Table 11. Persons Likely to be Consulted by Refugees

	<u>Settlement</u>	<u>Camp</u>
Hamlet chief or camp chief	96 (80.0%)	104 (84.3%)
Village chief	4 ( 3.3%)	0 ( 0.0%)
Religious leader	3 ( 2.5%)	15 (11.8%)
District chief	1 ( 0.8%)	0 ( 0.0%)
Other	16 (13.3%)	5 ( 3.9%)

Table 12. Purpose and Frequency of Travel

Purpose of Travel	Frequency of Travel						
	1 Trip per Year	2-4 Trips per Year	5-7 Trips per Year	8-10 Trips per Year	1 Trip per Month	1 Trip per Week	Daily Total Percent
Market		2			17	34	21 75 67.0
Business Requirements		1			2	9	15 27 24.1
Visit Friends/Relatives	1	2			2	1	7 6.2
Attend Family Rites		1					1 2 1.8
Watch Game or Theatre							0 0
Attend Religious Ceremonies							0 0
Attend Political Meeting							0 0
Collect Possessions							0 0
Other							1 1 0.9
Total	1	6	0		21	44	38 112
Percent	0.9	5.4	0	1.8	18.8	39.3	33.9 100.0
DANANG REFUGEE SETTLEMENT (n = 112)							
DANANG REFUGEE CAMP (n = 109)							
Market		2	2		15	28	17 65 59.6
Business Requirements		1			2	9	19 32 29.3
Visit Friends/Relatives		3			3	2	1 9 8.3
Attend Family Rites						1	1 1 0.9
Watch Game or Theatre					1		1 1 0.9
Attend Religious Ceremonies							1 1 0.9
Attend Political Meeting							0 0
Collect Possessions							0 0
Other							0 0
Total	0	6	2	2	21	40	38 109
Percent	0	5.5	1.8	1.8	19.3	36.7	34.9 100.0

Table 13. Participation in Ceremonies\*

<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Camp</u>	<u>Settlement</u>
None	20 (15.5%)	48 (40.0%)
Buddhist	36 (27.9%)	21 (25.8%)
Catholic/Protestant	39 (30.2%)	19 (15.8%)
Wedding	26 (20.2%)	23 (19.2%)
Funeral	34 (26.4%)	18 (15.0%)
Death Ceremony	10 ( 7.8%)	4 ( 3.3%)
Dinh Ceremony	8 ( 6.2%)	0 ( 0.0%)
Other	16 (12.4%)	10 ( 8.3%)

\* Respondents could cite more than one ceremony

### III. Characteristics of Refugee Population

#### Demographic Characteristics

##### Age and Sex Distribution

Figure 10 represents in standard pyramid form data on the age and sex distribution of the two Danang refugee populations. Significant for both sites is the underrepresentation of males between the ages of 15-34. The sex ratio for this group is 49 at the camp site and 56 at the settlement site, as compared to a sex ratio of 102 for the 0-14 age group for the two sites combined, and a ratio of 90 for the entire population of both sites.

##### Productive Capability

Some 82 percent of the camp refugees over 15 years old, and 88 percent at the settlement, are reported to be free of major physical defects and thus capable of performing normal physical labor.

Assuming that only those persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are "producers"--that is, capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs--and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratios of various populations. The camp refugee population has 316 producers per 1,000 people, and the settlement population has 325 producers. The number of nonproductive individuals in both sites is well below the norm for rural Vietnamese society. While no accurate comparative data is available for a nonrefugee population in Central Viet-Nam, a village in the Mekong Delta province of Long-An had, in 1958, 435 producers per 1,000 people.<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup>Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51.



42.270

Figure 10. Population Pyramid



### Impact of Movement on Family Size

Camp and settlement respondents together reported 29 persons being separated from their families during and after movement. Fourteen of these had joined the government military forces, three had found employment elsewhere, six were away at school, and six were missing for unknown reasons.

### Literacy

Each respondent was given a card on which four statements were printed and was asked questions concerning the content of these statements. If the respondent could read and understand at least three of the statements, he was considered functionally literate. If he could not, he was considered functionally illiterate.

Using this test, 65.0 percent of the males of the camp and settlement populations combined, 41.2 percent of the females, and 52.6 percent of both sexes were functionally literate. In comparison, when this test was administered to primary school children in a government school in Binh Duong Province, all of the children in the 2nd Form (4th grade in American schools) or above could read and understand all four statements.

### Refugee Attitudes

In order to study the attitudes of refugees, the HSR questionnaire included a portion of the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (described in detail in Part I, Chapter IV of this document) and other items attempting to measure refugees' comparisons of their present and former life situations, their aspirations for the future, and their expectations of government aid in the future.

### Cantril Scale Ratings

The Cantril Scale begins by having an individual describing his highest hopes and his worst fears for the future. These hopes and fears are then used as anchoring points for an equal-interval scale, with the best life assuming a scale value of ten and being defined as the situation in which all the individual's fondest hopes materialize, while the worst life (i.e., if all the worst fears

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should come to pass) is assigned a zero scale value. By use of a visual aid, a ten-rung ladder device, the respondent points out where he feels he stands at present on this ten-point scale between best and worst possible life. He then points out where he stood five years ago, and finally where he thinks he will stand five years hence.

The concerns named by Danang Refugee Settlement interviewees as anchoring points for the scale are quite comparable to those concerns, both hopes and fears, cited by other displaced persons studied. Table 14A shows that the hopes most frequently named deal with: peace and personal happiness, sufficient money, education for one's children, and food, clothing and shelter. Their fears were: primarily fear of lack of food and clothing, fear of ill health, and fear of war and general "misery" about equally.

Danang Camp residents are similar to other groups of displaced persons with regard to their hopes for the future, as they are with regard to their fears. Table 14B shows that the largest number of persons expressed hope for a future life which would include peace and other conditions allowing for personal happiness. Only half as many people cited hopes for food, clothing, and shelter which would seem to indicate, on the basis of what is known about the Cantril Scale, that these people harbor some anxiety about availability of the necessities, but not to the extent that this is seen among forced evacuees. On a level even with the hope for food, clothing and shelter is that for sufficient money for one's personal use; this is followed closely by the hope for education for one's children. Very few persons mentioned personal possessions of real or status value as hopes for the future.

Fears, in order of frequency of citation, are: that of lack of adequate food and clothing at a future date, a life of "misery," ill health, and continued war activities.

The average ladder-scale ratings assigned by the settlement refugees to past, present, and future appear in Figure 11A. The pattern of ratings is similar to the overall pattern for all refugee groups studied in that the present is lower than either past or projected future conditions, but the future is not expected to meet the quality of conditions that the past was comprised of. This group,

Table 14A. Hopes and Fears for the Future as Expressed  
by Residents of the Danang Refugee Settlement

Hopes	Number of Responses	Percent of Refugees
Peace, personal happiness	77	64.2
Money	45	37.5
Education for one's children	34	28.3
Food, clothing, house	29	24.2
Land	2	1.7
Other	6	5.0
Fears		
No food, clothing	74	61.7
Sickness	50	41.7
War activities	36	30.0
Misery	34	28.3
Death	7	5.8
Other	20	16.7

Table 14B. Hopes and Fears for the Future Expressed by  
Danang Refugee Camp Residents

Hopes	Number of Responses	Percent of Refugees
Peace, personal happiness	82	63.6
Food, clothing, shelter	40	31.0
Money	38	29.5
Education for one's children	34	26.4
Land	4	3.1
Other	6	4.7
Fears		
No food, clothing	75	58.1
Misery	58	45.0
Sickness	42	32.6
War	28	21.7
Other	23	17.8

Figure 11A. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings for Past, Present, and Future--Danang Refugee Settlement





Figure 11B. Mean Cantril Scale Ratings for Past, Present, and Future--Danang Refugee Camp



in fact, is the least optimistic of all volitional refugee groups studied in that the few who projected future ratings (and only a very few did so) on the average rated the future lower than did any other similar group.

In placing themselves on Cantril's "ladder of life," Danang Camp interviewees, on the average, rate themselves higher at present than does any other group studied (see Figure 11B). The discrepancy between past and present, though a negative one, does not reflect as great a degree of retrogression as in most other locations. And those who project their position five years in the future (less than 50 percent chose to do so) are rather optimistic.

#### Comparison of Present and Premovement Life Situations

When asked how their overall situation at the time of interview compared with the situation prior to their assuming refugee status, the settlement interviewees responded as shown in Table 15A. More than half (57.5 percent) felt that current conditions were at least a little worse than before, while only 30.8 percent felt they were better off now. The picture is one of dissatisfaction similar to that found in most other voluntary refugee sites except the Danang Camp, where feelings were more equally polarized between preference for the past and preference for the present. This indicates that the settlement dwellers are somewhat less satisfied than the camp residents.

In Table 15B are presented the Danang Refugee Camp residents' views of the way their overall life situations at the time of interview compare with their situations prior to their becoming refugees. Of the nine groups of displaced persons interviewed in this study, the present group expresses the least dissatisfaction with current conditions. It is the only group in which more people rated the present better than the premovement situation, which would seem to indicate that a large proportion of the population feel that the government had done an adequate job of caring for their needs.

Table 15A. Comparison of Present and Former  
Life Situations--Danang Refugee Settlement

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees</u>
Present much better	3	2.5
Present a little better	34	28.3
No change	14	11.7
Present a little worse	43	35.8
Present much worse	26	21.7

Table 15B. Comparison of Present and Former  
Life Situations--Danang Refugee Camp

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees</u>
Present much better	11	8.5
Present a little better	50	38.8
No change	10	7.8
Present a little worse	43	33.5
Present much worse	15	11.6

### Refugees' Aspirations and Wishes

Interviewees were asked to express a preference for their favored place of residence under each of three sets of conditions, viz.: if war should continue, if peace should come and bring with it improved living conditions, and if peace should come but bring about no other changes in the life situation.

Among Danang Settlement refugees (see Table 16A), as among most other volitional refugee groups, almost no one aspires to return home while war continues, while almost three-quarters of the sample would remain in Danang and 20 percent would move on to a new location. The situation changes, however, if peace should come to Viet-Nam. If peace brought about an improvement in living conditions, over half would return home and about a third would still stay in Danang. If peace were accompanied by no additional changes in the quality of life, about 80 percent would return home, and only about 13 percent would stay in Danang.

Among Danang Camp refugees (see Table 16B) the preference if war should continue is obviously to remain in the present location. This alternative was named by over 84 percent of respondents. Less than three percent would rely on the government to relocate them, none would return home, and about 11 percent would move on to a new location. This is further verification for the finding that many of these people are quite satisfied in the Danang Refugee Camp. In fact, over 40 percent would stay even if peace returned to the country, provided some other improvements in living conditions occurred, but under the same conditions over 45 percent would return home. If peace came with no other improvements, 70 percent would return home, but over 20 percent would still stay in Danang. This group appears to be much more satisfied with their present situation than is any of the other groups studied.

Interviewees were also asked what they would wish for if, in some magical way, they could be granted any two wishes for anything they wanted to do, to be, or to have. Danang Settlement refugees were similar to other refugee groups in their wishes, which are presented in Table 17A. Their three most frequently named wishes were for: peace, personal happiness and an easy life, and personal wealth. This was followed closely by the wish for good health. Concern over



Table 16A. Preferred Place of Residence Among  
Residents of Danang Refugee Settlement

Aspiration	If war continues		If peace, Life improves		If peace, Life same	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Stay here	89	74.2	40	33.3	16	13.3
Return home	1	0.8	68	56.7	95	79.2
Rely on GVN	5	4.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	25	20.8	12	10.0	9	7.5

Table 16B. Preferred Place of Residence Among  
Residents of Danang Refugee Camp

Aspiration	If war continues		If peace, Life improves		If peace, Life same	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Stay here	109	84.5	54	41.9	27	20.9
Return home	0	0.0	60	46.5	90	69.8
Rely on GVN	3	2.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	14	10.9	10	7.8	8	6.2
Don't know	3	2.3	5	3.9	4	3.1

Table 17A. Wishes Expressed by Residents of  
Danang Refugee Settlement

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees</u>
Peace	42	35.0
Personal happiness	33	27.5
Personal wealth	32	26.7
Good health	24	20.0
Other	27	22.6

Table 17B. Wishes Expressed by Residents of  
Danang Refugee Camp

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees</u>
Peace	52	40.3
Happiness, easy life	39	30.2
Personal wealth	26	20.2
Good health	24	18.6
House, clothing, land	15	11.6
Food	12	9.3
Education for one's children	10	7.8
Other	12	9.3

life's necessities was expressed less often by this group than by any other, which would indicate that they feel little doubt that such necessities will come to them.

Danang Camp refugees named peace, personal happiness, good health and personal wealth much more frequently than they named food, clothing, housing, etc. (see Table 17B). This, again, tends to reflect their comparative lack of concern over the physical needs, apparently because they are well taken care of.

#### Refugees' Expectations of Future Government Aid

Danang Camp refugees differ from other refugee groups interviewed in the frequency with which they named various categories of expectations of government aid in the future. Their responses centered about expectations of government provision of money and/or food; employment; and community facilities. These items were mentioned more often here than in other refugee locations. Since the camp refugees have already received permanent resettlement assistance, expectations of a house site and commodity or monetary assistance for the duration of the refugee period were relatively low. This contrasts with expectations of settlement refugees (Table 18 A and B), 50 percent of whom expect a house site and long term assistance.

Table 18A. Refugees' Expectations of Future  
Government Aid--Danang Refugee Settlement  
(n = 124)

<u>Type of Aid Expected</u>	<u>Number Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees</u>
Money, food	41	33.1
Employment	53	42.7
Community Facilities	39	31.5
Shelter or house site and commodity or monetary assistance for the duration of the refugee period	63	50.8
Shelter or house site and commodity or monetary assistance on a temporary basis	23	18.5
Land for farm site	18	14.5

Table 18B. Refugees' Expectations of Future  
Government Aid--Danang Refugee Camp  
(n = 132)

<u>Type of Aid Expected</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees</u>
Money, food	81	61.4
Employment	58	44.0
Community facilities	47	35.6
Shelter or house site and commodity or monetary assistance for the duration of the refugee period	21	16.0
Shelter or house site and commodity or monetary assistance on a temporary basis	7	5.3
Land for farm site	7	5.3

SITE REPORT FOR  
QUANG-TRI CITY REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

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## QUANG-TRI CITY REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

### Introduction

This refugee settlement is a subdivision of Thach Han Hamlet, Hai-Tri Village, and is located on the outskirts of Quang-Tri City in Mai Linh District, Quang-Tri Province (Map 1). Called Khu N (Section N), the site has been populated by refugees who moved from the more remote and insecure districts and could not find room in a government refugee camp. They have built their houses around a cemetery forming an area about one-half of a kilometer long and one-half of a kilometer wide. The Khu straddles National Highway 1, between Tran-Hung-Dao and Ho Dac-Huan Streets which lead into Quang-Tri City. Regular lambretta service runs from this area into the city, and buses travel Highway 1 to Hue on a daily basis.

### I. Dynamics of Refugee Movement

Refugee movement in Quang-Tri Province, unlike many other provinces, has been relatively recent. In May of 1965, the province had only 4,000<sup>1</sup> registered refugees. Since that time, the area has become the arena of heavy fighting between U. S. or GVN forces and the North Vietnamese Army or the Viet-Cong. As a result of this conflict and greater Viet-Cong activity, an increased number of refugees were generated. CORDS Refugee Division estimated in June 1967, that Quang-Tri had 39,000 refugees in 39 camps and 2,250 scattered refugees. The Quang-Tri Social Welfare Service Chief reported that 11,000 of the refugees in camps were registered between July, 1965, and August 1967, a figure that does not include the 10,000 DMZ evacuees.

The refugee population in Khu N developed concurrently with the overall refugee population. Table 1 shows that only about 22 percent of the respondents

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<sup>1</sup> Estimate provided by the Quang-Tri Province Social Welfare Service.

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Map 1. Quang-Tri City Refugee Settlement






Table 1. Periods of Refugee Movement to Khu N  
(n = 97)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Prior to 1 October 1965	21	21.6
October 1965 - September 1966	32	33.0
October 1966 - September 1967	<u>44</u>	<u>45.4</u>
Total	97	100.0

moved prior to October 1, 1965, and that about 45 percent reported moving after October of 1966.

Almost all the refugee movement to Khu N was voluntary, only seven respondents (6.5 percent) reporting that they were forced or encouraged to move. Consequently, the Khu N population will be treated as voluntary refugees in this presentation.

### Reasons for Refugee Movement

Each respondent was asked about the situation in his native hamlet causing the decision to move; responses were categorized and summed as shown in Figure 1. Lack of security from VC activity was the reason most frequently cited by the refugees, and VC taxes, conscription and imprisonment was the second most frequently cited reason.


Reasons given for movement may be grouped into categories of causal agent, as follows:

<u>Causal Agent</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
Viet-Cong	1. No security (VC activity) 5. VC taxes, conscription, imprisonment
GVN/U.S.	2. Bombing/artillery 3. GVN/U.S. war operations
Other (reasons could not be attributed to either the GVN/U.S. or the Viet-Cong)	4. House destroyed 6. Fear of stray bullets/general fear of death 7. No jobs, couldn't farm

Figure 2 shows the relative effect of causal agents resulting from this grouping: 62.5 percent of the reasons cited are caused by the Viet-Cong, 21.0 percent caused by either GVN or the U.S., and the remaining 16.5 percent could be caused by either party.


When the reasons for refugee movement are grouped by causal agents and time of movement, a slight increase in citations of conditions caused by GVN/U.S. war activities and a slight decrease in citations of conditions caused

Figure 1. Specific Reasons for Voluntary Refugee Movement  
(n = 101)\*



\*The seven respondents who were imposed or encouraged to move are not included. Respondents could cite more than one reason.

Figure 2. Percentage of Refugee Citations of VC, GVN/US, or Other Factors as Causes of Movement



\*Total Citations = 176

by the Viet-Cong are evident as the movement becomes more recent (Table 2). However, this trend is not statistically significant.

#### Decision to Move

When the refugees were asked how long the conditions causing them to decide to move existed before they actually moved, 47 percent replied that these conditions existed for only three months or less before they moved, and an additional 29 percent replied that the conditions existed from three months to a year. These figures would indicate that most of the refugees did not remain in their hamlets long after adverse conditions developed. Also, more than half (54 percent) of the respondents reported making their decisions to move only one week or less before moving.

When the respondents were asked which people remained in their native hamlets, no particular group or class of people was reported as staying behind.

#### Viet-Cong Attempts to Prohibit Movement

Table 3 shows that 38.9 percent of the respondents reported that the Viet-Cong did try to prohibit refugee movement away from their native areas. These same respondents indicated that the Viet-Cong wanted the people to stay to provide support to the NLF. None of the respondents indicated that the VC encouraged the movement.

#### Nature of Movement

##### Means of Transportation

The refugee movement to Khu N was almost completely intraprovincial with most of the refugees moving from insecure districts located around Quang-Tri City. Quang-Tri Province has few water routes, and most people move by road. The mode of transportation used by the refugees to move from their former hamlets to Khu N reflects this. Table 4 shows that 72.2 percent of the respondents walked and another 17.6 percent moved by bus. Only a few respondents utilized boats or other forms of transportation.

Table 2. Changes in Frequency of Citation of Quang Tri City

Time Period	VC		GVN/US		Other		Total	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	Citations	Respondents
Prior to 1 October 1965 (1-3)	23	67.7	5	14.7	6	17.6	34	21
October 1965-September 1966 (4-6)	36	65.5	11	20.0	8	14.5	55	32
October 1966-September 1967 (7-9)	50	58.8	21	24.7	14	16.5	85	44
Total	109	62.6	37	21.3	28	16.1	174	97

$\chi^2 = 1.746$   
 $df = 4$   
 Not significant

Table 3. Viet-Cong Attempts to Influence Movement

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Did nothing at all	63	58.3
Attempted to prohibit movement	42	38.9
Encouraged movement	0	0.0
Interviewer did not know	3	2.8
Total	108	100.0

Table 4. Means of Transportation

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees Citing</u>
Walking	78	72.2
Lambretta/horse cart	5	4.6
GVN/Allied truck	1	0.9
Aircraft	0	0.0
Boat	3	2.8
Bus	19	17.6
Other	2	1.9
Total	108	100.0

### Concurrent Departure

Most of the refugees moved in relatively small groups. Figure 3 shows that 72.3 percent of the respondents reported that they moved alone, with members of their household, with relatives, or with five or less other family groups. Only 9.3 percent reported that their entire hamlet moved with them.

### Retention of Possessions

It was stated earlier that about one-half of the refugees walked from their native hamlets to Khu N. Consequently, most of the evacuees could not bring along all of their possessions. Table 5 shows that 26.9 percent of the respondents retained no possessions. Furthermore, of those who did retain their possessions, only one respondent (1.3 percent) retained all his possessions while the majority could only bring easily transported items such as money and extra clothing.

### Resettlement Site Selection

It was noted earlier that Quang-Tri Government refugee camps were already overcrowded and that the refugees in Khu N had to settle elsewhere. Figure 4 shows that 49.1 percent of the respondents settled in Khu N because land was available for a home site and 33.3 percent chose Khu N because they had friends and relatives already there. Only two respondents (1.9 percent) were directed to Khu N by the government.

One-half of the respondents moved directly from their native hamlets to Khu N and another 45 percent stopped at one other location. Only five respondents (5 percent) moved to two or more locations before arriving at Khu N, indicating that this area is one to which refugees come to resettle, probably due to its proximity to Quang-Tri City.

Figure 3. Other Persons Moving with Interviewee







Table 5. Retention of Possessions

	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Refu- gee Population</u>
Retained no possessions	29	26.9
Retained possessions	<u>79</u>	<u>73.1</u>
	108	100.0

Kind of Possession	Number of Citations	Percent of Respondents
All possessions	1	1.3
Money	49	62.0
Paddy	12	15.2
Extra clothing	64	81.0
Kitchen and household utensils	27	34.2
Livestock and/or trade tools	9	11.4
Vehicle	14	17.7
Furniture	19	24.0
Other	2	2.5

Figure 4. Refugee Reasons for Relocation at Present Site



## II. Refugee Relief and Resettlement

As stated earlier, Khu N is not a government refugee camp, and the refugees there are not readily registered and receive little or no assistance from the government. The Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) does have a procedure for registering non-camp refugees, but this is a long and difficult process involving the approval of the Khu chief, the hamlet chief, the village chief, and the district chief. As a result, few of these refugees receive any assistance from the SCR. However, other government agencies, such as the Social Welfare Service, sometimes assist these unregistered refugees.

### Security


When asked if the settlement area was secure, all of the 108 respondents replied that it was. This is due to the proximity of Khu N to Quang-Tri City where there are considerable GVN forces stationed.

### Aid Received by Refugees

Figure 5 shows a comparison between the refugees' premovement expectations of government assistance and the assistance actually received. While 73 of the 108 respondents (67.6 percent) expected temporary or permanent shelter and some commodity or monetary assistance, only 2.8 percent received this assistance and 56.5 percent received nothing. However, 42 respondents (38.9 percent) did receive some money and food reflecting that GVN did provide these refugees with some assistance.

Over 70 percent of the respondents had no idea of what to expect or expected nothing from friends or relatives. Their expectations proved correct as 67 percent stated that they received no assistance from friends or relatives. However, 32 respondents (29.7 percent) did receive some housing and money or food from their friends or relatives.

Figure 5. Refugee Expectations of Government Assistance  
Compared to Actual Government Assistance Received



When asked what their premovement expectations of assistance from the native inhabitants of Khu N were, 81.5 percent of the respondents stated that they expected nothing or had no idea of what to expect. However, 27 percent of the respondents did receive assistance in the form of temporary shelter and some food and money from the local people.

### Refugee Adaptation to Resettlement Life

#### Housing

Since most of the refugees were not provided any housing assistance from the government, they built their own houses on land rented from a local landowner at a rate of 100 to 300 piastres per year per house site. As a result, the refugees built houses of thatch and tin roofing--similar in quality to their premovement houses. However, the houses in Khu N are jammed together due to lack of space, and the refugees had lost much of their furniture during the movement, hence, when the refugees were asked to compare their former and present house comfort, 89 percent stated that their present house was less comfortable (Figure 6).

#### Land Tenure

In their premovement native hamlets, 43 of the respondents owned land, 31 were renters only while the roughly one third remaining had no access to land as owners or renters (see Table 6). In the refugee settlement site, none of the respondents owned or rented any land other than house sites, since there was in fact no available farmland in or near the area, all such lands having been already used by native residents or divided into small plots for rental to the refugees as house sites.

#### Employment

In light of the information above, it is not surprising that the segment of the refugee work force that were previously farmers no longer till land for a living. Figure 7 shows a comparison of premovement and postmovement occupations.

Figure 6. Comparison of Present versus Former House





Table 6. Premovement Land Tenure

Mau Owned	Mau Rented					Totals
	None	0-1.9	2-3.9	4-5.9	6+	
6 and over	1	0	0	0	0	1
4-5.9	3	0	0	0	0	3
2-3.9	3	3	2	0	0	8
0-1.9	16	9	6	0	0	31
None	34	23	7	1	0	65
Totals	57	35	15	1	0	108

Owned but did not rent : 23  
 Owned and rented : 20  
 Rented but did not own : 31  
 Neither owned nor rented: 34  
 108

Figure 7. Changes in Refugee Occupation Since Movement  
(n = 291)\*



\* Work force consists of the total number of people who are 15 and older. Students are omitted. The respondent answered for entire family.

\*\* (Police, RF, PF, ARVN or CIDG)

Some of these individuals turned from farming to other occupations, such as working as vendors, serving in the Police, RF, PF or ARVN, or working as laborers. However, most of these ex-farmers are unemployed as are housewives in Khu N. Housewives are considered unemployed, because in Viet-Nam women are an important part of the work force. Unemployment increased from 1.8 to 13.7 percent of the work force, while the number of housewives increased from 8.8 to 32.8 percent of the work force.

The refugees confirm the poor employment situation. When asked to compare their former and present employment situations, 79.6 percent of the respondents replied that their present situation is worse (Figure 8).

#### Ownership of Capital Goods

It was stated earlier that the refugees lost many of the possessions during the movement. Table 7 shows that the refugees have been unable to gain back the number of possessions they had before moving. This is partly due to the fact that possessions needed while they were farmers are no longer needed in Khu N. However, this is also a result of poor employment conditions--i.e., the refugees have no means to gain back their possessions. The considerable gain in the "Other" category probably reflects the fact that refugees lacking major possessions felt compelled to list such items as furniture and clothing. Since more refugees lacked major possessions in the postmovement situation, more mentioned small common possessions which were coded as "Other."

#### Community Facilities

Khu N is an appendage to Quang-Tri City, and thus has no need for community facilities of its own. Shopping is done in the nearby village or city markets, and sick people receive care at the nearby provincial hospital. If possible, refugee children attend the three-room hamlet primary school located right in the Khu, and the religious attend ceremonies and services in the local pagodas and churches. There is no need for a farmers' association, since there is no land available for farming. Khu N itself is only a refugee housing section



Figure 8. Comparison of Present versus  
Former Employment Situation




Table 7. Comparison of Possessions Owned:  
Premovement versus Postmovement

	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Horses, cows, and water buffalo	36	33.3	0	0.0
Pigs	96	88.9	16	14.8
Poultry	97	89.8	25	23.1
Fish ponds	2	1.9	0	0.0
Trade tools	74	68.5	16	14.6
Vending stock	30	27.8	7	6.5
Motorized vehicle	46	42.6	37	34.3
Nonmotorized vehicle	46	42.6	37	34.3
Other	25	23.1	85	78.7

with no public facilities, but the Quang-Tri City community facilities available to the refugees will be discussed here.

Table 8 indicates the community facilities available in the refugees' native hamlets as compared to the facilities available in Quang-Tri City. All community facilities previously available to all or some of the refugees are available in Quang-Tri City.

#### Educational Facilities

Schools in Quang-Tri City are quite superior to those in the refugees' native hamlets. Table 9 shows a comparison between premovement and post-movement school attendance. After moving, the number of respondents with school-age children not in school increased by 15.2 percentage points. When asked why some or all of their children were not in school, the respondents replied that the children had to work or guard possessions or that they could not afford tuition and books--for both the premovement and postmovement situations. Thus, it is apparent that the drop in school attendance by refugee children is due primarily to increased poverty and not due to unavailability of schools.

#### Health Care

There is no health center or dispensary, but the refugees were able to use the dispensary in the nearest Quang-Tri City hospital when they needed medical attention. Indeed, 79 percent of the respondents stated that their family members went to this dispensary when they were ill. However, 93 percent of the respondents reported using the health services available in their native hamlets. The reasons refugees do not utilize the hospital as much as their probably inferior premovement dispensaries are unclear. Perhaps some of the respondents did not know about the availability of treatment at the Quang-Tri hospital, or perhaps some respondents were reluctant to receive medical treatment from strangers in the large hospital.

Table 8. Availability of Premovement and  
Postmovement Community Facilities

<u>Premovement Community Facilities</u>			<u>Facility Present at Resettlement Site</u>
<u>Community Facility</u>	<u>Number of Citations</u>	<u>Percent of Refugees Citing</u>	
School	107	99.9	Yes
Health Service	104	96.3	Yes
Information Service	108	100.0	Yes
Entertainment	88	81.5	Yes
Cooperative	70	64.8	Yes
Market	75	69.4	Yes
Electricity	0	0.0	No
Public Well	52	48.1	Yes
Public Transport	27	25.0	Yes

Table 9. School Attendance by Refugee  
Children of School Age

	<u>Refugee Households</u>			
	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Children not attending school	17	21.8	30	37.0
Some Children attending school	23	29.5	24	29.6
All children attending school	33	48.7	27	33.3
Totals	78*	100.0	81*	99.9

\*The total number of respondents with school-age children and the n value for this column.

### Other Community Facilities

Both Farmers and Consumers Cooperatives functioned in Quang-Tri City, but none of the respondents participated in them, probably because they were no longer farmers. Only nine respondents indicated any awareness of cooperatives in Quang-Tri City.

All of the respondents reported having an Information Service in their native hamlets, and one is available in Quang-Tri City. This Service disseminates information through various communications channels which are discussed later; and it also provides movies, broadcasts classical radio programs over loudspeakers, and sponsors musical and drama groups.

Both of these facilities in Quang-Tri City are no doubt superior to those in the refugees' native hamlets, because Quang-Tri is the urban center for the province.


### Overall Comparison

When asked to compare present and former community facilities 65.4 percent of the respondents replied that their postmovement community facilities were better and 9.3 percent said that they were about the same (Figure 9). Only 25.2 percent of the respondents felt that their former community facilities were better.

### Exposure to Government Information

Exposure to communications media is a measure of the refugees' exposure to government information and to the world outside of his area. In Viet-Nam, the most common communications media are the radio, loudspeakers, and newspapers or magazines. The radio stations are operated by the GVN, the Viet-Cong, and the North Vietnamese. Loudspeakers are utilized by the government Information Service to broadcast news, music, and radio programs. Newspapers and magazines are printed and distributed both by private publishers and the GVN.

Figure 9. Comparison of Present and  
Past Community Facilities  
(n = 107)



The comparison between the refugees' premovement and postmovement exposure to these media given in Table 10 shows that the number of refugees exposed to loudspeakers and newspapers/magazines decreased after moving, while their exposure to radio remained the same. The decreased exposure to loudspeakers and printed material indicates the failure of the GVN to utilize these media in Khu N.

### Leadership

Refugees moving into Khu N have moved in small groups or in individual family units, resulting in the loss of traditional hamlet cohesiveness. Nevertheless, the Khu has elected a Khu chief who assists with the renting of house sites, registers the refugee families with the village government, and represents GVN, showing that some community organization does exist.

When asked whom they consult when they have problems, 88.9 percent of the refugees stated that they consulted the Khu chief or the hamlet chief (Table 11). These results show that these elected chiefs are the most influential leaders in the Khu.

### Travel

When asked about their travels, 21 of the 108 respondents (19.4 percent) indicated that they did not travel at all. The frequency and purpose of trips made by the remaining 87 respondents are shown in Table 12. Most trips were made to the market, probably trips made by women into neighboring Quang-Tri City. 32.2 percent of the respondents mentioned trips required by their businesses. Perhaps these trips were made to buy items to sell in the settlement site or to buy supplies for a trade. These trips were probably made into Quang-Tri City or perhaps to Hue.

Table 10. Communications Media Reaching Refugees

	<u>Premovement</u>		<u>Postmovement</u>	
	<u>Medium Cited</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>	<u>Medium Cited</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondents Citing</u>
Radio	83	76.9	82	75.9
Loudspeakers	103	95.4	68	63.0
Newspaper/magazine	34	31.5	26	24.1
No Access	1	0.9	6	5.6

Table 11. Persons Likely to be Consulted by Refugees

<u>Choice</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Khu or Hamlet Chief	96	88.9
Village Chief	2	1.9
Religious Leader	2	1.9
Elder	3	2.8
Other	5	4.6

Table 12. Frequency of Refugees Consulting Persons

			<u>Frequency of Consulting</u>				
			<u>Once</u>	<u>Twice</u>	<u>Three or More</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Market			6	32	16	54	2.1
Business Requirements	1		2	12	13	28	32.2
Visit Friends or Relatives	1			1	1	3	3.4
Attend Religious Ceremonies				1		1	1.1
Other					1	1	1.1
Total	1	1	8	46	31	87	99.9
Percent	1.1	1.1	9.2	52.9	35.6	99.9	

### Participation in Community Ceremonies

Table 13 shows that 32.4 percent of the respondents do not participate in community ceremonies. The remainder of the refugees attend religious ceremonies, weddings, funerals, and death ceremonies.<sup>2</sup>

Table 13. Refugees Participation in Ceremonies<sup>\*</sup>

<u>Ceremony</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents Citing</u>
None	35	32.4
Buddhist	30	27.8
Catholic/Protestant	35	32.4
Wedding	16	14.8
Funeral	7	6.5
Death Ceremony	2	1.9
Other	1	0.9

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents could cite more than one ceremony.

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<sup>2</sup> A death ceremony is a celebration of the anniversary of the death of a relative which is usually attended by family members and their friends.



### III. Characteristics of Refugee Population

#### Demographic Characteristics

##### Age and Sex Distribution

The 108 families in the study sample are composed of a total of 588 individuals--273 males and 315 females. Figure 10 represents in standard pyramid form data on the age and sex distribution of the refugee population.

The underrepresentation of males between the ages of 15-34 is particularly significant. The sex ratio<sup>3</sup> for this age group is 42 compared to the sex ratio of 87 for the whole population and the sex ratio of 99 for the 0-14 age group. In the context of Viet-Nam this is not surprising and is undoubtedly due to military recruitment and conscription, both by GVN and the Viet-Cong.

Respondents reported that 29 men in the 15-34 age group were away serving in the GVN military forces. When these men are added to the refugee population, the sex ratio is raised to 96 for the 15-34 age group; a ratio that is higher than the ratio of the entire population and only slightly lower than the one for the 0-14 age group. Thereby, it can be assumed that the refugees have few family members serving with the Viet-Cong.

##### Productive Capability


Some 88 percent of the refugees over 15 years of age are reported to be capable of performing normal physical labor (i. e., free of major physical defects). Expectedly, the ratio of disabled to able-bodied persons increases with age with only 63 percent of persons 50 and older reported as being able-bodied.

Assuming that only persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are "producers"--that is, capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs--and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive

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<sup>3</sup> A sex ratio is the number of males per 100 females.

Figure 10. Population Pyramid



capability ratios of various populations. The Khu N refugee population has 340 producers per 1,000 people--which means that each refugee producer must support himself plus three other people. While no accurate comparative data for a nonrefugee population in Quang-Tri Province is available, a village in Long-An Province had, in 1958 (i.e., in the pre-insurgency period), 435 producers per 1,000 people.<sup>4</sup>

In summary, this refugee population has a considerably greater number of nonproductive individuals than is the norm for rural Vietnamese society.

#### Impact of Movement on Family Size

Apparently the refugee movement had little effect on family size. Respondents reported a total of ten family members who were separated during and after they moved. Three of these individuals went into the military and two found employment somewhere. The remaining five were missing for unknown reasons.

#### Literacy

Each respondent was given a card on which were four printed statements. The interviewer then asked the respondent questions concerning the content of these statements. If the respondent could read and understand three or four of the statements, he was considered functionally literate. If the respondent could read only one or two of the statements, he was considered functionally illiterate.

Using this test 73.0 percent of the males and 33.8 percent of the females interviewed were functionally literate, and 47.2 percent of both the males and females were literate. In comparison, when this test was administered to primary school children in a government school in Binh Duong Province, all of the children in the 2nd Form (4th grade in American schools) or above could read and understand all four statements.

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<sup>4</sup>Gerald Hickey, Village in Viet-Nam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51.

## Refugee Attitudes

To examine the refugees' attitudes HSR utilized the Cantril scale, explained in detail in Part I, Chapter IV, and other questions including the refugees' comparisons of their former and present life situations, their future aspirations and their expectations of future government assistance.

### Cantril Scale Ratings

The respondents were asked to define their best and worst life situation and these are shown as the refugees' hopes and fears for the future in Table 14. The most frequently cited hopes were peace, happiness, and job security. Food, clothes, housing and money were the next most frequently cited hopes. The most frequently cited fears were those caused by poverty--no food or clothing, misery, and no education for their children. Surprisingly, war activities was only the fourth most frequently cited fear. These results are similar to those found in other evacuee and refugee sites studied by HSR.

Each respondent was shown a ladder with 10 rungs. The 10th rung represented their highest level of life (i.e., their hopes materialize) and the first rung represented their lowest possible level of life (i.e., their fears materialize). The respondents were asked to indicate on which rung their life was five years ago, their present life level, and the level they anticipate five years hence. Expectedly, the mean ratings for this question, shown in Figure 11, show that the refugees consider their present level of life to be much lower than their life level five years ago--results similar to those of other refugee and evacuee sites studied by HSR.


These refugees are similar to other refugees and evacuee groups studied in another way; that is, they are reluctant to speculate about their future level of life. As the figure shows, while the mean past and present ratings are based on responses from 103 and 102 refugees, the future ratings are based on responses from only 43 individuals. There appears to be a rather common characteristic

Table 14. Hopes and Fears for the Future  
Reported by Quang-Tri City Refugees

Hopes	Number of Refugees Citing each Category	Percent of Refugees Citing each Category*
Peace, happiness, job security	66	61.1
Food, clothes, housing	39	36.1
Money	32	29.6
Education for children	18	16.7
Land	7	6.5
Other	10	9.3
Fears		
No food or clothes	54	50.0
Sickness, no medicine	44	40.7
Misery, no education for children	40	37.0
War, airstrikes, bombs, VC activities	33	30.6
Possible death	15	13.9
Other	7	6.5

\* Each refugee was allowed to name as many hopes or as many fears as he desired. Of these, only the first two mentioned are represented in this table. Since multiple citations were commonplace, the number of responses exceeds the number of refugees interviewed, and if summed, the percentages will exceed 100%.

Figure 11. Mean Scale Ratings for Past,  
Present, and Future for Quang-Tri City Refugees



among the Vietnamese people to be oriented towards the past and present, with little speculation about the future being manifested.<sup>5</sup>

#### Comparisons of Former and Present Life Situations

When the refugees were asked to compare their former and present life situations, 59.3 percent of the respondents replied that their former life was better (Figure 12), and 7.4 percent replied that their former and present life were about the same. Surprisingly, 33.4 percent felt that their present life was better than their premovement one; a higher proportion than found in most other refugee sites studied by HSR.

Refugees were also asked who they felt has a better life, the people who moved or the people who stayed behind. 83.3 percent of the respondents felt that the people who moved had a better life (Table 15); results conflicting with their comparisons of their own former and present life situations. When asked why the people who moved had a better life, all but two respondents stated more security, more freedom, and no war activities. Apparently when the refugees were comparing their own life situations, they were comparing their overall life; but when asked about who had the better life--the people who moved or the people who stayed--they were thinking mostly about the war and the security situation.

#### Future Aspirations

Each respondent was asked what two wishes he would make if he knew that these two wishes would come true. The most frequently cited wish was peace (Table 16); a result that was not unexpected considering the war situation. Other frequently cited wishes were wealth, happiness, easy life, and good health.

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<sup>5</sup> Martin Sternin, Robert J. Teare, and Peter G. Nordlie, A Study of Values, Communication Patterns, and Demography of Rural South Vietnamese (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., HSR-RR-68/2-Vs, February 1968).

Figure 12. Overall Comparison of Present  
with Former Life Situation




Table 15. Comparison of Present Life With  
That of Persons Who Didn't Move

Why	Who has better life now					Percent
	Not Applicable	Don't Know	People Who Moved	People Who Stayed	Total	
Not applicable	8	1	1	0	10	9.3
Don't know	1	0	0	0	1	0.9
More security at new location	0	0	21	0	21	19.4
More money, job, new location	0	0	1	0	1	0.9
More freedom at new location	0	0	18	0	18	16.7
No war activities at new location	0	0	49	0	49	45.4
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Better life, old location	0	0	0	5	5	4.6
Better farms, old location	0	0	0	3	3	2.8
Total	9	1	90	8	108	100.0
Percent	8.3	0.9	83.3	7.4	100.0	



Table 16. Wishes Expressed by Displaced Persons

<u>Wish</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent Citing</u>
Wealth	27	25.0
Peace	36	33.3
Happiness, easy life	17	15.7
House, clothes, land	9	8.3
Food	8	7.4
Education	9	8.3
Health	22	20.4
Other	13	12.0

The respondents were asked where they would go if the war continued, if peace came and their present life situation improved, and if peace came and their life situation did not improve. Table 17 shows 54.6 percent of the respondents would stay at Khu N and 11.1 percent would rely on GVN if the war continues. No one indicated a desire to return home if the war continues. If peace comes, 69.4 percent of the respondents would return home regardless of whether their life situation improved or not, and 79.6 percent would return home if there is no improvement of their life situation. Clearly, the refugees prefer to return home if the war ends, but they will choose to live as refugees as long as the war continues.


#### Expectations of Future Government Aid

Only two respondents did not expect future government assistance. Figure 18 shows that 65.8 percent expect some money and food, 47.5 percent expect some employment assistance, and 40 percent expect a land site for a farm. This indicates that the refugees expect and desire more assistance--especially employment assistance. These results are not surprising in light of the difficult employment conditions and poverty conditions in Khu N.

Table 17. Future Plans

Aspirations	If War Continues		If Peace Comes and Life Improves		If Peace Comes No Improvement	
	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent
Don't know	6	5.6	1	0.9	2	1.8
Stay here	59	54.6	22	20.4	10	9.3
Return home	0	0.0	75	69.4	86	79.6
Rely on GVN	12	11.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	31	28.7	10	9.3	10	9.3
Total	108	100.0	108	100.0	108	100.0

Figure 18. Refugee Expectations of Future  
Government Assistance  
(n = 120)



#### IV. Conclusions

- These refugees were early movers--i.e., people who move within a year after their hamlets become insecure.

- Conditions caused by the Viet-Cong were the most frequently cited reasons for movement by the refugees. However, the refugees who moved most recently cited conditions caused by Allied war operations more frequently than did refugees who moved prior to October of 1965.

- About 39 percent of the respondents reported that the Viet-Cong tried to prohibit refugee movement. None reported VC encouragement.

- Most of the refugees lost some or all of their possessions while moving; possessions that they have not been able to gain back.

- Refugees moved to Khu N primarily because they could not find room in the government camps and that land was available for a house site in Khu N.

- The refugee population has a shortage of males in the 15-34 age group primarily due to war conditions. The number of productive individuals in the refugee population is quite low indicating that the population will have difficulty becoming self sufficient.

- Because Khu N is not a government refugee camp, these refugees have received little or no assistance.

- No land is available to the refugees on which to farm, and the employment situation is not adequate to provide enough employment for them.

- The Quang-Tru community facilities are an improvement over the refugees' former community facilities.

- The refugees look to the Khu chief and the hamlet chief for leadership.

- Refugees' exposure to communications media and thereby to government information has decreased slightly from their former exposure.

● In terms of security, refugees feel that the people who moved are better off than the people who stayed. However, they feel that their overall former life situation was better than their former one, and that their present level of life is considerably lower than their level five years before. Consequently, most refugees want to return to their former hamlets if and when peace come to Vietnam.

● Most of the refugees want their sons to have a good education and become professional men. Only a few refugees want their sons to be farmers.

● Peace was the refugees most frequently cited wish.